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Abstract  
The debate over the female headscarf has become an arena of fervent discussion in the 
West as well as in Muslim majority societies and it is often framed through the lens of a 
‘clash of civilizations’ between western/‘secular’ and ‘religious’/traditional values. This 
thesis attempts to contribute critically to the recent debate and ‘obsession’ over the 
legal regulation of the hijab shared by westerns and Islamists. Trough anthropological, 
semiotic, political and legal theories, it proposes to give a different reading of the legal 
decisions over the practice of veiling in order to unwrap the way in which the tension 
between ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ is understood as an absolute polarization.  
A closer analysis of recent western legal decisions over women’s veiling reveals a 
disturbing symmetry with a positivized modern view of Sharia law by Islamists as 
binding women’s bodies to a fixed, transparent and singular ‘universal’ identity that is, I 
claim, analogous to a universal-ist subjectivity of Human Rights law. Thus, the veil 
emerges as the metaphor of a clash between two imperialist universalist modern 
discourses: the secular discourse of a westernised world that is re-humanised through 
Human Rights and the reactive Islamist discourse. Both aim at creating a fixed and 
monolithic subject of law through the control of the visible (veiling/unveiling) in the 
public sphere. The claim of an incompatible dichotomy between liberal/secular and 
‘Islamic’ religious values obscures this symmetry. 
Moreover, I argue that this polarization is the result of a specifically Occidental 
(Christian/secular) semiotic understanding of religion and religious practices which is 
nowadays embedded in western law, but also in Islamist discourse. This dichotomy 
becomes a useful tool to sustain the fiction of a monolithic subject and to operate a re-
configuration of religious sentiments and practices in the public sphere to benefit state 
sovereignty. This re-conceptualization emerges as a necessary sovereign act to preserve 
the unity and homogeneity of a people. 
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Introduction 
 
My research began to take shape while I was involved with women’s activism in the 
Middle East at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It was a period of political 
turmoil: the 9/11 attacks, the 7/7 bomb in London, the Palestinian uprising and western 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have deeply changed East/West relations. Increasingly 
those changing relations have been played out around the image of women. In Iraq and 
Afghanistan, western wars have been justified as a struggle in the name of democratic 
principles and women’s freedom: for years, western mass media have repeatedly 
broadcast images, documentaries and news of oppressed women under the shroud of a 
burqa. But women’s body has also become prominent in discourses around the ways 
European societies deal with integration, multiculturalism and the place of religion in 
western, liberal, secular space. Veiled Muslim women in Europe started to be perceived 
as a threat to European values and a challenge to the western concept of women’s 
freedom, to the point that many European countries felt the need to legislate over the 
wearing of the headscarf: as a result, the veil has been banned -from educational 
institutions, work places and public offices- in the name of secular values and gender 
equality. In 2004, France enacted a law to ban the headscarf from public schools, and in 
2010 the French government banned the burqa from the public sphere. Belgium and 
Switzerland passed similar laws forbidding the wearing of the veil in schools and public 
offices, and the concealment of the face in public spaces.1 At the same time, in 
Germany, eight Landers forbade the use of the veil in public institutions, while allowing 
the display of Christian symbols. Although in many other European countries there is no 
specific law banning the female headscarf, veiled Muslim women have felt their 
possibility of agency to be limited in the work place, in educational institutions, and 
even in courtrooms. 
The female veil is not only an obsession for westerners: some Muslim countries have 
banned or rendered the veil compulsory. In Turkey, for instance, the veil was banned 
from public offices and educational institutions until 2013; in Iran the veil was made 
compulsory after the 1979 Iranian revolution. In Saudi Arabia women are obliged to 
                                                             
1  ‘Burka Ban for Muslims Enforced in Switzerland with Fines of as Much as £8,000’ (The 
Telegraph, 2016) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/07/burka-ban-for-muslims-
enforced-in-switzerland-with-fines-of-up-t/> accessed 22 October 2016. 
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wear the veil and in certain parts of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban, the burqa has 
been rendered compulsory. This reveals that the power of the veil lies exactly in the 
symbology conferred on one item of female clothing: for some, the veil is a symbol of a 
backward tradition, while for others it is a symbol of modesty and Islamic values. 
It is well known that ever since antiquity, the female body, with more or less clothing, 
has been a useful tool for establishing a specific gendered social order and, as part of 
the process of nation building, creating and representing the borders of an ‘imagined 
community’.2 But the ‘modern’ obsession over women’s attire seems to signify 
something different, intertwined with a new reality which has deeply changed the 
relation between East and West. 
The re-presentation of a fixed image of veiled Muslim women has always struck me as it 
has contrasted with my experience in the field, where I have seen a plurality of 
subjectivities and women’s normative choices that escapes the singularity attached to 
their performative acts (such as wearing a veil). It is exactly the inexplicable obsession 
over Muslim women’s garments, along with my experience in the field with Arab and 
Muslim women, that encouraged me to write about the female headscarf: I started to 
think that there was something more than a defence of specific societal values behind 
the obsession over the veil. The discrepancy between the reality that I was living and 
the one that was presented made me think that, rather than being a crusade to help 
Muslim women or to advance specific societal values, the discourse around the veil 
focuses on Muslim women’s performativity in a particular way: as a fixed singular 
image, a construction that hides profound dis-similarities and unveils something about 
the East as well as about the West. What, then, does the discourse around the veil 
disclose?  
This research attempts to give an answer to this question and to contribute to the 
recent debate over the legal regulation of the Muslim headscarf. As veiling emerges as 
an extremely multifaceted practice, I have developed my argument by using different 
approaches. Through an anthropological investigation of the plurality of uses and 
meanings of veiling, and a comparative political and legal study of sovereignty formation 
in the ‘West’ as well as in Muslim majority societies before and after westernization, the 
research aims to show that both western and Islamist modern legal thinking fail to 
                                                             
2 Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender & Nation, (vol 24, Cambridge Univ Press, 1997).  
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understand and respect the plurality of performativity and normative choices expressed 
in the different uses of the veil. These two dis-similar legal and political systems aim at 
creating a singular and monolithic subject of secular and religious law through the 
control and juridical regulation of images and symbols in the public sphere. By attaching 
to the practice of veiling a fixed and unchangeable meaning, the sovereign state aim to 
define not only subjectivity, but also the ‘proper’ place of religion and religious 
sentiments/practices in public space. This re-conceptualization of religious practice 
emerges as a necessary act to maintain the unity and homogeneity of an ‘imagined 
community’. In this regard modern Islamist ‘mirror’ the occidental in ways that medieval 
Muslims never did, I further show. 
The first Chapter focuses on the analysis of veiling through different approaches: 
normative, cultural, praxiological and anthropological. The normative approach focuses 
on legal practices in a specific social/historical context, by adding a normative dimension 
to the analysis of the discourse: it is based on the investigation of existing juridical 
procedures, various legal interpretations, and subsequent lines of action; in essence, it 
analyses the “set of guidelines that state how things ought to be done” based on a 
normative theory that is “theoretically derived through a process of logical thinking”.3 
As norms outline human behaviour and influence the recognition of a normative order 
within a society, the Chapter will include an analysis of the main legal Islamic texts in 
relation to the women’s headscarf: as I shall argue, veiling is not compulsory in Islam; 
rather, it is a variant result of the historical accommodation of Islam in different 
cultures. For this reason, it is also essential to analyse the phenomenon using a cultural 
and anthropological approach. The first approach is based on the idea that culture, such 
as social customs, beliefs and language, frames the popular identity, way of life, and 
understanding of reality.4 The second focuses on the study of human beings in relation 
to fluid socio-cultural and historical contexts. But the headscarf should also be 
understood through a praxiological approach which focuses on “how people, in their 
many settings, orient themselves to something they call ‘Islamic law’ and how they refer 
personal-status questions to the Islamic law model […]. [This] suggest[s] [the need to] 
                                                             
3 Edmund Heery and Mike Noon, A Dictionary of Human Resource Management (1st ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 238-9. 
4 Culture, however, is not a fixed “set of permanent pre-existing assumptions but something that 
is permanently produced, reproduced, negotiated and oriented to by members of various social 
settings”. Baudouin Dupret, ‘What Is Islamic Law? A Praxiological Answer and an Egyptian Case 
Study’ (2007) 24 Theory, Culture & Society 79, 79–80. 
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focus on the methods people use locally to produce the truth and intelligibility that 
allow them to cooperate and interact in a more or less ordered way”.5 In essence, there 
is a difference between classical Islamic doctrine (from the 6th to the 12th century) and 
how law is administrated on a daily basis by local courts which use different methods of 
interpretation and different books of Shari’a law in deciding over a single case.6 The first 
Chapter, then, aims at framing the headscarf within different and ever-changing 
cultural, normative, social and historical contexts. 
My analysis attests not only that the donning of the veil is not compulsory in Islam 
(since, on this matter, Islamic legal sources are variably interpretable because Muslim 
scholars have not reached consensus), but also that veiling is an immanent, ever-
changing, practice which acquires different meanings based on the wearer’s personal 
intentions within pluralist non-liberal discursive traditions. Although my 
anthropological, legal and cultural survey of the uses of the female veil reveals a 
multiplicity of meanings and interpretations, I note how it is since the formation of 
nation-states and nationalist movements that the veil started to acquire a specific 
meaning and to be legally regulated by the state. But while, in western history, clothing 
(including the female veil) has always been regulated by a supreme authority (be it the 
church or the state),7 in Muslim-majority societies, such top-down regulation of clothing 
did not start until the nineteenth century, with the birth of western-style nation-states. 
In fact, as historically the construction of nationhood passed through the definition of 
‘womanhood’ and ‘manhood’, women’s body became the biological, cultural and 
symbolic reproducer of the new nations and/or nationalist movements. Clothing, then, 
and the veil in particular, has been constructed through its symbolic meaning as image, 
metaphor, of a specific order of things:8 like every image, clothing has the potential to 
include and exclude and to delineate gendered territorial borders of an ‘imagined 
community’9 as it expresses uniformity, hierarchy and regularity.10 In this context, the 
                                                             
5 ibid, 82. 
6 Noel J Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Pbk ed, University Press, 1978); See also Dupret (n 4).  
7 Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passions : A History of Sumptuary Law (Macmillan 
Press, 1996).  
8 Peter Goodrich, ‘Visive Powers: Colours, Trees and Genres of Jurisdiction’ (2008) 2 Law and 
Humanities 213; See also Peter Goodrich, ‘Signs Taken for Wonders: Community, Identity, and A 
History of Sumptuary Law’ (1998) 23 Law & Social Inquiry 707.  
9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(Verso, 1991).  
10 Gary Watt, Dress, Law and Naked Truth: A Cultural Study of Fashion and Form (Bloomsbury 
Publishing Plc, 2013). 
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female dressed body emerged as the symbol of an imaginary static and monolithic 
national culture within specific territorial borders. More recently, it has also been a 
useful tool to create an (imaginary) ‘clash of civilizations’ between a ‘tolerant’ and 
‘secular’ ‘West’ and a ‘backward’ and ‘chauvinist’ ‘East’. It’s exactly the reading of 
women’s body as a symbol of an intrinsic ‘clash of civilizations’ that I will address in 
Chapter Two. 
Alluding to Diamantides’ approach,11 who sees the so called ‘clash of civilizations’ as the 
progeny of similarity rather than complete difference, my argument is that the 
passionate debate over the Hijab is a fake one; the veil emerges as a visible symbol, a 
mirror, of a clash between two legal-political systems, ‘similar and contingently dis-
similar’.12  My examination takes into consideration the medieval origins of the Islamic 
legal system in relation to the occidental canon legal system, along with Nancy’s theory 
of the ‘monotheist model of social organization’.13 This framework allows the 
comparative analysis of two legal systems of religious origins. While the comparison 
reveals that in both cases the power to make law acts as a substitute for God’s supreme 
power, only in the Occident was this fully articulated with the development of the 
triumphant doctrine of sovereignty. The difference concerns mostly the ‘deficient 
sovereignty’, as Diamantides calls it in another context,14 and legal authority of pre-
modern Muslim government and how this was ‘corrected’ by colonialism and, ironically, 
by Islamist nationalists. The result of this analysis is that, on the one hand, the Occident 
conceives of a universal, abstract, identity valid for everyone which is historically tied to 
Christianity and that was exported to Muslim-majority societies during the colonial 
period, while on the other, Islamists respond by trying to change the content but 
maintain -unknowingly- the same Christian/liberal/secular form of one universal law, 
imposed by the appropriate authority. In this connection, the current obsession with the 
                                                             
11 Marinos Diamantides, ‘Toward a Western-Islamic Conception of Legalism’, in Peter Goodrich, 
Lior Barshack and Anton Schutz (eds) Law, Text, Terror: Essays for Pierre Legendre (Glass House 
Press, 2006); See also Marinos Diamantides, ‘Shari’a, Faith and Critical Legal Theory’’, in  Marinos 
Diamantides and Adam Geary (eds) Islam, Law and Identity (Routledge, 2012); Marinos 
Diamantides, ‘Constitutional Theory and Its Limits – Reflections on Comparative Political 
Theologies’ (2015) 11 Law, Culture and the Humanities 109. 
12 Diamantides, ‘Toward a Western-Islamic Conception of Legalism’ (n 11), 97. In his work, 
Diamantides uses also the term ‘structurally similar and contingently dissimilar’, or ‘di-similar’ 
legal and political systems. 
13 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Deconstruction of Monotheism’ (2003) 6 Postcolonial Studies: Culture, 
Politics, Economy 37. 
14 Diamantides, ‘Toward a Western-Islamic Conception of Legalism’ (n 11), 95.  
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Muslim veil, shared by western human rights activists and Islamists, as revealed in many 
polemical debates, acts to hide the anxiety produced by the imposition of one way of 
secularized monotheism over another. This anxiety derives from the condition of 
incompleteness between two dogmatic (desired) legal systems and their own internal 
shortcoming: this, in turn, developed on both parts a mechanism of defence and 
attachment to their respective laws. In this context, the veil emerges as a symbol of the 
contest between two versions of sovereignty, the European imperialist and the Islamist 
nationalist; in fact, both the compulsory veiling promoted by contemporary power-
hungry Islamist groups and the compulsory un-veiling proposed in many western and 
westernised countries are attempts to symbolically forge a common, fixed and 
monolithic (national) identity through the female national body. 
Chapter Three focuses on the analysis of the so called ‘hijab cases’ decided in various 
national European courts as well as at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). My 
analysis draws, inter alia, on Esmeir’s work on the emergence of ‘juridical humanity’.15 
Her analysis discloses how the imposition of modern positive law by British colonizers 
was a project of colonization which presupposed the inclusion of the human within the 
pale of (positive) law as an instrument of subjugation, able to eliminate the past in the 
name of an eternal present, and thereby to deliver humanity. As Esmeir argues, Human 
Rights law, a combination of positive and natural law, has replaced the legal positivism 
exported during the colonial period and took over its global power to deliver humanity 
through the inclusion of the individual within the pale of the law. Human Rights law 
protects a mask, a ‘human-yet-to-become’ that forever needs state law in order to be 
human. In this way law’s power allows a double movement: ‘de-humanizing’ and ‘re-
humanizing’.16 This is shown in the analysis of the ‘hijab cases’ where, in the name of 
women’s rights, Muslim women have been forced to shed the Muslim veil in order to be 
re-veiled with another mask, first worn by the Christian/secular citizen. In this context, 
the juridical regulation of the practice of veiling is the emblem of the intrinsic 
contradiction of liberalism and Human Rights discourse in general and of the particular 
violence this contradiction entails for non-western traditions of law. These decisions 
reveal the paradoxes of liberal thought, which on the one hand claims a separation 
between the spiritual and the temporal, while on the other it legally defines the private 
                                                             
15 Samera Esmeir, Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History (Stanford University Press, 2012), 3.  
16 Samera Esmeir, ‘On Making Dehumanization Possible’ (2006) Pmla- Publications of the Modern 
Language Association of America, 1544. 
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life of the individual. The result is the emergence of secular law’s subject who is (in the 
abstract) the holder of rights and the bearer of duties and, at the same time, free and 
compelled. Thus, the veil cases show that the twenty century project of universal 
emancipation, through the combination of legal positivism and human rights, in reality 
works to assimilate difference into a Christian/secular understanding of law and politics 
and to control and forge private sentiments in the public sphere; failing to be re-born in 
the image of modern law’s subject can literally results in the removal of the individual 
from the public sphere. As I show, the removal of many Muslim women from the public 
sphere has been made possible normatively through the distinction made by article 9 
(‘freedom of thought, conscience and religion’) of the ECHR between faith and its 
manifestation. This distinction allows states great discretion in deciding which symbols 
should be considered ‘religious’. Thus, what is at stake is the plurality of different 
normative choices represented in the many symbolic uses of the veil in contrast with 
the ‘mask’ of the abstractly equal legal subject. In this sense, what the analysis of the 
‘hijab cases’ reveals is that the forced unveiling of Muslim women works to veil them 
with the mask of the liberal individual. Ipso facto, the universality of liberal thought has 
precluded the possibility to imagine different forms of humanity, beyond the scope of 
the juridical humanity that the combination of positive and natural law enable.  
The last Chapter returns to European legal decisions over the practice of veiling and 
attempts to give a different reading of the obsession over the female headscarf: through 
an anthropological analysis of Islam and Islamic performative practices, coupled with a 
study of images in the secular public space, I challenge the legal reasoning which 
understands the Muslim veil as a symbol ‘incompatible with the principle of gender 
equality and with western democratic values’.17 My discussion is informed by 
Mahmood’s analysis of the concept of freedom and agency within non-liberal 
traditions,18 Goodrich’s study on clothing regulation19, Asad’s critique of the secular,20 
                                                             
17 Sahin v. Turkey, Application no. 44774/98, (ECHR, 2005), Dahlav V Switzerland, Application no. 
42393/98 (ECHR, 2001); S.A.S v. France Application no. 43835/11 (ECHR, 2014). 
18 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety : The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton 
University Press, 2005).  
19 Peter Goodrich, Oedipus Lex : Psychoanalysis, History, Law (University of California Press, 
1995); See also Goodrich, ‘Signs Taken for Wonders’ (n 8). 
20 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford University Press, 
2003). 
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and Mancini’s reading of European legal decisions over the practice of veiling.21 I point 
out that the definition of veiling as a ‘religious’ symbol not only reiterates previous 
attempts by nation-states to regulate women’s body through dress, but it is also a 
desperate way of bolstering waning sovereignty in both western and Islamist states. I 
challenge the western category of understanding of freedom and agency through the 
anthropological analysis of veiling in different pluralistic non-liberal contexts, and 
propose a different understanding of these concepts. Mahmood’s analysis of the ‘piety 
movement’ in Egypt serves to point out that it is possible to conceive an understanding 
of norms different from the liberal one, by assuming that different contexts produce 
different subjectivities. Her analysis reveals that the western/liberal concept of 
freedom, based on the mere formulation of choices as a measurement of freedom, is 
inadequate when studying non-liberal traditions, as the individual, her desires, and her 
choices are rendered possible only within specific discourses. By defining veiling as a 
symbol of Muslim women’s oppression, the European court’s decisions reveal the 
inadequacy of western universal(ist) discourse to understand women’s freedom and 
agency within non-liberal pluralistic contexts. The price of this inadequacy, however, is 
paid by women whose veiled bodies are re-inscribed as a ‘symbol’ of a chauvinist 
religion and not as subjects of changing culture and contingent history.  
Therefore, it is not through the analysis of women’s freedom, but through the 
symbology conferred on the practice of veiling that the gender dimension of the 
problem may be unfolded. By defining veiling as a ‘sign’, a fixed symbol of a monolithic 
non-modern culture unable to absorb ‘democratic’ values, European courts have 
applied a specific western semiotic understanding of signs and symbols and, by so 
doing, have ‘naturalized’ women’s desires as something ‘neutral’ to be defined by the 
state through an ‘exercise of a centralized sovereign power’: in fact, it is the sovereign 
that assumes the duty of defining which symbols are to be regarded as ‘religious’ and 
brings religious practice into the civil domain. This exercise of sovereignty has been 
rendered necessary in order to preserve the homogeneity of a people. Sadly, as Schmitt 
argued, even liberal, plural democracy is based on a presupposition of substantial 
‘homogeneity’ which is artificially constructed through a fundamental distinction 
                                                             
21 Susanna Mancini, ‘The Tempting of Europe, the Political Seduction of the Cross: A Schmittian 
Reading of Christianity and Islam in European Constitutionalism’ in Susanna Mancini and Michel 
Rosenfeld (eds) Constitutional Secularism in an Age of Religious Revival (Oxford University Press, 
2014). 
14 
 
between ‘self’ and ‘other’, and the consequent exclusion of the ‘other’ from the public 
sphere in order to maintain an artificial unity and homogeneity. As Mancini points out, 
this ‘imaginary’ enemy is today symbolized by veiled Muslim women. In fact, the 
fundamental dichotomy between a ‘tolerant’ Christian/secular thought, presented as a 
central value in western civilization, and a ‘un-democratic’ Islamic thought, presented as 
a threat to western democracy and human rights, deeply informs the legal reasoning 
over the ‘hijab cases’.22 This contraposition is instrumental in creating the fiction of a 
unified community in which Christianity and post-Christianity emerge as a useful tools 
to strengthen social cohesion and build a unified European identity in contrast with the 
‘stranger’, the ‘other’, the ‘uncivilized’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
22 Susanna Mancini, ‘Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power: Secularism and Religion as 
Guarantors of Cultural Convergence’ (2008) 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2629. 
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Chapter 1: Law, power and the Muslim female dressed body 
 
In 2009, during the so called ‘Iranian Green Revolution’, I travelled from Beirut to 
Tehran. At that time, the political situation was particularly tense and Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s government was quite suspicious of ‘western people’ entering the 
country. As I did not want to experience any problems, and I knew about the restrictive 
rules applied to women, including the compulsory practice of veiling, I decided to buy a 
traditional headscarf which would anyway reveal my hair. At my arrival in Tehran I was 
relieved to see that most of the women walking in the street were wearing a loose 
headscarf which reveals most of the hair and covers only the back of the head: as I was 
wearing a ‘more modest’/‘more covering’ hijab, I was sure that I would not have 
problems regarding my attire. Surprisingly, after few days, I discovered that I was 
wrong: men harassed me continually while I was walking in the city. I asked my Iranian 
friend why, unlike other women who wore a loose scarf revealing part of the head, I 
caused such reactions with my ‘all-covering’ hijab. Her answer was clear and 
straightforward: my hijab was definitely different from theirs. It was not a matter 
related to more or less ‘covering’ as ‘measurement’ of modesty, as implied by many 
Muslim scholars, but of form, shape and colour. One only needs to travel from one area 
to another to discover that different veiling practices within the Muslim world do not 
only depend on the interpretation of the Qur’an but also, more importantly, the 
meaning attributed to the practice is often related to particular geographical, historical, 
political, economic and cultural factors as well as to personal/psychological attitudes. 
This reveals that veiling, like every performative human practice, should be studied 
within its wider cultural, historical and political context. While recognizing the 
impossibility of grasping the many meanings and uses of the veil, this Chapter is an 
attempt to show the plurality of the practice of veiling. In doing that, I contend that the 
equation between veiling, modesty, shame and seclusion is a western ethnocentric 
point of view that denies the very plurality and differences of the practice within Arabo-
Islamic culture.23 
 
I will briefly introduce the practice of veiling in the Islamic religion to point out that 
although many people think that the veil is a phenomenon related to Islam, a more 
                                                             
23 Fadwa El Guindi, Veil : Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance (Berg, 1999) 83. 
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accurate analysis of the main Islamic texts, namely the Qur’an and the Hadith, reveals 
that veiling is not a compulsory practice in Islam in the way baptism is in Christianity. 
Rather, it is a pre-Islamic custom of many societies such as the Mesopotamian, Hellenic, 
Byzantine, Sassanian, Persian and Greek as well as in the Christian Middle East and 
Mediterranean regions.24 In fact, based on different studies, the practice of veiling was 
not in common use during Muhammad’s life, when only his wives and women of the 
elite used to veil.25 As I will argue, in the course of Islamic history, the veil has assumed 
different meanings and emerges as one of the most visible symbols of the 
accommodation of Islam with heterogeneous local cultures and traditions of the 
conquered population. In fact, as El-Guindi argues, 
“In ordinary life people integrate a multiplicity of dimensions. Devout Muslims live 
according to rhythmic patterns alternating between sacred and secular space and time 
in daily life and throughout the life cycle. Islamic texts, far from remaining frozen in 
Islamic scholars’ specialized teachings and writings, spread to ordinary folk through 
forums of collective worship and public media, and are transmitted through 
socialization and by oral tradition. They enter the cultural constructions that shape 
thinking and influence ordinary lives.”26 
In fact, as Asad points out, since Islam is a ‘discursive tradition’ based on the 
interpretation of the past for a reformulation of practices in the present, it should not 
be studied as a fixed or unchanged religion: veiling, like many other Islamic practices, is 
an ever-changing phenomenon which is lived and experienced differently by believers.27 
This multiplicity of understandings of Islam and Islamic practices has important 
implications for the construction of specific gender roles and implies a multiplicity of 
ways to practice and understand veiling. 
However, the practice is not only related to different ways to live and experience Islam: 
the veil, like many other articles of clothing, has been a useful tool to define and express 
not only class, gender, caste, marital status and kinship/community belonging, but also 
                                                             
24 Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam : Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (Yale 
University Press, 1992) 18–29. 
25 Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite : A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in 
Islam (Perseus, 1991); Theodore Gabriel and Rabiha Hannan (eds), Islam and the Veil: Theoretical 
and Regional Contexts (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).  
26 El Guindi (n 23) xv. 
27 Talal Asad, ‘The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam’ (2009) Qui Parle 1, 14–5. 
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political agency and national identity. In Tunisia, for instance, veiling can be a way to 
participate in community life, but it might also signify a specific community’s belonging 
as well as a rejection of western ‘corrupt’ values and cultural influence. 28 On the other 
hand, in Turkey or Iran, the veil (along with the ‘un-veil’) has assumed a political 
meaning and has been legally regulated, while in Syria, Egypt, Palestine and other 
countries of the near Middle East and North Africa the use of the veil has been strictly 
connected to geographical/socio/economic and political circumstances. The 
particularity and situationality of the practice of veiling is particularly clear when 
thinking about the different shapes, colours and uses of the headscarf: in India, women 
wear the sari or the burqa, in Iran they wear the chador, in east Africa women wear 
traditional fabric wrapped around their head, while in Morocco both women and men 
are accustomed to wearing a head-cover. 
Despite the wide plurality of meanings attributed to the practice of veiling visible in its 
colours, shapes and forms, many of the current debates have largely ignored the 
particularity and the differences of the practice within the Muslim world: consequently, 
the multi-meanings and variegated practice of veiling has been reduced to a politico-
religious ‘clash of civilizations’ without taking into consideration the complexity of 
gender identity formation. As a result, (Muslim) women emerge as a homogeneous 
entity with similar thoughts and behavioural paths: this approach, as I shall argue, not 
only denies the heterogeneity of Muslim women’s practices, but it also leads to the 
imaginary construction of a fixed, a-historical and monolithic ‘other’.29 It is out of the 
violence of western colonialism, imperialism and the newly created nation-state in 
Muslim majority societies, that the veil starts to assume a fixed ‘political’ meaning and 
becomes the symbol of national belonging: in fact, on the one hand, the veil was 
banned by British and French colonizers, while on the other, it was elevated by 
nationalist as well as by Islamist/nationalist movements as a symbol of anti-
imperialist/anti-western struggle. Interestingly, although in Arabic culture the headscarf 
is worn by men and women, within newly created nation-states only the (female) veil 
becomes the centre of an ‘ever-ending’ passionate debate and comes to be legally 
regulated. In fact, within nationalist thought, women’s body represents the nation’s 
                                                             
28 Mounira Charrad, ‘Cultural Diversity within Islam: Veils and Laws in Tunisia’, in Herbert L. 
Bodman, Nayyirah Tawhīdī, (eds) Women in Muslim societies : diversity within unity (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998) 67. 
29 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, ‘Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial 
Discourses’ (1988) 61 Feminist Review, 333–58. 
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honour, the ‘mother of the nation’, whereas the “prevention of foreign penetration of 
the motherland – and women’s bodies as symbols of it– is at the very heart of national-
state security.”30 As Yuval-Davis argues, women’s body in the nation-state emerges as 
the biological reproducer of ethical/national/cultural group boundaries:31 “[they are 
seen] as reproducer of a community’s culture and tradition insomuch as women serve 
as placeholders for broader claims about culture, identity, and territoriality […] women 
might be the objects of such narratives (to be saved or repudiated) but they are seldom 
its subjects or agents.”32 The centrality of discourse over the veil in the colonial and 
post-colonial periods indicates that the practice (whether banned or imposed), has been 
a useful tool to strengthen national unity and to create a homogeneous law’s subject 
through the creation of a dichotomy between the ‘citizen’ and the ‘other’.33 If, as 
Anderson argues,34 the ‘nation-state’ is the result of the ‘imagination’ of citizens which 
is constructed through the repetition of symbols, mythology and narratives in the public 
sphere, then the regulation of women’s body within nationalist thought “is obviously 
not a simple case of men versus women but instead a recognition of the pressure and 
divisions which arise from employing gender to fashion a national community in 
somebody’s, but not everybody’s imagine.”35 
 
The passionate debate about women’s body, exemplified in the struggle over the veil, 
shows the power of clothes in shaping the public sphere: this is evident when studying 
the history of sumptuary laws,36 promulgated in periods of socio-political change in 
order to ‘differentiate’ between ‘citizens’ but also to ‘homologate’ as a means to 
strengthen a sense of national identity. As I shall argue, since, historically, clothes have 
been conceived as images and images have the power to rhetorically construct (visible) 
forms of knowledge, the regulation of clothes emerges as an act of sovereignty useful to 
fashion not only the public sphere but also, more importantly, its subjects. In fact, it is 
                                                             
30 Joanne P Sharpe, ‘Gendering Nationhood’ in Nancy Duncan (ed) Bodyspace: destabilizing 
geographies of gender and sexuality, (Routledge, 1996) 100. 
31 Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (eds), Woman-Nation-State (Macmillan, 1989).  
32 Saba Mahmood, ‘Sectarian Conflict and Family Law in Contemporary Egypt’ (2012) 39 
American Ethnologist 54, 56. 
33 Joanne Sharp 'Gendering Nationhood' (n 30) 97. 
34 Anderson (n 9).  
35 Cynthia Enloe, The Morning after: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War (University of 
California Press, 1993) 250. 
36 “Sumptuary laws are attempts to regulate any kind of consumption, especially conspicuous 
consumption”. Kim M Phillips, ‘Masculinities and the Medieval English Sumptuary Laws’ (2007) 
19 Gender & History 22, 23. 
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exactly through the fashioning of images, including clothes, in the public sphere, that a 
specific subjectivity obedient to a ‘specific order of things’ and faithful to an absolute 
and transcendent power comes to be constituted. The ‘politic of dress’, then, which, as I 
shall argue, is not limited to the promulgation of sumptuary law between the thirteenth 
and fifteenth centuries but is an integral part of European and non-European history, 
not only reveals a certain anxiety in relation to clothes regulation, but also, more 
importantly, it emerges one example of the increasing intrusion of the state in the 
private life of its citizens. 
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1.1 The veil and Islamic law 
 
The web site ‘Ummah- the Online Muslim Community’37 offers a virtual forum of 
discussion for a wide Muslim community scattered in the western world. Searching the 
word ‘hijab’ directs the reader to a page in which a ‘guest’ asks:  
 
“Is the hijab compulsory in Islam? [...] The Qur'an just says to draw the clothes over the 
bosoms (breast/chest). This is not the hair. I just want to know what the Arabic of these 
words really mean. I want to know if the wives and female believers had to have the 
hijab on or if they were able to walk without it. I wish it was compulsory but I don't think 
it is.” 
 
 Another ‘guest’ answers: ‘if you want to wear it then wear it inshallah. don't go 
confusing yourself”, while another, called ‘beardedbrother’, explains that 
 
 “you need to see what the tafseer [exegeses/interpretation of the Qur’an] is behind 
that ayaah [Qur’anic verse] and you need to understand that the english translation of 
the arabic does not do justice and that the arabic words have deeper meanings [...] you 
need to see what the scholars of the sunnah [Muslim tradition based on the study of 
Muhammad life and actions] say about this ayah and the mufasireen (scholars of 
tasfeer) […] we cant just interpret ayaahs from Qur’an to our own understanding 
because this would lead to great problems within the Muslim ummah [Muslim 
community], we need to understand the ayah as the Prophet and his Companions 
understood the ayah sis.”  
 
Uthman Ibn Affan, a member of the forum who chooses to call himself one of 
Muhammad’s Companions, has the privilege of having the ‘last word’ in the forum: 
through the reading of few (interpretable) Qur’anic verses (ayah), and an accurate 
choice of specific scholars’ interpretations and translations, he tries to demonstrate that 
the veil is compulsory for Muslim women and that it is legally required by the holy 
Qur’an. This debate does not mirror a general confusion of Muslims over God’s 
                                                             
37 ‘Is the HIJAB Really COMPULSORY?’ (Ummah, The Online Muslim Community) 
<http://www.ummah.com/forum/showthread.php?261950-Is-the-HIJAB-really-COMPULSORY> 
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commandments; rather, it highlights the plurality intrinsic in the very structure of 
classical Islamic law, based on a continuous interpretation of the past for a 
reformulation of practices in the present. As I shall argue, the hijab is one issue that has 
assumed different meanings based on different interpretations of the sacred Islamic 
texts. 
 
Before embarking on an analysis of the hijab within Islamic religion, it is worth briefly 
introducing a few key concepts concerning Islamic legal sources, which I will come back 
to in the next Chapter. For Muslims, the revelation is entrusted in the Qur’an, the holy 
text of Islam, which is not the outcome of a divinely-inspired human such as the Gospel 
for Christians, but the word of God that was received verbatim by the Prophet 
Muhammad: for this reason, it is the most important religious text and the primary 
religious and legal source for Muslims in every aspect of their lives. The Qur’an, 
however, gives only general exhortations, mostly of an ethical nature, and 
commandments on worship, fasting, pilgrimage, marriage and divorce, restrictions of 
polygamy, regulation of slavery, etc.38 For this reason, as many scholars point out, as a 
legislative book, the Qur’an raises several problems: “It by no means provides a simple 
and straightforward code of law. On the contrary, the specific content of the laws 
derivable from the Qur’an depend greatly on the interpretation that legists chose to 
bring to it and the elements of its complex utterances that they chose to give weight 
to”.39 Another important legal source for Muslims is the Sunna, ‘the trodden path’, 
which is translated in the body of Islamic practices based on Muhammad’s words and 
life. The Sunna is documented in the Hadith (the verb derives from the Arabic haddatha, 
‘to recount’ or ‘to tell’): a collection of testimonies and stories of the Prophet gathered 
by his Companions or those who followed his Companions.40 Generations of Muslim 
scholars have collected hadith from direct or indirect testimonies: to evaluate the 
validity of each hadith those scholars have to establish the legitimacy of Isnad, the chain 
of people who transmitted the source.41 The function of the Hadith, which form the 
Sunna, is to clarify and detail how a good Muslim should behave in order to follow the 
path of the Prophet Muhammad, who acted completely in conformity with the demands 
                                                             
38 Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Thought : An Introduction (Routledge, 2006) 16, 17, 24. 
39 Ahmed (n 24) 88. 
40 Mernissi (n 25) 35. 
41 Fatima Mernissi, Women and Islam : An Historical and Theological Enquiry (Blackwell, 1991); 
See also John Burton, An Introduction to the Hadīth (Edinburgh University Press, 1994).  
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of the Qur’an.42 In other words, for devout Muslims, “the example of the Prophet 
Mohammad and of the community he established is to be followed as much as 
possible”43 because his actions cannot be in conflict with what is written in the sacred 
book, as they derive from the same source. Islamic law(s) derive from scholars’ different 
interpretations of the Qur’an and Hadith: Sharia law (which, nowadays, comprises six 
different books of law) is divided into six categories: wajib (obligatory) halal (allowed), 
haram (forbidden), mustahabb (recommended), makkruh (discouraged) or mubah 
(permissible or indifferent). Moreover, for believers, Islam is not simply a religion but a 
way of life: this, as I shall argue, is in contrast with western/secular/protestant who 
relates religion only to conceptual meanings and, for this reason, it is seen as a ‘private 
matter’. The way in which Muslim live and inhabit Islam should be studied by taking into 
consideration also performative and emotional meaning.44 Indeed, as Sharia law does 
not cover all aspects of Muslims’ lives, Ulama (the body of clergy) can issue fatwa, a 
(localized) “authoritative statement on a point of law.”45 The veil, as every other Islamic 
practice, should be understood within a wide plurality of Islamic sources and 
interpretations. 
In Arabic, the veil is known as the hijab: the verb indicates the act of covering or hiding 
something (yahjib or hajaba) for the purpose of protection. The word is found seven 
times in the Qur’an46 and it has different meanings such as ‘barrier’, ‘separation’, 
‘messenger’, ‘veil’ and ‘darkness’.47 However, the term does not always indicate 
women’s dress code: its various meanings, coupled with different readings of God’s 
commands, have rendered the matter of the veil interpretable: in fact, there is not 
unanimous consensus about the matter of the hijab by local Ulema and Islamic legal 
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Brealey Pub, 2006) 9. 
43 ibid. 
44 Roy A Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, (vol 110, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
45 Aisha Abdurrahman Bewley, A Glossary of Islamic Terms (Ta-Ha Publishers, 1998) 7. 
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(Wordsworth Editions, 2000). 
47 It is worth remembering that Muslim Sufi have developed a different interpretation of the 
word hijab. “In Sufism, one calls mahjub (veiled) the person whose consciousness is determined 
by sensual or mental passion and who as a result does not perceive the divine light in his soul. In 
this usage it is man who is covered by a veil, or a curtain, and not God”. Asqalani, Isaba, vol. 7, 
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scholars/experts. Analysis of the controversial verses of the Qur’an that mention the 
hijab reveals different interpretations which have been developed by Muslim scholars 
during the centuries.48 
In the Surah 24, ‘An Nur’ verse 30 and 31, the Qur’an introduces the concept of hijab 
with a commandment to lower the gaze in order to protect chastity: 
“30: Tell the believing men to lower their gaze and be modest. That is purer for them. 
Allah is aware of what they do. 31: And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and 
be modest, and to display of their adornment only that which is apparent, and to draw 
their veils over their chests, and not to reveal their adornment except to their own 
husbands or fathers or husbands’ fathers, or their brothers or their brothers’ sons or 
sisters’ sons, or their women, or their slaves, or male attendants who lack vigor, or 
children who know nothing of women’s nakedness. And let them not stamp their feet so 
as to reveal what they hide of their adornment. And turn to Allah together. Oh 
believers, in that you may succeed.”49 
The verse, which concerns both men and women, is an exhortation to lower the gaze 
and to cover the awra (private parts) as well as ‘beauty and ornaments’ (in relation to 
women). This ayah is understood differently by Muslim scholars: in fact, the word zinah 
(adornments, ornaments) can signify either zahirah (apparent adornment) or batinah 
(hidden adornment). Based on Imam Tabari’s50 interpretation, for instance, this verse 
means that a woman must cover herself in public, apart from her face and hands. 
Women are permitted to use make-up and jewellery since they constitute the zinah 
zahirah (apparent adornment) which are ordinarily visible in public.51 Furthermore, as 
he points out, the command, ‘they should draw their veils over their bosoms’, means 
that women should cover the rest of their bodies and their hair, necks and earrings.52 To 
                                                             
48 Barbara Freyer Stowasser, Women in the Qur’an, Traditions, and Interpretation (Oxford 
University Press, 1994). 
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this interpretation, Qurtubi53 adds that it is unlawful to reveal women’s hidden 
adornments to any man except for the husband, father, sons, or to those with specific 
conditions, such as men who have no sexual appetite (the impotent, the insane, the 
slaves etc…).54 
But it is in the Surah 33, Al-Ahzab, ayah 53 that many Islamic scholars found the 
command of the hijab intended as the headscarf worn by Muslim women: 
“53: Oh You who believe! Enter not the dwellings of the Prophet for a meal without 
waiting for the proper time, unless permission be granted you. But if you are invited, 
enter, and, when your meal is ended, then disperse. Linger not for conversation. That 
would cause annoyance to the Prophet, and he would be shy of (asking) you (to go); but 
Allah is not shy of the truth. And when you ask of them (the wives of the Prophet) 
anything, ask it of them from behind a curtain (hijab). That is purer for your hearts and 
for their hearts. And it is not for you to cause annoyance to the messenger of Allah nor 
that you should ever marry his wives after him. That in Allah’s sight would be an 
enormity”.55 
The context of this verse is related to the wedding of Mohammad to Zainab bint Jahsh. 
After the wedding ceremony, three discourteous guests remained in the house: this 
annoyed the Prophet. The disciple Anas recounted that Muhammad recited the verse 
when the guests departed from the Prophet’s house. As the ayah was pronounced 
during a special occasion, scholars and jurists disagree whether the verse relates just to 
the Prophet’s wives, conferring them a special status, or to all Muslim women. For al-
Tabari, the true meaning of the verse has to be found in the division of the space 
between two men: the Prophet and Anas, the witness of the event. The interpretation 
of the word hijab as a delimitation of space (a ‘curtain’ that separates the space) is 
supported by many other scholars56 as “the Prophet loosened while standing on the 
threshold to Zainab’s chamber, with one foot in the room and the other outside, in 
order to bar his servant Anas Ibn Malik…from entering”.57 Thus, a “relatively minor 
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incident – after an evening meal some guests delay their departure longer than they 
should – provokes a response so fundamental as the splitting of Muslim space into two 
universes – the interior universe (the household) and the exterior universe (public 
space)”.58 For Ibn Sa’ad,59 however, the hijab command was issued after Muhammad 
saw some men outside Zainab’s house the day after the wedding, while other traditions 
attributed to Umar Ibn al-Khattab60 the advice to seclude Muhammad’s wives as “both 
the righteous and the wicked enter into your house”.61 
The ayah 59-60 (Surah 33) seems, however, to extend the command not only to the 
Prophet’s wives, but to all Muslim women: 
“59: Oh Prophet! Tell your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers to 
draw their cloaks close around them (when they go out). That will be better, so that 
they may be recognized and not annoyed. Allah is ever Forgiving, Merciful. 60: If the 
hypocrites, and those in whose hearts is a disease, and the alarmists in the city do not 
cease, We verily shall urge you on against them, then they will be your neighbours in it 
but a little while”.62 
This ayah clearly refers to women’s appearance when outside the home: it is not, 
therefore, related to seclusion within the household. The verse is divided into two parts: 
the first is an exhortation for women to cover themselves, while the second highlights 
the reasons for the commandment. Traditional commentators such as al-Tabari, Qurtubi 
and Ibn Abbas63 agree that this ayah was pronounced in order to protect Muslim 
women of Medina from sexual harassment. In fact, at that time, the men of Medina 
used to harass women walking in the street, thinking they were slaves or prostitutes: 
women, then, used to wear a veil in order to distinguish themselves from the slaves and 
as a means of protection from male harassment.64 However, as Ibn al-Arabi argues, the 
ayah do not require excessive covering, but clothing that can be a visible sign of the 
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difference between the ‘free’ and the ‘slave’.65 It can be argued, though, as some 
modern interpreters do, that the question of being distinguished as a free woman can 
be inconsistent after the abolition of slavery throughout the world.66 As Ahmed points 
out,67 the veil was a practice in use before the advent of Islam by Greeks, Roman, Jews 
and Assyrian women who wore it to indicate high social status:68 based on this 
interpretation, it seems that Muhammad was trying to create “in non-architectural 
terms the forms of segregation –the gynoecium, the harem quarters – already firmly 
established in such neighbouring patriarchal societies as Byzantium and Iran, and 
perhaps he was even borrowing from those architectural and social practices.”69 Thus, it 
can be argued that the question of identity could have a particular significance in a 
world where Islam was a new emerging religion and needed to be distinguished and 
recognized by the whole society. In the same vein, Ibn Kathir70 notes that one of the 
purposes of the verse was to distinguish the free woman from women of the era of 
ignorance (jihiliyyah) and, thus, to show her Muslim identity: as, at the time of the 
pronouncement of the ayah, living conditions in Mecca were particularly harsh due to 
repeated military defeats, the command seems to indicate the privileged elitist status of 
Muslim women, as confirmed in medieval hadith.71 It remains, though, unclear whether 
the veil was prescribed only for the Prophet’s wives or for all Muslim women.72 Qurtubi, 
for instance, suggests that the command to cover should be extended to all women, 
whether free or slaves, because all their body is awra, private. However, he admits that 
some Prophet’s Companions recount that the jilbab covered just the upper body and 
not a woman’s whole body.73 
More contemporary interpretations suggest that the hijab, and the shapes it takes, is 
still a matter of dispute between Islamic scholars. Sayyid Abul A ’la Maududi (1903-79), 
an influential Indian scholar, is one of the main ‘defenders’ of the purdah (the veil) 
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<http://www.qtafsir.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3000&Itemid=731> 
accessed 5 January 2016; Ibn Khatir Tafsir Ibn Kathir (Brother Noha Publishing, 2015).  
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intended as both women’s seclusion and the headscarf worn by Muslim women.74 In 
contrast with many scholars, who see the practice of veiling emerging after 
Muhammad’s death, Maududi claims that, in reality, veiling was a practice established 
by the Prophet as a specific Islamic norm.75 By taking into consideration different hadith 
in which women were active in the battlefield and in the mosques, Sultan Muhammad 
Shah (also called Aga Khan III),76 argues, however, that the purdah was not in use during 
the Prophet’s life.77 During a visit in Zanzibar in 1905, the Imam pointed out that the veil 
“is not for you, but [better] for you is a veil of the heart [dhill], have modesty [aya: 
shyness, modesty] in your heart, fill your heart with modesty all the time. You [women] 
should not cast your eye on other men except your husbands; do not have any thoughts 
for other men. If in your mind there is desire for other men, you will not gain from your 
prayers.”78 Although the Imam was considered one of the most authoritative 
interpreters of the sacred text by his followers, the Imami Shi’I Nizari Isma’ili community 
applied his reformist view differently in different geographical contexts; if, for instance, 
in east Africa his interpretation of the purdah, female marriage, and female work was 
perceived successfully, in Pakistan the implementation of reforms was more gradual and 
of a lesser degree.79 
Other contemporary scholars analyse the Qur’an precepts by taking into consideration 
social, political and historical factors of Muhammad’s age. Fatima Mernissi, for instance, 
argues that the concept attributed to the word hijab is three-dimensional, and these 
three dimensions often blend into one another: 
“The first dimension is a visual one: to hide something from sight. In fact, the root of the 
verb hajaba means ‘to hide’. The second dimension is spatial: to separate, to mark a 
border, to establish a threshold while the third dimension is ethical because it belongs 
to the realm of the forbidden. So we have not just tangible categories that exist in the 
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reality of the sense- the visual, the spatial- but also an abstract reality in the realm of 
ideas; a space hidden by a hijab is a forbidden space.”80 
Mernissi’s analysis in relation to the veil takes into consideration not only various 
interpretations of Quranic verses, but also the historical period when the Prophet 
pronounced them. At that time, year five of the Hejira, the Islamic calendar, the 
Prophet’s armies suffered numerous military defeats; it was a particularly disastrous 
year from a military point of view and, consequently, a year of political stagnation. In 
fact, the Surah describes, among others issues, the siege of Medina. This epoch of doubt 
and political uncertainty eroded the morality and manners of Medina’s population. It 
seems therefore that “the Prophet, during a troubled period at the beginning of Islam, 
pronounced a verse that was so exceptional and determining for the Muslim religion 
that it introduced a breach in space that can be understood to be a separation of the 
public from the private, or indeed the profane from the sacred, but which was to turn 
into a segregation of the sexes”.81 In this context, it is important to point out that many 
Muslim interpreters have noted that the Prophet’s wives used to participate actively in 
the communal affairs of Medina until the revelation of the ‘ayah of hijab’. However, 
their gradual exclusion from the public sphere was determined by several factors: the 
protection of Muslim women during a period of political tension and the need for 
privacy of Muhammad’s wives. 
In fact, at that time, Medina was a crowded city, especially the Mosque, which was the 
centre of public affairs: the female room of the Mosque was an extension of the 
Prophet’s wives’ apartment and it seems that one of the reasons for the hijab revelation 
was the intention to give privacy to the female elite of Islam.82 It is worth mentioning 
that the Arabic concept of privacy differs from that of the west as it “is based on a 
specific cultural construction of space and time central to the functioning of Islamic 
society in general […]. Space in this construction is relational, active, charged and 
fluid”.83 Ardener observes that space, in Muslim culture, is related to social life whereas 
“behaviours and space are mutually dependent”:84 thus, in Arab culture, space and time 
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are fluid concepts within which people manoeuvre their agency. As El-Guindi argues, the 
western idea of privacy, which is based on a binary opposition between private and 
public and its corollary honour/shame, has been used to create a link between space 
and gender which has been universalized by western feminists and translated into the 
polarity domestic/public life:85 this concept, in turn, has been imposed over Muslim 
culture. The Arabic notion of ‘privacy’ should be understood “in its transformational 
fluid form, [which] embraces the Arab cultural construction of space that connects 
space to time and gender”.86 
Not only the Qur’an, but also the Hadith are considered an important legal source for 
Muslims. The ‘hadith of Asma’ is the most commonly quoted by scholars to indicate the 
importance of modest clothes for Muslim women. Durayk reported that Aisha, one of 
the Prophet’s wives, recounted that Asma, her sister, visited Muhammad wearing 
transparent clothes. In this occasion the Prophet lowered his gaze and pointed out that 
an adult woman should be covered in public. However, even Abu Dawud, the main 
transmitter of this fact, doubts about the authenticity of this hadith because Asma was 
known as a woman of piety and she would not introduce herself to the Prophet with 
transparent garments. Moreover, as Abu Dawud argues, it seems that Khalis b. Durayk, 
the narrator, has never met Aisha.87 
Besides, there is a wide body of literature about the ‘mothers of the believers’, the 
Prophet’s wives, in the Hadith: they are considered a model of piety and devotion for 
their role as protectors of Islamic norms and values. Hence, as Stowasser argues, their 
behaviour, their dress and their conduct in general must be read as a “(para)legal texts 
in that their intended meaning is normative, not descriptive. […] This process involved a 
dynamic spiral of mutual reinforcement of its two constituent components, that is, the 
principle of these women’s righteousness on the one hand, and their function as 
categorical norm-setters on the other”.88 There are many Hadiths describing how the 
Prophet’s wives used to hide themselves in the presence of male strangers. Aisha, for 
instance, used to veil even in front of the Prophet’s grandchildren as well as during the 
prayer and the circumambulation of the Ka’ba.89 Historically, however, Muhammad’s 
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wives used to participate actively in the public life of Medina: there are hadith 
recounting how the Prophet’s wives used to take care of the injured during war time, 
for example, or Aisha, who used to pull up her garments to carry water for Muslim 
warriors on the battlefield.90 
Interestingly, in the Hadith, it is also possible to find many references to men’s 
garments, especially to the male veil. Historical ethnography reveals that men, in pre-
Islamic societies, were also accustomed to wear the veil: it seems that even the Prophet 
wore the veil on certain occasions.91 For instance, in the hadith Sahih al-Bukhari 5360, 
the Prophet introduced himself to Abu Bakr face-veiled. In the same hadith, as Abu 
Bakr, the witness of the event, testified, Muhammad entered Aisha’s room and covered 
his face with garments because two slaves were dancing and playing drums in front of 
him.92 
This indicates that a fixed and monolithic interpretation of Islamic legal sources on the 
command of hijab does not exist. As I briefly pointed out, the hijab had a precise 
function of identity formation, especially in the emergent phase of Islamic religion 
within an extremely heterogenic society such as Medina. Dozens of legal schools were 
created throughout Islamic history and about six remain (Sunni and Shi’a).93 Simplifying 
the complex issue of the hijab by reducing the interpretations to the main four Islamic 
legal Sunni schools, we can say that for the Saafiites and Hanbalites the entire body, 
including the face and hands is awra, while for Malikites and Hanafites the face and 
hands are not awra. During the centuries, Muslim scholars have developed a myriad of 
interpretations regarding the veil.94 Nowadays, conditions for the interpretation of the 
Qur’an and Sunna are extremely limited compared to the first period of Islam. However, 
as I shall argue in the next Chapter, Islamic law remains open to interpretations and is 
based on ‘consensus’: in order for a rule to be normatively suitable there has to be a 
constant production of Islamic interpretations followed by the consent of the scholarly 
community. As the veil is one of the matters that do not find unanimous consent among 
Muslim scholars, it cannot be considered compulsory in Islam. It is worth noting that in 
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Islamic history, Ulama have released diverse fatwa in relation to the female veil which 
assume a ‘legal value’ not for the whole Muslim community, but for the local 
community that follows a particular scholar. In 2013, an influential Saudi Cleric, Sheikh 
Ahmed Bin Qassim al-Ghamdi, issued a fatwa on the veil: based on his interpretation, 
women do not need to veil and they can travel alone.95 On the other hand another 
important Saudi scholar, Sheikh Abdullah Daoud, issued a fatwa calling for female 
babies to wear the burqa as a mean of protection from sexual harassment.96 In 
Deoband-Darul-Uloom in India, an influential Islamic scholar issued a fatwa prohibiting 
women from working without the veil: the religious edict aroused various reactions 
from other clerics, including Maulana Khalid Rashid Firangi Mahali, a leading Sunni 
scholar of the area, who condemned the fatwa as ‘unfortunate’ and ‘useless’ since, in 
Islam, women and men are encouraged to be educated and to have a career.97 Fatwa 
can be issued publicly or privately: believers are accustomed to asking precise questions 
of scholars or Ulama who then release specific religious edicts (fatwa). This is the case 
of Aishah Azmi, a British teacher who refused to remove her hijab at school because she 
was obeying a fatwa issued personally to her by an Islamic cleric.98  
In recent years, many Muslim scholars have also started to issue online fatwas: 
believers are able to ask questions related to their daily lives and a scholar, based on his 
personal interpretation of Islamic legal sources, will answer. Searching online fatwas 
concerning the veil, reveals variegated and differentiated interpretations of the 
practice. The web site ‘Islamweb’ has delivered a high number of fatwas in recent years 
and it is particularly used by Muslims living in western countries. When a woman, 
confused by different fatwas found in the website, asks if the jilbab is compulsory in 
Islam, the scholar answers that 
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“[Islamic law] does not enjoy a fixed style of dress that the Muslim woman must wear. 
Rather, there are conditions that should be met for a given clothing to be approved by 
the sharee'ah. The Muslim woman is not obliged to wear an outer garment if the 
clothes that she is wearing duly conceal her body (and meet the conditions of the 
Islamic hijaab) and there is no harm on her for wearing such modest clothing outdoors, 
even if she wears no outer garment over it. If the conditions of the Islamic hijaab are 
met in the skirt and the traditional Pakistani dress (salwar kameez), then there is no 
religious impediment for the Muslim woman to wear such clothes in public places 
before non-mahram (marriageable) men.”99  
In another online ‘fatwa website’, a Muslim (female) university teacher asks if it is 
possible for her to remove the hijab as she experiences harassment by students. In the 
case, by referring to Surah 24 as well as to the hadith of Asma, a scholar answers that “it 
is impermissible for a woman to take off the hijab and uncover the body parts it covers 
before a non-mahram (a person with whom marriage is permissible) except when there 
is a necessity or a need that reaches the degree of a necessity”.100 However, based on 
the Ulama’s interpretation, the unpleasant circumstances experienced by a Muslim 
teacher in a non-Muslim country cannot be considered a ‘case of necessity’. The 
differences among interpretations of God’s commands have rendered the matter of 
veiling extremely heterogeneous: not only have scholars issued very different fatwas 
concerning the veil, but also, more importantly, when locating the practice within 
Islamic texts and exegesis, what comes out is a plurality of different interpretations 
which do not find consensus within the Muslim community: for this reason, it is possible 
to state that the veil is not compulsory in Islam and that its use and shape depends on 
different interpretations developed over the centuries. 
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1.2 The Veil and Muslim cultures 
 
Lithma is a “brightly coloured thin material or muslin draped around the head in such a 
way as to cover the hair and the forehead, while the lower part of it can be pulled down 
to uncover or pulled up to cover the whole face except the eyes”.101 In Yemen, this 
specific kind of veil is associated with the concept of femininity while among Bedouins 
and Berbers, it is considered as a ‘sign of’ masculinity and virility.102 This plurality of 
meanings in relation to veiling expresses the intrinsic variety of the practice: in fact, as 
any other article of cloth, the veil has been a useful tool to communicate instances of 
gender, kinship/group belonging, social status etc.: as Rugh argues, clothes “provide a 
code which can decipher the complexities of social structure and the values on which 
they are based”.103  
 
In Nubian society, for instance, the veil is seen as a sign of modesty and respectability: 
the (ever-changing) veil worn by Nubian women is understood as a tool to communicate 
a woman’s life’s phases as well as marital status. In the case, not only does the veil, 
along with its different uses, emerge as a “mark [of] gender but [it also] becomes a 
vehicle through which adulthood is distinguished from youth and socially recognized 
maturation is expressed. Nubian dress, therefore, communicates both a woman’s public 
persona and her social transition.”104 Among the Tuareg, veiling does not communicate 
gender difference, but it formalizes “the group status of the individual, the identity of 
the group and the sacredness of privacy.”105 The veil does not conceal identity; rather it 
is worn by men and women (men wear a ‘face veil’ which reveals only the eyes while 
women have a decorated scarf over their heads) as a symbol of maturity, honour and 
social class.106 Historically, the veil has also been a useful tool to indicate an individual’s 
social status: among the Rashayda, (female) dress serves not only to separate the 
individual’s life into phases, but also to indicate a woman’s identity, her ‘reputation’ and 
social status which is acquired through the material artistic achievements of both men 
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and women.107 Similarly, in Yemen, where the practice dates back to the pre-Islamic 
period and a wide range of different headscarves is worn by men and women,108 the use 
of different veils indicates a specific social status. Outdoors, women wear the sitara or 
the sharshaf: the sitara is “a large piece of cotton material printed in red, blue and 
green and covering the head and the body. To this is added a piece of black batik 
ornamented […] covering the face and transparent enough to let the women see 
through”,109 while the sharshaf “consists of three parts: a long pleated skirt worn over 
the dress and a waist-length cape covering the head and shoulders”.110 Upper-class 
women tend to wear the sharshaf, while women of lower socio-economic status wear 
the sitara, and non-Yemenis and servants do not veil: “this use of women’s veiling is 
consistent with the use of the veil as a status symbol reported in stratified urban 
societies”111 of the area. In this context, the veil emerges as “the most distinctive 
expression in a material form of the various grades of social life [whereas] the biological 
period…becomes a social period of existence and the individual is merged in a functional 
section of the community”.112 Among Egyptian peasants, though, the veil is worn to 
indicate a specific regional, socio/economic and religious identity, while in Palestine, the 
veil used to indicate a (pre-1948) regional/kinship belonging. Similarly, Ghanyari 
peasants, a community settled in the Himalayas, wear the veil to indicate kinship 
relationship and social restrictions;113 “veiling distinguishes consanguinity from affinity, 
men from women and caste from caste […] it is a community that is highly stratified and 
differentiated by caste, affines versus consanguines, men versus women etc.”114 As, 
historically and contextually, the veil has been a useful tool to communicate and 
demarcate matters of gender, class and territory, it also expresses power relations 
within the society. El-Guindi reveals that “among the Rashayda prize money is given to 
the woman who dances best in public at a wedding, and it is pinned to her milayah. In 
the past in Muslim India women ritually beat their husbands with their veils. In Bahrain, 
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village women attach the key to the lock of the house to their headveil or hair”.115 The 
many meanings and uses of the veil reveal the impossibility of fully understanding this 
pluralistic and ever-changing practice: “the absence of a single, monolithic term in the 
language(s) of the people who at present most visibly practice ‘veiling’ suggests 
significance to this diversity that cannot be captured in one term.”116 Thus, the veil is 
more than the interpretation of Shari’a law; it is a complex phenomenon that embarks 
on a wide analysis of ethno/cultural/local customs as well as socio/political/historical 
and economic factors and it comes out as the most visible symbol of the 
accommodation operated by Islam with different and heterogeneous populations. 
 
With the expansion of Islam, the ‘Medina Community’ comes face to face with the 
conquered local population, especially the Byzantine and the Sassanian Empire, where 
the seclusion of urban upper-middle class women was a common practice.117 After the 
death of the Prophet, Islamic jurisprudence was a still-developing apparatus, and the 
first Caliphs kept the local traditions and cultural norms of the conquered populations: 
judges were appointed to administrate local affairs by applying local customs based on 
their own understanding of the Qur’an. The practice of veiling, as Ahmed observes, has 
not been introduced by Muhammad;118 rather, it was a custom of many pre-Islamic 
societies such as the Mesopotamian, Hellenic, Byzantine, Sassanian, Persian, and Greek 
Empires as well as in the Christian Middle East and Mediterranean regions.119 Thus, 
what today is considered the ‘Muslim veil’ is in reality the visible symbol of the 
accommodation that Islam operated in its history with various heterogeneous 
populations. In fact, the uses, shapes and meanings of veiling have changed during the 
course of history and have been interconnected with several political and social factors; 
in pre-Islamic societies, the veil was worn by women for many reasons such as honour, 
protection, and to indicate a specific social status: it was “adopted by upper-class urban 
women who lived in great places and courts and enjoyed considerable mobility and 
opportunity to participate in the activities within their community. [Differently], village 
and rural women were slower to adopt these practices, as they interfered with their 
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ability to work in the field.”120 Within the borders of the Assyrian Empire, for instance, 
the veil was a visible symbol of the stratified social system based on class, moral, marital 
status and respectability: as a matter of fact, Assyrian law stated that women of nobility 
had to veil in order to distinguish themselves from servants and concubines.121 In 
contrast, in classical Greece, the rigid patriarchal structure of the society determined a 
strict division between private and public space with a consequent increase in women’s 
seclusion practices, including veiling. 
 
In ancient Sumer, gender roles were seen as complementary; whereas men worked on 
the sea, women worked on the land: this complementarity and autonomy is visible 
today in Shi’a villages in Bahrain where “each home is locked with a padlock […] [and] 
each woman carried the key to her house tied to her head cloth or to one of her 
braids”.122 In ancient Egypt, where men and women enjoyed a form of legal equality, the 
practice of veiling was not associated with women’s seclusion; rather, the veil was worn 
solely to communicate geographical belonging.123 This indicates that the practice of 
veiling has been adopted in Islam as a consequence of the encounter with other 
populations of the area where the practice was already in use: “the influx of wealth, the 
resultant raised status of Arabs, and Muhammad’s wives being taken as 
models…combined to bring about […] [its] general adoption.”124 Hence, it is possible to 
say that “Islam selectively sanctioned customs already found among some Arabian tribal 
societies while prohibiting others.”125 Thus, the uses of the veil in the area, which 
carried different meanings, emerge as the expression of different cultures, and not as a 
strict symbol of women’s seclusion or Islamic religion: in certain areas, the veil was used 
to indicate a high social status. In others, it distinguished the ‘pious’ women from the 
‘prostitute’,  while in the ancient Middle East, veiling indicated a specific 
tribal/geographical belonging.126 
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During the Abbasid period, when the Muslim Empire was at the apex of its expansion, 
women’s veiling and seclusion became a common practice: their household role was 
important while men were abroad maintaining governmental structures in the 
emergent Islamic civilization. The Abbasid adopted the practice of women’s seclusion 
from the Persian and Byzantine Empires and operated a broad Arabization and 
Islamization of the conquered population by reducing the myriad interpretations of 
Islamic law into four main (Sunni) legal schools. Thus, the texts produced during the 
Abbasid period mirror general assumptions of the chauvinist society of the time: the 
“weight Abbasid society gave to the androcentric teachings over the ethical teachings in 
Islam in matters concerning relations between sexes was the outcome of collective 
interpretative acts reflecting the mores and attitude of society”.127 Despite the 
Abbasid’s attempt to create a united and homogeneous Muslim community, minorities 
such as the Sufi and Qarmatians managed to keep their own interpretation of Islamic 
law. Unlike many women living under Abbasid rules, Qarmantian women were not 
secluded and did not wear the veil: this is why, as Ahmed argues, the texts of the time 
portrayed those women as ‘obscene’ and ‘degraded’.128 
Nevertheless, Ahmed’s analysis attests that from the fifteenth to the nineteenth 
century, during the Mamluk and Ottoman Empires, women were quite active and 
present in the public sphere: they inherited property, as Islam permits it, worked in 
many business and textile activities, though with a modest income, and studied in 
different madrasas (school). Moreover, most ‘Ulama class’ women seem to have 
reached a high level of education: Ahmed recounts the story of Hajar (b. 1388), who was 
educated by her father and participated actively in scholarly discussions. She became 
one of the leading Muslim scholars of her time: as she did not wear the veil, many 
scholars chose not to attend her lessons, but she taught other influential scholars of the 
time such as al-Aswalani and al-Suyuti.129 The story of Hajar, as well as of other women 
scholars analysed by Ahmed in her study, demonstrates that women had a continuous 
interaction with other male Muslim scholars and that they were taught by both sexes.130 
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It is worth noting, however, that women also experienced short periods of seclusion: in 
1437, for instance, the plague was spreading in the Muslim Empire. At that time, the 
Sultan held a meeting with judges and jurists in order to find a way to resolve the 
problem.131 It was decided that the plague was God’s punishment for people’s sin, 
especially ‘adultery’. If, before the plague, women used to walk outside day and night, 
while the disease was spreading women were secluded and forbidden to leave their 
houses. These kinds of extreme limitations, however, lasted for very short periods.132 It 
is during the colonization period, to which I will return in this Chapter, that the veil 
comes to be understood (by westerners) as a symbol of universal women’s oppression 
and seclusion and (by the colonized) as a symbol of resistance. Before that period, as I 
have pointed out, veiling was not necessarily associated with women’s seclusion and it 
has taken different meanings, shapes, and colours in different geographical areas in 
which Islam took a foothold. 
Thus, veiling, in its broader cultural context, is the result of an accommodation between 
conquerors and local populations. In fact, in the whole history of Islam, in the past as 
well as nowadays, the veil assumes very different meanings within Muslim majority 
societies and emerges as the most visible symbol of the accommodation between Islam 
and various, heterogenic, populations. Some examples can be useful to understand how 
the expression of Islam in society has changed with time, cross-cultural interaction, 
gender, ethnicity and class. Local populations have adopted Islamic rules selectively in 
accordance with individual or group interests and the current realities of each 
geographic area. As Geertz argues, the universality of Islam comes exactly from its 
“ability to engage a widening set of individual, even idiosyncratic, conceptions of life 
and yet somehow sustain and elaborate them all”.133  
The experience of women in central Asia is of particular interest when taking into 
consideration the complex and variegated socio-ethnic realm of the region and the 
strong influence of socialist regimes over religions, which developed a different 
assimilation of Islamic precepts.134 The construction of gender roles in Kazakhstan 
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presents some differences from other central Asian Muslim communities due its 
nomadic heritage. Islam gained a foothold only in the nineteen century, and was 
introduced by the Tartar merchants and missionaries who started to build Islamic 
schools and mosques. Prior to the arrival of Islam, Kazaks believed in one or two forms 
of syncretic religions and considered the shaman their spiritual leader who was able to 
mediate between the spiritual and earthly realms. The nomadic lifestyle of the local 
population prevented the establishment of Islamic religious institutions such as schools 
and charities as centres of people’s lives. In Kazakhstan, Islam operated a great 
accommodation not only with pre-syncretic religions already practiced in the area, but 
also with the nomadic lifestyle of the local population. Examples of this accommodation 
can be found in many Kazak practices: when a Mullah (Islamic religious leader) is not 
present, for instance, it is the oldest men of the community that performs his tasks; the 
pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five pillars of Islam, can be replaced with five visits to 
the grave of Hoja Akhmed Yassawi, an important poet and Islamic mystic. As their 
nomadic heritage is incompatible with the practice of female seclusion, Kazak women 
have never embraced this practice, nor the use of the veil, and they mingle freely with 
men: the practice of veiling, however, has been adopted by sedentary Kazak women in 
recent years.135 Thus, Kazaks simply “accepted Islamic practices that fit well with their 
way of life and rejected customs seen as incompatible with a nomadic lifestyle”: in their 
daily lives, it is customary law, and not Sharia law, that is the accepted social 
regulation.136 
Another interesting example of the accommodation of Islam with different cultures is 
that of Minangkabau people; an ethnic/indigenous group situated in the highlands of 
West Sumatra, Indonesia, and in Malaysia (which is considered one of the most 
Islamized areas of the region). For centuries prior to the arrival of Islam, the 
Minangkabau have regulated their lives based on the adat, a complex social system 
which mirrors their culture and customs.137 Within Minangkabau society, magic and 
syncretic traditions are bound with Islamic traditions and the adat matrilineal system: 
the lives of the Minangkabau are thus regulated by Islamic precepts as well as by 
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cultural norms.138 This is mirrored in their ceremonials which emerge as a mix of Islamic 
rituals, syncretism, animist and magic ceremonies. Ellen suggests the existence of two 
complementary traditions in relation to gender: “in the first, ‘masculine’ adat reflects 
the influences of the Shari’a and jurisdictions of the patrilineal royal family over the 
entire society, while ‘feminine’ adat reflects matrilineal and local customs”.139 The 
complementary relation between adat and Islam is mirrored also in a famous aphorism 
which states that “Minangkabau customary laws are based on the Holy Book, the 
Qur’an. For religious law, orders, adat applies. Nature is the teacher of humankind”.140 
The Islamic faith of Minangkabau women strongly coexists with local ethnic traditions 
based on the adat, which derives from animist beliefs. The way in which Islam is tied to 
the matriarchal system is particularly interesting when taking into consideration 
western stereotypes of Muslim women as subjugated to a chauvinist religion; even if 
religious and political affairs are mainly led by men, property and land are inherited 
from mother to daughter. The matrilineal Minangkabau kinship system assures that 
children become part of the mother’s family and the responsibility of the maternal uncle 
rather than the father. Although Muslim leaders in Minangkabau believe that women 
should be covered with Islamic dress except for their face and hands to save their 
chastity and morality, many women simply wear modest dresses because Minangkabau 
perception of morality is based on both adat and Islam. In contrast with Minangkabau 
women from Indonesia, those from Malaysia have assimilated Islam differently and 
Islamic law has supplanted the adat: most Minangkabau/Malaysian women wear the 
typical middle eastern hijab or a jilbab (a triangular fabric secured under the chin that 
covers the body from the head to below the shoulders) along with the traditional 
Muslim dress style, which comprises a loose tunic, called sarogon, and a filmy 
headscarf.141 
Africa presents a further differentiation in the assimilation of Islamic practices: 
Niger/Nigeria could be a good example. In 1808, ‘dan Fodio, a prominent Fulani Muslim 
scholar, launched a jihad (holy war) against the Hausa-speaking aristocracy based in 
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Gobir,142 which continued for almost half a century and culminated in the victory of the 
Fulani and the establishment of two caliphates. Before this, the region comprehended a 
wide and syncretic variety of Islam(s): although during the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries Islam was considered the most practiced religion in the area, few people 
observed the five pillars of Islam, including the pilgrimage to the Mecca. During that 
period, people of the area drew their practices from both Islamic and animist traditions: 
“the two could be reconciliated because much of the Islamic world recognizes the 
existence of spirits, or genies.”143 Thus, spirit cults, leaded by aristocratic urban women, 
continued to be performed in conjunction with Islamic practices at least until the Fulani 
era. In the pre-Fulani period, women fully participated in the life of the community, 
working in the fields side by side with men and by leading religious rituals. Only upper-
class women were veiled, and seclusion was not contemplated. With the victory of 
Fulani, a less plural and more monolithic interpretation of Islam was introduced and 
established.  
However, in the Maradi Valley, where many emigrated during the Fulani jihad, women 
continued to integrate Islamic precepts with their own way of life: they worked side by 
side with men on the farm while veiling and seclusion remained a custom of aristocratic 
women, as during the pre-Fulani period.144 Yet, Nigerian women continue to use 
different kind of veils as a result of the accommodation of Islam with the local culture 
and traditions. Hausa wear the Kallabi (a one square metre of cloth tied to the forehead 
which covers only the head, sometimes partially), or the Gyale (a two metre cloth which 
covers only partially the head), while Kanuri wear the Mandil (similar to the Gyale) or 
the Lefaya (similar to the Indian Sari, it is wrapped around the body to cover the 
shoulders from the back to the front).145 From the mid-1970s, as Mahdi observes, the 
trend in relation to the veil in Nigeria changed: women in institutions of higher 
education started to wear the hijab, while by the late 1980s the veil had spread to other 
classes of urban women. But it was only in the 1990s that the practice of women’s 
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veiling in Nigeria began to challenge public schools’ official uniforms: in fact, since the 
expansion of Islamic law at the end on the 1990s, the compulsory hijab has been 
introduced as a school uniform.146 Based on Mahdi, the increasing uses of the veil in 
Nigeria can be understood as the expression of the increasing presence of women in the 
public space, however, it is also important to point out that “recent studies highlight 
gender issues in the encounter between colonial rule and the elite of the caliphate 
demonstrate that although a thread from the past could be discerned in the present, 
adorning hijab can be linked more with the politic of colonial encounter than with the 
heritage of the Sokoto Caliphate”.147 
These studies indicate not only that Muslim people live and experience Islam differently, 
but also that the veil can take on different meanings and interpretations based on 
historical, cultural and geographical contexts. This is attested by the many studies of the 
veil in recent years which take into consideration an integrated approach and locate the 
practice within its wider and different cultural, historical, geographical and political 
context.148 The veil, as any other item of clothing, should be studied as a tool to 
understand social, cultural, and normative implications within a specific society: as 
Simmel observes in relation to clothes, “through their capacity to symbolize a social 
order, what is and what should be, [they] are related to social action and 
communication in a dynamic way.”149 Since clothes have the power to establish a ‘social 
identity’,150 they emerge as a part of a society’s normative system. As the uses and the 
meaning of clothes changes in different historical and cultural contexts, dressing comes 
out as a ‘situated body practice’ which embodies and incorporates fluctuating power 
relationships:151 if ‘dressing’ is a ‘situated practice’, then the ‘dressed body’ emerges as 
a performance of embodied practices.152 Likewise, veiling, as every other item of 
clothing, should be studied as a ‘situated practice’ which takes different shapes, colours 
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and meanings based on specific cultural, historical and political contexts. Historically, 
the veil has emerged as an act of communication materialized by the reiteration of 
regulatory performative norms and has assumed a multitude of meanings: it might 
indicate an individual’s place within society; identity; geographical provenance; kinship; 
race; rank; class, territoriality, ethnicity, gender, etc.153 
 
The many meanings of, and differences over, the practice of veiling, this ‘diversity within 
unity’,154 indicates that, in order to understand why and how women wear the veil in 
Muslim majority societies, it is essential to take into consideration many factors, 
including, but not exclusively, Islamic precepts. 
Thus, “treating Islamic culture as frozen in place obscures the processes by which 
gender is historically, socially and politically constructed. It fails to locate Islamic 
societies within their proper historical and geographic context, and it ignores the 
particularities of time and place central to the making of culture. As do other world 
cultures, Islam provides a general framework with a range of options for action. Within 
that framework, groups and individuals negotiate practices and symbols while engaging 
in social action and ongoing struggles”.155 
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1.3 Imagining nations, imagining women: the regulation of female clothes in the era 
of nations 
 
Until the colonial period both men and women wore the veil or other kinds of 
headscarf/face covering for many reasons and to many effects. The violent western 
economic/political/cultural imperialist colonization, along with the creation of the 
‘nation-state’ in many other Muslim majority countries in the nineteenth century has 
completely changed the meaning of the practice of veiling. From a plurality of meanings 
and performative outcomes, the (female) veil becomes a monolithic and static symbol 
of state/national identity: as I shall argue, on the one hand, the veil has been elevated 
as a ‘sign of’ anti-western/anti-colonial/anti-imperialist struggles by Islamist and 
nationalist movements, while on the other, colonizers have seen in the practice of 
veiling a symbol of the backwardness of conquered populations needing to be ‘saved’ by 
colonizing forces. The fact that only the female scarf has been elevated as a symbol of 
cultural belonging is an important feature of nationalism; it reveals that in nationalist 
thought, women’s body becomes the terrain upon which territoriality, ethnicity and 
culture are established and reproduced. 
“Nationalism is an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity 
and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an 
actual or potential ‘nation’.”156 As Anderson argues, ‘nation’ is a socially constructed 
cultural ‘artifact’ that “has to be understood by aligning it not with self-consciously held 
political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which –
as well as against which- it came into being.”157 For him, ‘nation’ is primarily an 
‘imagined community’ as “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may 
prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. 
Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so 
many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited 
imaginings.”158 An ‘imagined community’, then, implies a process of imaginistic 
individuals’ identity formation whereas people recognize themselves as belonging to a 
particular group/community: this sense of belonging is negatively constructed through 
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the differentiation and contraposition between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’,159 whereas symbols come out as a clear cut-dividing line between different 
‘imagined communities’, a useful tool to create unity and homogeneity through the 
figurative construction of an ‘imagined’ ‘national’ history, culture, and tradition.160 In 
fact, as Smith argues, “attitude and perceptions are expressed and codified in myth, 
memories, values and symbols.”161 Henceforth, the ‘nation-state’ aims to build a 
mythical and symbolic idea that the ‘national collective identity’ is ethnical, a-historical, 
and pre-existing. If, as I have argued, individuals’ perceptions are codified through 
symbols because they work on an individual’s pre-symbolic level, then nationalism 
appropriates images, metaphors and symbols in the public sphere to create a specific 
paradigmatic and binary opposition between the self, citizen of the territorial ‘nation-
state’, and the ‘other’, the ‘outsider’.162 By metaphorically constructing the ‘image of 
the nation’ through women’s body, the state creates new gendered/national 
subjectivities which mirror and reproduce specific (national) cultural values: as Massad 
observes: “metaphors of nationalist movements are not only metaphors. They also 
reflect the fundamental assumptions of nationalist thought, which establishes the 
future gender constitution and gender roles of nationalist agents.”163 In other words, 
men and women’s roles and responsibilities toward the nation became the focal point 
of the nation building process.164 
Specifically, in nationalist thought, women’s body emerges as the biological reproducer 
of ethnic/national group boundaries, the transmitter of ideology and culture, and as 
signifier of ethnic/national differences.165 In essence, while women within nationalist 
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thought symbolize the nation (the heart, the soil, the home, social customs and 
traditions), men assume the role of creating, building, and protecting the nation.166 
Thus, women’s role within nationalist discourse lies in the symbolic meaning attributed 
by nationalist thought to their bodies: since they symbolize the 
biological/ethnic/cultural reproducer of the community, they represent ‘national 
boundaries’, the signifier of ethical/cultural differences, the image of the ‘Other’.167 One 
needs only to reflect on the many myths of women’s abduction, such as Troy or Ram 
and Sita, which indicates “how gender and sexuality serve as the ground over which epic 
struggles about territoriality and morality have been historically waged. That women’s 
bodies figure prominently in almost all nationalist and communitarian struggles 
(whether ethnic, racial, or religious) in the modern period only serves to strengthen this 
claim.”168 As Yuval-Davis points out, it is not the exchange or the abduction of women, 
but their control which is the base of social order and identity formation.169 
As gender, nation and ethnicity are intertwined with nationalist and colonialist 
discourses, the racialized, gendered and fixed image of Muslim women’s body has been 
a useful tool to justify imperialist struggles in the west as well as in the east;170 it is 
through the visual rhetorical construction of women’s body that the nation-state 
produces a visible differentiation, a contraposition, a ‘clash’ between the ‘self’ and the 
‘other’ in order to create an homogeneous and fixed identity for the citizen of the 
nation-state. In this context, it is the ‘image of the (female) veil’, and not the veil itself, 
that becomes the symbol of the ‘clash of civilizations’.171 It is exactly through the 
understanding of veiling as a fixed symbol of the incompatibility of ‘East’ and ‘West’, 
whether through its rejection or its compulsory adoption, that a simple piece of cloth 
assumes important implications in the process of gender construction of Muslim 
women. 
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Thus, in the colonial period, not only does the veil emerge as a ‘political symbol’ but 
also, more importantly, it comes to be one of the best examples of the ‘politics of 
clothes’ in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the ‘West’ as well as in the 
‘East’.172 If, as Fanon argues, “it is by their apparel that types of society first become 
known, […] [then their] belonging to a given cultural group is usually revealed by 
clothing traditions”:173 in other words, it is through clothes, the most immediate and 
perceptible images in the public sphere, that a society constitutes its sense of 
uniqueness and belonging. 
With the ‘politics of clothes’, exemplified in the struggle over the veil, colonial power 
created a “fusion between the issues of women, their oppression, and the cultures of 
other men. The idea that other men, men in colonized societies or societies beyond the 
borders of the civilized west, oppressed women was to be used, in the rhetoric of 
colonialism, to render morally justifiable its project of undermining or eradicating the 
culture of colonized peoples.”174 The ‘politics of clothes’, a ‘politic of differentiation’, has 
placed the veil as the most powerful symbol of the ‘clash’ between two dis-similar 
political systems: on the one hand, colonizers have seen in the veil the symbol of the 
backwardness of Muslim culture, while on the other, “standing in the relation of 
antithesis to thesis […] [colonized] reversed –but thereby also accepted – the terms set 
in the first place by the colonizers” by elevating the veil as the symbol of their 
nationalist struggles. Thus, it is western discourse that in the first place determined the 
new meanings of the veil and gave rise to its emergence as a symbol of resistance.”175 In 
both cases, women’s body emerges as an objectified symbol of the newly created 
nation-state: in other words, it becomes a field of struggle. Some examples can help us 
to understand how nationalism has appropriated and shaped women’s body, specifically 
the (performative) practice of veiling, into a symbol of ‘national difference’: Palestine, 
Algeria, and Iran. In Palestine and Algeria, the meaning of the veil arose from the 
colonial context, while in Iran, invasive western influences, coupled with the creation of 
a ‘modern’ western style-nation-state by the Shah, have transformed the veil into the 
Iranian national symbol. In Chapter three, I will also take into consideration the 
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regulation of the veil in the post-colonial period through the analysis of legal cases in 
the west as well as in Turkey. 
The identity of Palestinian women has been deeply shaped by the complex political 
context: the Israeli occupation, the strong impact of foreign policies in the country, and 
the growth of anti-western nationalist movements have deeply impacted women’s lives. 
In the case of Palestine, anti-colonial nationalist movements, “in adapting European 
nationalist thought to local conditions, […] were faced with the task of defining not only 
the roles of men and women in the nationalist project, but also what a non-European 
nationalist masculinity would look like, and what kind of performances would guarantee 
it.”176 In fact, as Butler argues, nationalism, as well as sexual and gender identities, are 
performatively produced and re-produced by the regulatory practice of nationalist 
agency.177 
Before the first intifada, or ‘Palestinian uprising’, only peasants wore the veil, as a 
symbol of geographical/kinship belonging, while urban women were accustomed to 
wearing modest western-style garments. But the outbreak of the Intifada, in employing 
European nationalist practices, changed the pluralistic uses of the veil typical of the 
area: on the one hand, religious/nationalist parties, such as Hamas, started to call for a 
strict female ‘Muslim attire’ by linking Islamic faith with the national liberation struggle, 
while on the other, secular/nationalist parties, such as Fatah, ‘ab-used’ the character of 
the (veiled) peasant as a ‘sign of’ a past un-touched by western powers. By 1988, the 
streets of Gaza, where Hamas gained a wide support, were filled with graffiti stating 
"Daughter of Islam, abide by Shari’a dress!" and “women who don’t wear the Hijab are 
not patriotic”, while ‘un-veiled’ women were repeatedly harassed. To the contrary, in 
the West Bank, where national/secular parties were particularly strong, it was the image 
of the peasants that distinguished Palestinian national identity from other Arab 
identities in the area;178 in both cases, however, women’s body became the symbol of 
Palestinian national, cultural and traditional values. Women who did not conform with 
nationalist values were accused of being ‘disloyal’ to their community and their 
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common national liberation struggle.179 As Parker argues, in “the same way that ‘man’ 
and ‘woman’ define themselves reciprocally (though never symmetrically), national 
identity is determined not on the basis of its own intrinsic properties but as a function of 
what it (presumably) is not”.180 
Palestinian women became the symbol of the ‘nation’, the ‘soil’, the ‘home’, while men 
were the defenders of the ‘nation’.181 Women’s body, thus, emerges as a matter of 
national honour whereas the defence of their bodies becomes the defence of the 
‘nation’ itself.182 As a matter of fact, in the introduction of the Palestinian Nationalist 
Charter, as well as in Yasser Arafat’s speech at the UN in 1974, the Israeli conquest of 
Palestine is pictured as a ‘rape’ of their land, while Palestinians are portrayed as the 
children of an ‘abused’ mother:183 “the metaphor of the nation as a mother- or 
fatherland, the practice of defending and administering it with homosocial institutions 
like the military and the bureaucracy, and the gendered strategies of reproducing not 
only the nation and its nationalist agents but also the very national culture defining it, 
were all constitutive of nationalist discourse”.184 Similarly, as Said argues, Zionists have 
seen Palestine both as the ‘mother land’ to which to return, and the ‘virgin-land’ ready 
to be fecundated by the newly created ‘Jewish state’.185 Interestingly, during the 2014 
Israeli-Gaza war, the City Council of Or Yehuda displayed a ban stating ‘“Israeli soldiers, 
the residents of Or Yehuda are with you! Pound their mother and come back home 
safely to your mother”: in Hebrew, the term ‘kansu’ means ‘beat’, but it also has a 
colloquial connotation of ‘sexual penetration’. The banner appeared after a sexualized 
image of an Arab woman was shared in Israeli social networks: the image portrays a 
“woman labeled ‘Gaza’, [who] wears conservative Muslim dress from the waist up and 
nearly nothing from the waist down, while striking an alluring pose and giving the 
viewer a come-hither glance. The accompanying Hebrew text reads: ‘Bibi, finish inside 
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this time! Signed, citizens in favor of a ground assault’” whereas, in Hebrew language, 
the term ‘finish’ has a colloquial meaning of ‘ejaculate’.186 Thus, as Mosse points out, 
 “nationalism and respectability assigned everyone his place in life, man and woman […] 
Alongside the idealization of masculinity as the foundation of the nation and society, 
woman […] was at the same time idealized as the guardian of morality and of public and 
private order. The roles assigned to her were conceived of as passive rather than active 
[…] guardian, protector and mother […] woman as a national symbol was the guardian 
of the continuity and immutability of the nation, the embodiment of its 
respectability.”187 
The veil, then, within religious/nationalist or secular/nationalist movements, has lost its 
intrinsic plurality of meanings and come to signify the fixed image of the nation and its 
honour. Though the veil has never been legally regulated in the country, the influence of 
nationalist thought has deeply influenced the public image of Palestinian women. It is 
worth noting, however, that in 2013 the board of trustees of Al Aqsa University in Gaza 
voted to impose a ‘dress code’ for female students which renders the hijab compulsory 
and the jilbab (a long loose jacket-like cover that extends to the feet) strongly 
recommended.188 While, in recent years, Hamas have operated Islamization policies in 
Gaza, including encouraging women to wear the veil, the government in the West Bank, 
due to the strong western presence and influence, coupled with the heterogenic 
religiosity of the area, decided to keep the matter of veiling at grassroots level: peasants 
still use the traditional veil, while in the city women wear the traditional Muslim 
headscarf. Christian women, as well as many Muslims, do not veil: however, during 
important ceremonies, they wear traditional Palestinian clothes. 
Similarly, in Algeria, the practice of veiling has situationally and historically assumed 
different meanings: before the colonial period, the hijab was worn by women to 
indicate tribal belonging. During the colonial period, however, the veil was portrayed by 
colonizers as a symbol of Algerian backwardness and at the same time elevated as a 
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symbol of anti-colonial struggle by colonized people. In 1830, France colonized Algeria 
and assumed control over the country’s political and economic sectors. Most 
importantly, French colonizers, supported by the massive Christian proselytising mission 
operated by the Church, imposed French law over the governing Shari’a law, destroying, 
in this way, the normative system that have governed the local population for centuries: 
education in the Arabic language was forbidden and even the academic curriculum was 
designed to mimic the French one. This indicates that colonization was primarily a 
cultural battle aimed at transforming Algerians into ‘French citizens’. Along with 
amending the legal and educational system, the French concentrated their efforts on 
changing the cultural heritage of the country. The veil became the benchmark for a 
France’s cultural and civilizing battle and emerged as the visual and symbolic form of 
colonization.189 In fact, in appropriating the visibility of Algerian women’s body, French 
colonizers charged Algerian women with transforming Algerian men and the whole of 
Algerian society’. Their political doctrine was simple: “if we want to destroy the 
structure of Algerian society, its capacity for resistance, we must first of all conquer the 
women; we must go and find them behind the veil where they hide themselves and in 
the houses where the men keep them out of sight”.190 
As in nationalist thought, the visible works as a form of rhetoric; whereas the ‘truth’ is 
rhetorically produced by the discourse, the metaphoric use of the practice of veiling by 
colonizers and colonized reveals that symbols are rhetorically constructed through 
competing national images and identities through which imaginary boundaries of 
nationalism, citizenship and geography are established.191 In Algerian colonial discourse, 
the veil was “invested with a two-fold visibility of desires: a libidinal desire to pierce the 
veil – a desire to see beneath it – as well as an imperial desire to civilize or modernize 
Muslim society by removing the veil.”192 This is particularly clear in the postcard 
produced and sold by French colonizers at that time: images that portrayed sexualized 
veiled women revealing only the breast, or un-veiled/liberated Algerian upper-class 
women, to indicate the victory of France’s ‘mission of civilization’. The aim of the 
colonizers was to transform Algerian people into French citizens and the veil was the 
visible ‘sign of’ difference between France’s ‘civilization’ and its colonies: in fact, “for 
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male nationalists, women serve as the visible markers of national homogeneity, they 
become subjected to especially vigilant and violent discipline. Hence, the intense 
emotive politics of dress”.193 In colonial Algeria, “every veil that fell, everybody that 
became liberated from the traditional embrace of the haik [the typical Algerian 
headscarf], every face that offered itself to the bold and impatient glance of the 
occupier, was a negative expression of the fact that Algeria was beginning to deny 
herself and was accepting the rape of the colonizer.”194 
As a result of the passionate battle against the veil implemented by French colonizers, 
the hijab also assumed a new meaning for Algerians: “to the colonialist offensive against 
the veil, the colonized opposes the cult of the veil. What was an undifferentiated 
element in a homogeneous whole acquires a taboo character, and the attitude of a 
given Algerian woman with respect to the veil will be constantly related to her over-all 
attitude with respect to the foreign occupation.”195 The harsh conditions of colonized 
Algeria and the consequent feeling of injustice and dispossession had reinforced 
traditional behaviour and social norms and rendered the veil the symbol of Algerians’ 
anti-colonization struggle.196 But the participation of Algerian women in the national 
liberation struggles was not only limited to the practice of veiling; they wore European 
dress in the heart of France, carrying messages or military equipment without attracting 
suspicion, and they wore the veil in their country as a symbol of resistance against the 
occupation. The visible transformation of women’s body was a key factor during de-
colonization struggles in the country. Once women’s role in the Algerian liberation 
movement had been revealed, the French launched a tremendous offensive against 
them. El-Guindi reports French troops raping and torturing Algerian women:197 by 
violating women’s body, French colonizers also violated Algerian men’s honour, so 
consent by the local population for the anti-colonial movement increased, until the 
withdrawal from the country of French troops in 1962. After Algeria’s liberation, the 
country witnessed a long period of economic and political stagnation and Islamist 
groups rooted in the territory started to obtain a growing consent from the local 
population, especially in the poorest areas of the country. Despite the active role of 
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women in the national liberation struggle, in 1981, due to the pressure of conservative 
Islamist movements, the government introduced a new family code which revived many 
of the traditional features of the patrilineal family, relegating women to a minor legal 
status.198 
In Iran, the veil has assumed different political meanings in different historical and 
cultural moments while women’s body has been fashioned by different state 
ideologies:199 “in the nineteenth century, European and Iranian/Islamic women emerged 
as ‘terrain[s] of political and cultural contestations’ [which] resulted in the valorization 
of the veil (hijab) as a visible marker of the self and the other.”200 In the Iranian case, 
women’s opposition to veiling or un-veiling emerges as a resistance to an assigned 
state/nationalist identity which passes through the juridical regulation of their bodies. 
Sedghi identifies three distinct economic and political phases of nineteenth century Iran: 
the Qajar dynasty, the Pahlavi dynasty, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In each of these 
phases, Iranian policies of veiling, un-veiling and re-veiling have been a key element of 
the changing state national image:201 in every moment of political transition “the 
depiction of women’s bodies as uncovered or masked, exposed or concealed and their 
designation as ‘western’ or ‘Islamic’ contribute to a specific form of national identity”.202 
It is worth pointing out that veiling was a common practice in pre-Islamic Persia; during 
the Achaemenid Empire women observed seclusion and wore the traditional chador, a 
long veil that covers the body from head to toe. They were referred to as zai’feh, the 
weak sex, and moti’eh, obedient to men’s will; their lives were strictly controlled by men 
and they were “primarily confined to the household and reproduction”.203 This situation 
lasted until the end of the Qajar dynasty. When Reza Shah took power, the country was 
passing through a period of economic and political stagnation. The Shah, encouraged 
also by the 1906 constitutional revolution, which saw a great and active participation of 
women claiming their constitutional and educational rights, gradually started 
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implementing several reforms for the modernization of the country. Inspired by Ataturk, 
in 1936 the Shah decided to ban the veil as a symbol of Iranian westernization and 
modernization.204 The ban was so strict that if women did not comply with it, they 
would incur a fine, or even detention in some circumstances. The ban was particularly 
enforced in the main cities of the country, centres of capitalist development, while in 
villages women continued to wear the traditional rural chador. If, on the one hand, 
women protested against the ban, then on the other the promise of equal access to 
public space was underscored by the forced imposition of this law which, in the name of 
women’s rights, denied them the freedom to choose what to wear. As Spivak argues, “it 
is in terms of this profound ideology of the displaced place of the female subject that 
the paradox of free choice comes into play”.205 In essence, Iranian women at that time 
were placed in the position of choosing to accept the modernizing policies of the Shah 
or being targeted as ‘obstacles’ to the nation’s renovation and modernization.206 
As the ban attracted criticism from the clergy as well as from many women who felt 
uncomfortable walking in the street without the veil, in 1941 the Shah decided to repeal 
the ban. But the Shah’s ‘secular’ government did not mean it to last for long; the general 
climate of dissatisfaction with western political and economic influence, coupled with 
the westernization policies operated by the Shah, created strong anti-Shah/anti-western 
feelings. In fact, the Shah allowed western powers to directly control the country’s oil, 
sugar and tobacco industries in order to pay its debts to foreign powers: the population, 
then, started to see the newly established secular-national government as a puppet in 
the hands of the US. In the eyes of Iranians, the US was not only responsible for 
‘stealing’ the country’s natural resources, but also for imposing western cultures and 
values over the Iranian population. In this climate of dissatisfaction, the chador becomes 
the symbol of Iranian culture and tradition in contraposition to a corrupt and imperialist 
west.207 In fact, the rejection of western values spurred the demand for a ‘return’ to an 
authentic and ‘un-touched’ ‘imagined’ past and the hijab became the most powerful 
symbol of the 1979 Iranian revolution broadcast in western media: while western 
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women at the time were struggling for the ‘mini-skirt’, in Iran, women decided to re-veil 
and publicly show their support for the Islamic state by enforcing the revolutionary 
demands. Thus, “while the Constitutional revolution aimed to achieve economic and 
political independence through the emulation of secular European models of modernity, 
progress and strength, the emphasis of the Revolution of 1977-79 was in achieving 
cultural independence through the construction of an indigenous and authentic Islamic 
model of modernity and progress in Iran.”208 
If, during the revolution, the veil acquired the symbolic meaning of public anti-western 
and anti-monarch feelings, after 1979, the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran 
adopted the veil as a symbol of national identity and passed a law to render the practice 
compulsory;209 the safeguard of women’s appearance become the safeguard of the 
state. From a religious/cultural symbol, the hijab becomes a national symbol and 
women who do not wear the veil could incur serious consequences. The juridical 
regulation of women’s bodies was part of a wider Islamization policy operated by 
Khomeini after the revolution.210 As Sedghi argues, the new image of Iranian women 
mirrors anti-western positions and the Shi’a roots of Persian society whereas women’s 
body continues to serve patriarchal powers, whether secular/nationalist or 
religious/nationalist.211 Notable in the Iranian case is how the significance and visibility 
of the veil have been translated into a concept of nationhood, citizenship and cultural 
borders. 
In contemporary Iran, the debate over the veil is rapidly spreading in the media and 
many Ulama have started to doubt that the veil should be imposed by the state. In 
2012, referring to the polemic regarding women wearing an ‘improper’ Islamic veil, 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared, “What should we do with them? Is it advisable to 
reject them? Is it right to reject them? No, their hearts are attached to this camp and 
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their souls are attached to our goals and values.”212 However, although the debate over 
the veil has been revived, the government does not seem to be willing to repeal the 
law.213 
The cases I have taken into consideration reveal the gendered and misogynist practices 
and assumptions of nationalism.214 In fact, in nationalism the necessity for unity and 
homogeneity based on cultural/ethnic territorial differences is at the heart of the 
tension between women’s own identity and their assigned ‘state identity’: since women 
within nationalist thought represent the biological and cultural reproducers of an 
‘imagined community’, their plurality of performative practices has been reduced to a 
singular, national, fixed subjectivity.215 To the extent that veiling becomes a legal 
obligation, the veil, far from preserving Islamic values, hides an occidental obsession in 
the centralized law shared by both ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ nationalism. It is exactly the 
fixed and monolithic (visual) identity of Muslim women’s body that the practice of 
veiling addresses during the colonial and, as I shall argue in Chapter three, in the post-
colonial period. In fact, not only have racialized images of veiled women as victims of a 
chauvinist culture justified imperialist wars, but also, more importantly, they have 
produced a visual rhetoric of abjection toward the ‘other’: in the colonial period, the veil 
emerges as the cut-dividing line between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, ‘citizen’ and ‘alien’, 
‘friend’ and ‘enemy’. If the overarching strategy of nationalists’ ‘politics of clothes’ is to 
construct a binary opposition between the ‘self’ and the ‘enemy ‘other’, then the veil 
becomes the visual representation of an ‘imaginary’ ‘clash of civilizations’ between good 
and evil;216 as identity is constructed in terms of its negation, the regulation of women’s 
clothes in the public sphere becomes a useful tool to create cohesion in contraposition 
with the ‘other’. In essence, as Willford and Miller argue, “the compulsory veiling of 
women by nationalist movements in Sudan, Iran or Afghanistan, whether they are 
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seeking to shore-up existing regimes or fashion new ones, is but a graphic 
representation of women’s subordination that elsewhere may assume more subtle 
forms but which are, nevertheless, integral to the processes of defining a national 
identity.”217 In this case, the veil, a simple multi-meaning piece of cloth worn by women 
and men, becomes the ‘Muslim veil’, a fixed symbol of the fluctuating Muslim culture. In 
particular, the genealogy and the history of the practice of veiling indicates firstly that it 
was western discourse that created a link between the (backward) ‘culture of the ‘other’ 
and women’s body and, secondly, that that ‘eastern’ anti-colonial struggle adopted the 
same nationalist narrative as the colonizers.218 Ultimately, “they are mirror images of 
each ‘other’. The resistance narrative contested the colonial thesis by inverting it – 
thereby also, ironically, grounding itself in the premises of the colonial thesis.”219 What 
colonial powers did first and then nationalist/religious/secular movements in Muslim 
majority societies, was to apply a secularized form of privatization of “religion that, in 
turn, helped secure the foundational distinction between the public and the private. The 
privatization of this aspect of social life did not mean, of course, that they feel outside 
the purview of the state; rather, they came to be increasingly regulated by the 
centralized state and its various political rationalities (no longer administrated by local 
muftis, qadis, customary norms, and parochial moral knowledge).”220 In this sense, as 
Mahmood points out, “the gendered and sexualized dimensions […] are best 
understood as a product of the unique paradoxes produced by the simultaneous 
privatization of sexuality and religion under the modern post-colonial state. Even 
through this intertwining of religion and sexuality exhibits a normative structure that 
cuts across the West and non-West divide.”221 Therefore the veil can be seen as the 
regulation of private sentiments operated by a newly created centralized sovereign 
state, be it ‘Islamist’ or ‘secular’. Thus, “because of this history of struggle around it, the 
veil itself is now pregnant with meanings, as item of clothing, however, the veil itself 
and whether it is worn are about as relevant to substantive matters of women’s rights 
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as the social prescription of one or another item of clothing is to western women’s 
struggles over substantive issues.”222 
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1.4 Regulating clothes, regulating subjectivities 
 
In 2011, the conservative Canadian government banned the niqab (a veil that covers 
part of the face, revealing only the eyes) at public citizenship oath ceremonies; the 
niqab, as stated by Harper, the Canadian Prime Minister, is “offensive and not how we 
do things here”.223 A few years later, in 2013, a young Pakistani woman, Zunera Ishaq, 
challenged the ban by refusing to remove the niqab during her oath ceremony: as a 
result, Zunera could not take Canadian citizenship, but the government allowed her to 
live in the country with a resident permit. She decided to sue the government, claiming 
the infringement of her charter rights: the Federal Court of Appeal ruled in her favour 
and quashed the imposed ban.224 The case is of particular interest for two reasons: 
firstly, the ban was imposed in a public oath ceremony where the niqab emerges as a 
cut-dividing line between the ‘citizen’ and the ‘stranger’, and secondly, the simple 
wearing of a specific article of clothing can be considered ‘provocative’ by civil 
authorities and so becomes legally regulated. 
 
Why do clothes have such an important place in both western and non-western 
societies? Why can a simple article of clothing be understood as ‘threatening’ to civil life 
in a context in which citizenship comes to be cast in term of the law’s subject’s visibility? 
As Hansen argues, “because [clothing] both touches the body and faces outward others, 
dress has a dual quality […] this two-sided quality invites us to explore both the 
individual and collective identities that the dressed body enables.”225 In fact, as I shall 
point out, since “forms of dress, as with forms of architecture, are not [only] mere 
metaphors for the power and authority of the political state [but] they instantiate the 
power and authority of the political state,”226 the sovereign power has always had a 
particular interest in regulating clothes in the public sphere. After all, from Charles the 
Great until today, rulers have always tried to regulate dress in order to fashion similarity 
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and differences in the public sphere:227 in the Roman Empire, for instance, citizens 
sentenced to exile were forbidden to wear the toga which was used to distinguish 
between the ‘citizen’ and the ‘barbarian’. Similarly, the so called ‘sumptuary laws’, 
promulgated throughout European history to restrict luxury and extravagance, emerge 
as an “intrinsic element in the formation of the modern legal [and social] order….[based 
on the] identification of the ‘imagined communities’ […] [as well as] moods of nation, 
class, […] gender”, and visible social hierarchies.228 In this sense, the regulation of 
clothes becomes one of the “instruments of political, social, and economic 
regulation,”229 especially in periods of political and social change.230 In fact, as I shall 
argue, since clothes are perceived as ‘images’, and ‘images’ have the power to fashion 
the public sphere, the legal regulation of clothes emerges as “the law’s cultural 
commitment to the fabrication of a certain idea of the civil face and the force with 
which it seeks to fashion that face for itself and to enforce it on (and perform it for) 
society at large.”231 In fact, in western and non-western history, the appropriation by 
the authorities of images and icons in the public sphere has been compounded with the 
implementation of rules related to clothes which, in the past and present, represent 
cultural boundaries, accepted or rejected images of an (imaginary) community.232 Thus, 
by regulating clothes, law also regulates subjectivities; it places a mask on the real 
subject in the name of a fixed and monolithic law’s subject. 
 
In the course of history, rulers have spent considerable time and efforts to promulgate 
laws related to the individual’s apparel in the public sphere. In teleological terms, as 
Goodrich remind us, clothes have been conceived through their symbolic meaning, as 
images, metaphors, of a specific order of things.233 Tertullian’s interest in apparel, for 
instance, reveals how the regulation of the proper clothes to be exposed in the public 
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sphere should mirror a divine transcendental order.234 In his treatise, clothes emerge as 
a powerful image of an ‘ordered society’ through which the individual reads and 
interprets the external world, which, in turn, shapes her/his internal soul:235 in other 
words, the external world should mirror the individual’s internal ‘being’. In fact, not only 
do clothes “make the human body visible”236 as they are located at the border between 
the internal self and the external world, but also, more importantly, their symbolic 
meaning is understood as a semiotic code which shapes our and others perception of 
the world.237 Based on Barthes, garments are “the particular signifier of a general 
signified that is exterior to it (epoch, country and, social class) consequently, the 
relations between vestimentary signifier and signified can never be determined in a 
simple and linear fashion.”238 In essence, garments are strictly related to the formal and 
normative system which is “defined by normative links which justify, oblige, prohibit, 
tolerate, in a word, control the arrangement of garments on a concrete wearer who is 
identified in their social and historical place.”239 Thus, for Barthes, clothes are not simply 
a cultural phenomenon which defines a personal identity in a specific group, location 
and time, but they are a vehicle of meanings: they signify structures behind what is 
represented. As with every image, clothes have the potentiality to include and exclude 
and to delineate gendered territorial borders of an ‘imagined community’;240 as clothes 
express uniformity, hierarchy and regularity, they are concerned with the imaginistic 
order of a community.241 
In Medieval Europe clothes were conceived as a mark of difference; dress was 
understood as a visible symbol of belonging, social status, religion and gender. In mid-
late thirteenth century Europe, sumptuary laws aimed at restricting certain apparel to 
                                                             
234 Geoffrey D Dunn, ‘Tertullian’, in Roger S Bagnall  and others (eds) The Encyclopedia of Ancient 
History (Wiley & Sons Inc, 2012). 
235 Goodrich, ‘Signs Taken for Wonders’ (n 8) 721. 
236 Amy De la Haye and Elizabeth Wilson, Defining Dress: Dress as Object, Meaning, and Identity 
(Manchester University Press, 1999) 1–2. 
237 Umberto Eco and others, Travels in Hyperreality, Trans (Mariner book, 1990). 
238 Barthes (n 150) 5–6. 
239 Ibid, 7. It is worth pointing out that, in western history, clothes have always been understood 
as a ‘sign of’ an individual’s interiority. Drawing from Saussure’s system of language, Barthes 
argues that fashion is a form of language which, as Saussure’s semiotic system, is composed by 
signifier and signified. See Barthes (n 150). Differently, as I will argue in Chapter four, clothes are 
not only a ‘sign of’, but they can also be used as ‘means to’ acquire specific values. 
240 John Alexander Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (University of North Carolina Press, 
1982) 6–8. 
241 C Fred Blake, ‘Foot-Binding in Neo-Confucian China and the Appropriation of Female Labor’ 
(1994) Signs 676; Watt (n 10) 82. 
62 
 
the elites (as in Tertullian’s treatise) or distinguishing Christian from non-Christian 
communities settled in the area. In 1215, for instance, the Fourth Lateran Council 
adopted different measures to separate Christians from non-Christians and ruled that 
Jews and Saracens should wear different clothes in order to avoid confusion between 
them and the Christian majority. With the promulgation of sumptuary laws, the synod 
aimed at preventing the mingling of different religious groups: “it happens occasionally 
that through error Christians have sexual relations with the women of Jews or Saracens, 
and Jews or Saracens with the women of Christians.”242 Soon, Lateran IV shifted the 
legal regulation of clothes with the imposition of diverse ‘signs’ by introducing round 
badges of different colours: Jews were ordered to wear a red circular patch over their 
breast, Muslims and unbaptized people a yellow patch, while Christians who broke or 
challenged ‘sumptuary laws’ were forbidden to enter any church of the reign.243 
Similarly, in thirteenth century Hungary, clothes were used to designate the ‘other’, the 
‘outsider’, the ‘stranger’, an element of difference from the Christian majority settled in 
the country.244 Interestingly, however, while the Church in Hungary felt the need to 
distinguish Jews and Muslims from Christians through the introduction of sumptuary 
laws related to clothes, it tried at the same time to integrate and assimilate Cumans; as 
their attire was considered a ‘sign of evil’, they were ordered to conform with Christian 
dress and forms of behaviour. After a long negotiation with the Cuman community, the 
Church allowed them to keep their braids in exchange for baptism and permanent 
settlement in the area.245 However, the regulation of clothes to distinguish between 
different religions is not only a feature of European countries: in the near Middle East, 
the Umayyad Caliphs, to which I will come back in the next Chapter, introduced diverse 
types of belt and headgear to distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims.246 
 
But sumptuary laws were not only aimed at distinguishing between religions: in the 
Ottoman Empire, during the reigns of Sultan Osman III (1754-57) and Mustafa III (1757-
74), both of which periods were characterized by internal conflicts and political 
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stagnation, the regulation of clothes was used as a disciplinary tool. In fact, during this 
period, sumptuary laws addressed order, social discipline, honour and austerity:247 
through the legal regulation of different headgear, clothes were used to indicate a 
specific individual’s place within the society and to give people a sense of identity and 
belonging to a specific group in a ‘well-ordered society’. The Ottoman Empire, which at 
that time was facing many military defeats, needed to “assure ottoman subjects and 
elites that the world was still an orderly place in which all retained their respective 
political and social positions”.248 Thus, sumptuary laws were implemented to strengthen 
power relationships and the superiority of one group over another (men over women, 
Muslim over non-Muslim etc.). Similarly, Sultan Suleyman, called the ‘Lawgiver’, 
promulgated a code (Kanun-I-Reaya) to regulate clothes and specific forms of behaviour 
within different ranks and social hierarchies as a means to create a strong and unified 
‘nation-state’ through the control and interference of the state in the private life of the 
citizen. In this sense, as Goodrich argues, “a person’s place in the imaginary order of 
nation or class was also a question of the order of images […], the regulation of dress, 
ornament, and food was linked to a theological and moral concern with the proper signs 
of identity and community. The legislation of the licit image of a person was linked 
indissolubly to the order of images and the role of symbols, of […] the ‘visible world’ in 
public and private life.” 249 
 
Sumptuary laws served also to demarcate and secure sex and gender identities. In fact, 
as Hunt argues, sumptuary law related to women’s clothes “manifests itself as a concern 
to establish some natural and stable connection between sex, gender and social role”.250 
Meaningfully, during the Middle Ages, a great number of edicts and statutes relating to 
women’s clothes were imposed: as women were excluded from the social public life, 
their position was related to that of men as the head of family.251 But, as Hunt argues,252 
if on the one hand, ‘social anxieties’ about dress have fluctuated in relation to women, 
on the other, what remains stable is the persistent obsession with women’s modesty 
and morality through the centuries. This, in turn, has been associated with a certain 
                                                             
247 Quataert (n 227).  
248 Ibid, 407. 
249 Goodrich, ‘Signs Taken for Wonders’ (n 8) 711–2. 
250 Hunt (n 7) 217. 
251 Ibid, 217–9. 
252 Ibid. 
64 
 
anxiety in relation to the controllability of women: Hunt suggests that sumptuary laws 
related to gender emerge as a central part of the ‘political economy of marriage’ which 
is exemplified in the links between the dowry system and the promulgation of specific 
sumptuary laws.253 If for men the regulation of clothes expressed a specific social and 
economic class, for women sumptuary laws aimed at showing their respectability.254 In 
Siena, for instance, sumptuary law prescribed a specific length of women’s skirts 
(whereas only matrons and not unmarried women could wear long trains)255 while in 
Florence, in 1464, sumptuary laws were more concerned with women’s décolletage 
(women were allowed to wear a décolletage three centimetres below the 
collarbone).256 Another feature of women’s clothes regulation concerned cross-dressing. 
In 1443 Venice, men who dressed as women were subjected to heavy fines while in 
fifteenth century France Louis XI imposed harsh punishments for prostitutes who wore 
male clothes. It is worth noting that cross-gender anxieties are not only a feature of 
European countries: as Ahmed reveals, a decree “issued in Cairo in 1263 forbade 
women to wear ‘imamahs (male headgear) and other masculine clothing”.257 As, at that 
time, conservative religious authorities disliked gender-crossing clothes, they intimated 
families and husbands to put an end to this practice. Hunt’s study on sumptuary laws 
reveals that the focus on women’s body in Middle Ages Europe was particularly 
emphasized during the period of the struggle between religious and secular authority.258 
Though there was a general consensus over the inferiority of women, secular and 
religious power constructed different discourses in relation to the ‘woman question’: for 
the Church, women’s identity should be related to morality because signs of luxury were 
seen as a sin, while within secular discourse, women’s luxury was associated with the 
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‘economic wrong of extravagance.’259 The tension between secular and religious power 
is particularly exemplified by (European) women’s veiling; whereas, on the one hand, 
the veil was seen by the Church as a sign of religious piety and sexual modesty, on the 
other, the veil facilitated the concealment of identity. Thus, on the one hand, the 
Church favoured women’s head covering while on the other, secular authorities 
expressed anxieties over the anonymity of women.260 As a matter of fact, in Siena, 
officials were obliged to ask veiled women the name of their father or husband: 
therefore, “what was at stake was the degree of freedom veils allowed for assignations 
that breached patriarchal control and exhibited some degree of personal and sexual 
licence. This is borne out by the fact that prostitutes were frequently forbidden to wear 
the veil.”261 Besides, there was always a strict cooperation between secular and religious 
authorities: “in Italy, in particular, there is evidence that the targeting of women points 
to the presence of the ecclesiastical hand behind sumptuary law during the Middle 
Ages. The morality of women was a central preoccupation and dress and ornamentation 
was the readily visible sign of immorality; the immoral character could be read from the 
immodest clothing.”262 The distinction between the ‘respectable’ and the ‘depraved’ 
woman mirrored the legislation of the time: in 1351, the London Dress Ordinance 
imposed a strict dress code for prostitutes but highlighted that all the restrictions 
applied to prostitutes had no value if the prostitute was of noble birth.263 All in all, what 
is significant in the attention toward women’s apparel is that it continues to be an 
obsession even nowadays: “appearance continues to be ‘read’ in much the same way as 
physiognomy was in the eighteenth century as a means of access to some underlying 
social essence […] appearance is still read as a means of discerning the boundary 
between insiders and outsider”.264 
 
Clothes regulations, however, were not only implemented to ‘differentiate’ between 
citizens, but also to create unity and homogeneity: in 1337 Edward III of England 
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forbade the exportation and the wearing of foreign clothes except by the royal family.265 
The law stated that anyone acting or dressing as an ‘Egyptian’, a gypsy or a stranger was 
to be declared outlaw. The fact that, in sixteenth century England, over twenty 
enactments on apparel were promulgated indicates the power of clothes to shape the 
public sphere and to create not only differentiation, but also homologation: in other 
words if, on the one hand, clothes were regulated to establish class/group 
differentiation, then on the other the ‘English man’ was to be recognized exactly by his 
clothes.266 As, traditionally, external signs were considered the mark of internal states, 
“legal concern with dress was a concern both with the indigenous, with a vernacular 
civility free of the stranger […] and with all other cults that were suggestive of traditions 
and forces extrinsic to the native soil.”267  
 
Therefore, not only do clothes provide a sense of belonging but also, more importantly, 
they delineate the border between ‘citizen’ and ‘foreigner’: the first is included within 
the pale of the law, while the latter comes to be excluded by the law.268 As identity is 
built through the negation of the ‘image of the other’, the rejection of ‘foreign’ clothes 
(with their specific shapes, cuts, and colours) was a precise political strategy to avoid 
‘foreign vices’ and to create a sense of national belonging. As Goodrich argues, 
“doctrine depends upon an antiportait or negative image, it proves doctrine by 
denouncing heresy, affirms jurisdiction by exclusion of illegitimate speech or by the 
power of excommunication. It conjures identity by showing the face, the plurality or 
void, of evil.”269 Clothes, then, have been legally regulated not only to create the image 
of an ‘ordered society’, but also, more importantly, to build a unified image of a 
territorial unified (imagined) community. 
 
During a period of internal instability consequent to the political challenge represented 
by Greek rebels to the centralized Ottoman Empire (1821-1832), Mahmud II (1808- 
1839) imposed a fixed attire for different religious/cultural groups in order to shape a 
monolithic national identity and to create a sense of unity and identity in the fractured 
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Ottoman Empire. The law, as Quataert argues, “anticipated by a full decade the 
tanzimat (1839-76) commitment to the formal equality of all before the law and the 
entry of non-Muslims into the military and bureaucracy on the same legal basis as 
Muslims.” 270 The 1934 Turkish Dress Act, which banned the wearing of religious symbols 
and attire (except in places of worship), mirrors the attempt to create a strong and 
unified western style nation-state.271 Dis-similarly, in 1720s Turkey, where Muslim 
women were accused of dressing as Christians, a law on modest dress was promulgated; 
the streets of Istanbul should have ‘the face’ of a Muslim country.272 In both cases, the 
regulation and control of images in the public sphere emerges as a tool to create a 
specific legal subject by demarcating the boundaries of social thought and social 
reproduction through the regulation of women’s body: in fact, the power of images lies 
exactly in the opposition between orders of imagination. In essence, the legal regulation 
of specific clothes comes out as a precise political strategy which aims at 
institutionalizing a mode of thinking based on the control of images, clothes, desires, 
and human emotions by a centralized sovereignty,273 which “institute[s] subjectivity 
through and across the imagery of law and rhetoricity of its texts.”274 As a matter of fact, 
as images has been instituted to transmit social power and to establish a specific 
political order, they have the power to constitute a specific kind of law’s subject who is 
bound to a specific order of power and imagination represented and protected by the 
rules of law: thus, 
“whichever form the image took, either licit or illicit, iconic or idolatrous, its function 
was structural, it established the order of meaning and of law, it governed the soul by 
dictating what the heart could see or the mind portray of itself […] the definition of an 
order of true reference, a doctrine or creed, required the designation of an order of 
signs through which the […] subjects of law, could be ordered to imagine, perceive, 
understand, or know the invisible truth.”275 
Therefore, the control of clothes and images in the public sphere is aimed at instituting 
a ‘particular form of governance’ and, along with it, a particular form of ‘regulated’ 
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behaviour whereas the law’s subject emerges as emotionally attached to an ‘imagined 
community’. In this sense, law allows a double movement: on the one hand, it excludes 
difference in the name of ‘homogeneity’ by excluding the ‘stranger’, the veneration of 
other gods and the possibilities of other form of rhetoric, while on the other, by 
imposing a differentiation of clothes within different economic and social/gendered 
classes, it highlights differences between citizens. 
 
It is exactly in this sense that the new legal subject, with his/her new clothes, emerges 
as the image, the mirror, of a precise legal order, of law’s appearance in the social 
realm: “the social body, the icon and mode of civility, included and annexed the subject  
[…] it was the logic of the mirror, of mimetic duplication, of the mask or image, which is 
to say, of the father in the son.”276 In other words, the regulation of images and clothes 
in the public sphere was a regulation of the ‘licit’ form of visibility and its proper 
reference in order to forge and create a specific law’s subject: “the discourse against 
rhetoric, against images, and against women […] are discourses of the foundation of law 
in the definition and capture of subjectivity”.277 
In fact, as Foucault reveals,278 knowledge embraces both the ‘visible’ and the ‘sayable’ 
whereas each historical moment comes out as the combination of these two elements: 
the ‘visible’, in contrast with the ‘sayable’, is a form of knowledge able to create 
multiple networks of power relations and subjectivities.279 The place assigned to the 
visible “demonstrate[s] that rhetoric functions epistemologically not only by virtue of 
the sayable […] but also […] through ways of seeing. The visible, as a means of 
knowledge-production, is rhetorical because such knowledge, rendered through 
complex networks of seeing and being seen that define entire fields of the visible.” 280 
Images, then, as well as clothes, create meanings: through their symbolic power, they 
‘move the mind’ and they create a link between ‘internal’ and ‘external’, ‘form’ and 
‘substance’. “The symbolic is therefore no more than the medium that evokes or refers 
to the imaginary, the perfect community or model of relation, of which the symbol 
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(image or word) is a distant replica”.281 Thus, as images are central in the construction of 
meanings, they are functional to create a link between rhetoric and ideology in nation 
building process.282 As I have pointed out, clothes are not only to be intended as mere 
‘appearance’ but they should be analysed through their symbolic meaning through 
which it is possible to conceptualize nationality, geography and gender as a rhetorical 
form of the visible which “make the world known to different individuals, who thereby 
engage, on the basis of such knowledge, in the ongoing refashioning of life in the public 
spaces.”283 Thus, the visible, unlike the ‘visual’ which is a simple ‘representation’, 
depends upon a symbolic order which emerges as “a rhetorical form that produces 
effects merely through what is rendered as ‘self-evident’ or ‘natural’”.284 It is therefore 
clear that the aim of the law is not to ‘cover’ or ‘un-cover’, but to ‘order’ and control the 
public sphere in order to rhetorically construct meanings and subjectivities. 
The idea that clothes can cause ‘disruption’, or that they can be intended as ‘a threat to 
the values of a society’, as in the never-ending legal debate over the veil, shows that it is 
not the simple article of clothing, but its symbology that can threaten the status quo. As 
I have argued, the power of clothes lies exactly in their location: since they are at the 
margin of the body, they symbolize the boundary between the self and the external 
world.285 It is therefore clear why, for centuries, rulers have promulgated laws related to 
clothes: the law intervenes to re-order what escapes from the control of a singular and 
fixed state sovereignty. As Goodrich argues, “understood as a crucial part of the law of 
images, and equally as a dimension of the legal construction of the symbolic order, the 
regulation of appearance can be reinterpreted as a key component in the identity of 
those ‘imagined communities’.”286 
It is exactly through the fashion of images and its repetition in the public sphere that a 
community identity comes to be constituted and an absolute sovereignty established: 
thus, the regulation of clothes mirrors the increasing penetration of the state in the 
individual’s private life. If, in Medieval Europe as well as in the Middle East, clothes were 
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used as a means of differentiation, in the newly created nation-states, the regulation of 
clothes aimed at creating new categories of dress as ‘distinctive’ of a specific national 
belonging. In 1920s Turkey, for instance, the newly created secular state banned the 
veil, intended as a symbol of a ‘backward’ ‘religious’ tradition: in the passage from a 
supposedly (multi) religious Ottoman Empire to a singular ‘secular’ state sovereignty, 
women’s clothes come to symbolize the identity and the territorial border of the 
state.287 Being a means of differentiation or homologation, the appropriation and 
control of images in the public sphere becomes a useful tool to establish a collective 
national identity within ‘nation building’ processes through the visible negation of the 
‘other’.288 In this sense, the juridical regulation of clothes emerges as the expression of 
the state’s power and control over the private life of its subjects: in other words, 
clothing regulation emerges as the symbol of the expansion of regia potestas over the 
subject’s soul. 
The history of sumptuary laws, as well as the recent cases related to the regulation of 
the female Muslim headscarf in the west and in the east, reveals that “law 
demonstrates anxiety when individuals attempt to perform their own public face, 
through personal modes of dress and undress, in the liminal space of dress that the law 
takes to be a locus of its own dominion [...]. When we choose to dress ourselves publicly 
in a particular way, we are exercising a form of self-government. We are taking control 
of our little state.”289 Thus, the law’s anxiety over the legal regulation of clothes can be 
analysed as a means to control and regulate the subject’s boundaries:290 by wearing (or 
removing) a veil, the law’s subject is appropriating her right to regulate her own relation 
between her private life and the civil/public sphere. If law comes out as the defender of 
the licit image in the public sphere, then the secular claim of the separation between 
private and public is an illusion: as I have argued, the regulation of the individual’s 
private sphere has been a useful tool to shape not only the external world, but also, 
more importantly, the internal world of the law’s subject.291 Thus, what is at stake in the 
regulation of clothes is the relation between the individual and the state: this relation, 
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as Agamben argues, “concerns the routine inscription and registration of the most 
private and most incommunicable element of subjectivity –the biopolitical life of the 
body.”292 In fact, the regulation of clothes reveals that “public reason defines a private 
being which only has a legitimate existence within the public sphere of its 
representation.”293 Therefore, the legal subject emerges as a fixed and abstract mask 
created and subjugated by and through a specific form of visibility. As Deleuze points 
out, “the mask is the true subject of repetition. Such is the case because the nature of 
repetition differs from that of representation, because the repeated cannot be 
represented, but must always be signified, while masking at the same time that it 
signifies.”294 In fact, as Goodrich reminds us, the subject is said to have a ‘legal 
personality’: the word derives from the Latin persona which indicated the actor’s 
mask.295 
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Chapter 2: Setting the scene: Unveiling ‘political Islam’ 
In February 2016, the US Air Force Research Laboratory released a report entitled 
‘Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods & Strategies’.296 The report, which 
was first published in 2011 following President Obama’s announcement of a national 
counter-terrorism strategy, was drafted by academics and researchers and provides a 
detailed analysis of terrorism and the possibility of its prevention. In particular, the 
second part of the report includes a Chapter written by Dr Tawfik Hamid, a former 
Islamic extremist and fellow at the ‘Potomac Institute for Policy Studies’: the Chapter, 
entitled ‘A Strategic Plan to Defeat Radical Islam’, refers to the wearing of the veil as 
‘passive terrorism’. He states that “[extremism occurs when] increasing numbers of 
women begin to wear the hijab, which is both a symptom of Salafi proliferation and a 
catalyst for Islamism […] the proliferation of militant Salafism and the hijab contribute 
to the idea of passive terrorism, which occurs when moderate segments of the 
population decline to speak against or actively resist terrorism”.297 This reveals that the 
veil, a simple piece of cloth worn by women for many reasons and to many effects, 
emerges nowadays as the symbol of the ‘clash of civilizations’298 between a ‘secularized’ 
West and a ‘religious’ and ‘extremist’ Islamic world and is widely misconstrued, 
abstractly and without reference to the extreme heterogeneity of Muslim majority 
societies: in this struggle, religious freedom and gender equality confront the fear of 
extremism and a desire to exclude religion from the public sphere. It is exactly the so 
called ‘clash of civilizations’ and the intrinsic link drawn by western commentators 
between the veil and the ‘backward/violent’ culture of the ‘other’ that I address in this 
Chapter. Drawing from Diamantides’ approach, which sees the so called ‘clash of 
civilizations’ as the progeny of similarity rather than complete differences, my argument 
is that the veil emerges as a symbol, a metaphor, of a profound dis-similarity between 
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the ‘east’ and the ‘west’. Its metaphorical power lies in its capacity to symbolize, 
through women’s body, a specific law’s subject that is bound to a fixed and universal 
law. In fact, as Diamantides argues, although the ‘eastern’ and the ‘western’ world 
passed through the assimilation of Graeco-Roman consciousness, only in the west, this 
has signified a fusion between legal and political power. Differently, in the east, 
although the Abbasid’s effort to institute a unique, fixed Sharia law valid for everyone, 
the resistance of Islamic scholars never allows the creation of a ‘canonic form of Sunna’. 
Hence, while the west has managed to create a unique, universal, fixed law able to 
bound the subject to a fixed identity, in Muslim majority societies, only the Abbasid, and 
nowadays Islamists, have tried to demystify Islamic religion in the name of a superior 
raison d’État. In this context, the veil emerges as the symbol, the metaphor, of the 
anxiety produced by the encounter of two forms of universal(ist) legal systems: one 
triumphant, and the other aspiring. In fact, both western liberals and Islamists, aim at 
instituting through the force of the rules of law a fixed law’s subject bound to a positive 
unique and universal(ist) law. Both western liberals and Islamists are concerned with the 
legal regulation of the female headscarf: but while Islamists advocate the compulsory 
veiling referring to a westernized and secularized version of Sharia law, western liberals 
call for the un-veiling of women as a means to include them within the pale of 
western/Christian/secular law. Both aim at creating, through the enforcement of a fixed 
positivised law, a specific legal subject. Thus the veil is not only a metaphor, but a reality 
lived and experienced by many women who have seen their personal freedoms limited. 
My analysis takes into consideration the medieval origins of the Islamic legal system in 
relation to the western, canon legal system. I consider both systems to be part of what 
Nancy calls the ‘monotheist model of social organization.’299 He argues that in all 
monotheistic societies religious law gradually expands to cover more ‘secular’ concerns, 
to the point where the process of production of legal meaning is secularized, with little 
or no connection to core religious beliefs. In this way, by authorizing a system of law 
that deals with the temporal, religion itself is ‘demystified’: this process, as Martel 
argues, leads to a fetishization of law as a substitute for the withdrawn God.300 Nancy 
identifies three ‘auto-deconstructionist characteristics’ typical of all ‘monotheistic 
model[s] of social organization’ which lead to a ‘demystification of religion’. Firstly, 
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monotheism ‘is in truth atheism’. In fact, the presence of many gods in the ‘pre-
monotheist’ societies corresponded to an effective plurality in nature which is organized 
by religion through myths; in this sense, “the unicity of God […] signif[ies] the 
withdrawal of God from presence and thus also from the power thereby understood.”301 
Secondly, ‘monotheistic religion’ manifests itself historically as a composition of 
narratives and myths and emerges as the elaborations of Greek philosophical 
consciousness and Roman/statist juridical legacy. The third characteristic follows the 
former: the ‘demythologization/demystification of religion’, which found its expression 
in the construction of mythical narratives, was gradually substituted by narratives 
concerning human affairs, such as concepts of human rights and democracy in the West, 
and liberation/decolonization theories in the near East and elsewhere; ultimately, these 
‘secular’ western concepts produced a legalism which is nothing more than the 
substitute for God’s supreme power. 
The above framework allows the comparative analysis of two “structurally similar and 
contingently dissimilar”,302 legal systems of religious origins. While the comparison 
reveals that in both cases the power to make law act as a substitute for God’s supreme 
power, only in the West was this fully articulated with the development of the doctrine 
of sovereignty. By contrast, Islamic law’s precise relationship with political power is 
much less linearly developed and the different periods of its cross-fertilization with 
Greek philosophy and Roman law, before and after colonialism, should be analysed. 
After the death of the Prophet (632), the early Caliphs ruled the conquered provinces 
far from the capital, and left legal and administrative matters to local qadis (early 
judges), wise people respected by the conquered population.303 They were accustomed 
to adjudicating legal cases based on the principle of ra’y, discretionary opinion, while 
the Qur’an and the Sunna were presented as modifications of the existing customary 
law. The first period of Islam was marked by interpretative freedom and casuistry; 
therefore the production of jurisprudence was case driven and sensitive to local 
customs. One immediate result of this was the safeguarding of the conquered 
population’s customary law and pre-Islamic practices. 
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However, the centralization policies of the Umayyad dynasty initiated a profound 
struggle between legal and political powers: on the one hand, qadis and Ulama 
increasingly depended on the financial favours of the political elite, while on the other, 
the political elite needed the legitimization of the law to reign and to ensure absolute 
control over the conquered population. This dynamic and troubled symbiosis 
characterized the relationship between these two powers. An attempt at western style 
centralization and sovereignty under a self-proclaimed ‘God’s Caliph’ was further 
pursued by the Abbasid dynasty. This ‘would-be centralized Islamic theocracy’ tried to 
concentrate political, religious and legal power on the Caliphs who financed the 
translation of classical Greek work into Arabic in an attempt to promote a singular 
canon law to be interpreted and applied using Aristotelian logic and dialectic 
disputation. What the Abbasids sought to create was a monolithic, united and universal 
Muslim juridical community. Notably, however, this effort was not successful: as a 
matter of fact, the attempt by the Abbasids to create a ‘superior raison d’etat’ was 
damaged by Muslim scholars who maintained a relatively pluralist system by alleging 
respect for different schools of legal interpretation. As I shall argue, the matter of the 
hijab should be ‘positioned’ within this struggle of power and the attempt to create, 
through the women’s body, a singular, fixed, and monolithic national identity.304 
If, in the West, centralization and sovereignty eventually helped to produce the ‘nation-
state’, in Muslim majority societies the relative freedom of judges and jurists and the de 
facto and de jure plurality of schools, which reflected local cultures, meant less state 
legitimacy and a “deficient sovereignty model”305 (that arguably rendered the Muslim 
world more vulnerable to western expansionism). While in the West Christian scholars 
textualized a canon law embodied first by the Pope and then by the Emperor, in Islam 
the law’s textualization was constantly in need of negotiation with the local legal 
authority. The situation did not change until the 19th century, when the Ottoman 
Sultans modelled their new ‘Muslim Empire’ on the European sovereign ‘nation state’ 
by rendering the Hanafi book of law valid only in the hands of the Sultan and created a 
centralized appointment system for qadis while adopting elements of the French Legal 
system. With the Ottoman Empire the process of ‘secularization of Islam’ began to be 
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westernized. The subsequent colonization period (from the16th to the mid-20th 
century) marked even more profound changes with the imposition of law codification, 
the adoption of legal positivism by newly created law faculties, the parallel decline of 
the Ulama system of education and the loss of communication of ideas among different 
Muslim schools of thought, each of which was isolated in the confines of the new 
‘nation-state’ in the only jurisdiction remaining – namely ‘family law’. The codification of 
Islamic law signifies a reduction of legal and cultural plurality typical of the Muslim 
world: consequently, the individual becomes gradually bound to a singular, monolithic, 
binding law emanating from a ‘sovereign’ of the ‘new nation-state’. 
Thus, the demythologization and secularization of the Islamic and the western Christian 
religions happened differently. The differences concern mostly the ‘deficient 
sovereignty’’ and legal authority of Medieval Muslim governments which have never 
succeeded to create a unique Sharia law valid for everybody. The Abbasid’s attempt to 
‘proselytize’ religion is nowadays re-claimed by Islamists. In fact, what Islamists are 
seeking is not the ‘true’, ‘pure’ Islam, typical of Medina, where the law was made locally 
and reflected the plurality of cultures of the Umma, but the legal edifice sought in the 
Abbasid period which reinforces central political power by binding the community to a 
singular all-encompassing legal code as well as a ‘national’ ‘Muslim’ identity’. 
In this connection, the veil emerges as a symbol of the contrast between two versions of 
sovereignty, that of the European colonizer and that of the Islamist nationalist who aims 
to create a singular Muslim identity by reducing Islamic law to a monolithic codified 
legal system. In fact, as I have argued in the first Chapter, the veil is not an Islamic 
symbol but was borrowed from earlier non-Islamic cultures. The compulsory veil 
promoted by the Abbasid through a misogynist interpretation of Islamic texts,306 as well 
as by contemporary power-hungry Islamist groups is an attempt to symbolically forge a 
common identity; indeed the female figure and/or dress code are common collective 
group and also nationalist symbols. 
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Therefore, the current obsession with the Muslim veil, shared by western liberals and 
Islamists, acts to hide the anxiety produced by the imposition of one way of secularized 
monotheism over another.307 Recalling Nancy,308 if in the West the process of 
‘demystification of religion’ founds its final expression in the substitution of religious 
values with ‘human rights and democracy’, in post-colonial Islam this ‘demystification’ 
founds its westernized expression in the nationalist decolonization struggle. Henceforth, 
the new ‘nation-state’, in the West as well as in the East, produced a legalism which is 
nothing more than a substitute for religion. 
As Diamantides argues, when the western and eastern worlds meet, their internal 
incompleteness becomes apparent: this develops a mechanism of defence and 
attachment to their respective legal systems. In essence, the so called ‘clash of 
civilizations’ is nothing more than the anxiety of two dogmatic legal systems over the 
condition of incompleteness and their own internal shortcomings:309 on both sides a 
mechanism of defence and attachment to their respective laws develops which is 
nowadays mirrored in the struggle over the veil. In fact, both western liberals and 
Islamists are prompted by the desire for a positive law that can guarantee social order 
and facilitate centralized state control. In this context, the passionate debate over the 
hijab is a fake one: the veil is a visible symbol, a mirror, of a clash between two legal 
systems, structurally similar and contingently dissimilar. As a matter of fact, both liberals 
and Islamists agree that the dress code of Muslim women cannot be a personal 
women’s choice; where the two sides disagree is on how many centimetres of skin a 
woman should reveal. While, as I shall argue in the next two Chapters, western law 
implements a specific model of womanhood through the banning of the veil, the static 
Sharia law proposed firstly by the Abbasid and then by Islamist movements nowadays, 
proposes a fixed model of womanhood by rendering the veil compulsory. 
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2.1 Shari’a Law and Islamic legal sources 
The hierarchy of legal sources for Muslims is highly complex and is the result of a 
gradual process of accommodation between traditional local customary laws and the 
hermeneutic interpretations that have been developed in different historical periods 
and geographic areas; therefore, its specificity has to be found in the interaction of 
many cultural and normative systems that are inscribed in the very essence of Islamic 
law.310 In essence, Shari’a is a comprehensive juridical system which emerges as the 
result of the accommodation operated by Islam with the customary law of the 
conquered populations as well as of authority and power relationships which were 
continuously negotiated in the history of Islam. As I have briefly outlined in the previous 
Chapter, Shari’a law is not a fixed, monolithic ‘substantive’, ‘traditional’311 legal system, 
as is positive law in the West; rather, it is a ‘pluralistic’ legal system, a ‘polyglot 
discourse’, based on the consensus of the Ummah. There was no single Islamic law in 
the past, nor is there today; on the contrary, there exist many books of Islamic law 
which allow a certain flexibility in the regulation of Muslims’ daily lives. 
For Muslims, revelation is entrusted in the Qur’an which is not the outcome of a 
divinely-inspired human, such as the Gospel for Christians; rather, it is the word of God 
that was received verbatim by the Prophet Muhammad and, for this reason, is the most 
important religious text and the primary source for Muslims in every aspect of their 
lives. The text emphasises that the Prophet was asked to receive the sacred words in his 
original tongue, Arabic, and to protect humans from mistakes, inaccuracy, and 
misapprehensions.312 The sacred text also highlights that Muhammad was a mere 
human chosen by God to be the intermediary of the Revelation and to address mankind 
so they would have no doubt about the “right path” to take and would, therefore, be 
                                                             
310 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge : Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (3rd ed, 
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unable to live in ignorance.313 The sacred text deals with many themes and includes 
commands about worship, fasting, pilgrimage, marriage and divorce, restriction of 
polygamy, regulation of slavery, relation between the sexes, children and custody, 
punishment for crimes etc…314 The Qur’an, however, only occasionally gives explicit 
guidance; rather, it usually contains general exhortations. In fact, the number of ‘legal’ 
verses in the Qur’an (between 200 and 500) represents a small portion of the 6300 
verses present in the holy book. Since the Qur’an is the most important legal source for 
Muslims, Koranic exegesis (Tafsir) has emerged as one of the most important disciplines 
in Islam.315 
The second source of Islamic law is the Sunna: literally, it means ‘the trodden path’, and 
for today’s Muslims it is translated into the daily actions and behaviour of the Prophet 
Mohammad during his life. Sunna is a pre-Islamic practice; it was a custom of the earlier 
Arabian society to follow the Sunnan (normative practices to be emulated) of every 
charismatic and distinguished person in a family/clan. As I shall argue, in the first period 
of Islam, Caliphs and proto-qadis (early judges) referred to Sunnan (note the plural) as 
actions and norms accepted and recognized as ethically correct by the community.316 
The process that led to the singular, codified, Prophetic sunna as substitute for the 
Sunnan passed through diverse stages before becoming the second source of law after 
the Qur’an. For this reason, Islamic Sunna maintained many pre-Islamic customs, 
including the practice of veiling.317 
The Sunna is documented in the Hadith, testimonies and stories of the Prophet’s life 
transmitted by his companions or those who followed his companions.318 In the 
centuries after the death of the Prophet, writing down the Hadith was not considered 
an important practice; it is during the Umayyad Caliphs that Islam witnessed a 
systematic reorganization and collection of Hadith.319 For many Muslims, the Hadith are 
as important as the Qur’an, although the Sacred Book has a divine authorship because it 
was dictated directly by God. The function of the Hadith, which form the Sunna, is to 
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clarify how a good Muslim should behave to follow the path of the Prophet 
Muhammad, who acted completely in conformity with the demands of the Qur’an.320 
For devout Muslims “the example of the Prophet Mohammad and of the community he 
established is to be followed as much as possible”321 and it has the same normative 
value as the Qur’an because it cannot be in any case in conflict with it. In order to 
establish the validity and authenticity of a Hadith, Muslim scholars have established the 
isnad system which consists of re-tracing the chain of transmitters of a specific event. 
While some scholars argue that the isnad (the chain of transmission) was a common 
practice of Muhammad’s companions,322 others locate the beginning of the isnad 
system in the seventh/eighth century.323 All in all, historically, Muslim scholars have 
developed specific principles to establish if the isnad is valid:324 the chain must be traced 
back to its original transmitter and scholars should question whether the original 
reporter had high moral qualities. Once the isnad is established, scholars can accept 
(maqbul) the Hadith as authentic (sahih), or ‘agreeable’ (hasan), or it is simply rejected 
(mardud). In contrast with Sunni, Shi’a believe that, in order for a Hadith to be 
authentic, it should have been transmitted by a member of the Prophet’s family or by 
his descendant imams.325 The importance of the Hadith reveals that for Muslim 
believers, Islam is not simply a religion but a way to inhabit, live, and experience life: 
their love for the Prophet is mirrored in their wish to imitate his behaviour and way of 
life, “not as a commandment but as virtues where one wants to ingest, as it were, the 
Prophet’s personal into oneself”. Thus, Muslim performative practices lay “not so much 
upon a communicative or representational model as on an assimilative one”.326 
In the evolution of Islamic law, the study of the Qur’an and Sunna produced the Usul al 
fiqh, the body of knowledge. Usul al fiqh is the “legal theory that laid down the 
principles of linguistic-legal interpretation, theory of abrogation, consensus and juristic 
reasoning, among others.”327 Since Usul al fiqh arose from the synthesis between two 
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juristic theories, rationalism and traditionalism,328 it is both descriptive and prescriptive. 
At the very beginning, before the creation of the main schools of Islamic thought, which 
developed pluralistic and differentiated interpretations of the main legal sources, the 
legal theory exposed the modus operandi of the law: “the theory culled out what was 
seen as the best methods of actual legal practice and made them the prescribed 
methods of ‘discovering’ law: for, after all, the declared purpose of this theory was, in 
essence, to lay down the methodology by which new legal cases might be solved.”329 
When the earlier jurists started the process of sacred texts’ interpretation, Shari’a 
indicated the entirety of the commands and prohibitions found in the Qur’an (divine 
source), while fiqh indicated specific rulings that had arisen from the interpretation of 
Shari’a (human source). It is exactly this initial distinction that reveals the existing 
tension between divine revelation and human legal reasoning within the Islamic system 
of law: this tension, however, is obscured in so far as (many) believers see the Sunna as 
having ‘equal status’ with the Qur’an.330 
Shari’a law is based on five main categories: ‘forbidden’ (haram), ‘allowed’ (mubaha), 
‘recommended’ (mustahabb or Sunna), ‘discouraged’ (makruh), and ‘obligatory’ (Wajib). 
The establishment of these categories has given a certain flexibility of interpretation of 
what is right or wrong and has allowed Islam to accommodate itself to the 
custom/culture/traditions of the conquered populations.331 
Islamic legal analysis is based on two main principles: Ijma (consensus) and Qyas 
(analogy). The ijma is the unanimous agreement of the congregation of Muslims about a 
precise matter: it is a pre-Islamic customary practice of the Arabian peninsula, where it 
was common to legislate based on the consensus of the whole community. Nowadays, 
there is a consensus only about the fundamentals of Islam, such as the five daily 
prayers, the Qur’an as the word of God, the unity of God, Mohammad’s prophethood, 
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fasting, and pilgrimage to Mecca.332 Islamic law is also based on the recognition of urf 
(local custom): if a population follows customary practices that do not conflict with the 
Qur’an or the Sunna, then those practices have to be recognized under Islamic law.333 
One of the most important principles of Islamic jurisprudence is the ijtihad 
(interpretation of the sacred texts) by jurists and scholars. The maximum development 
of fiqh through ijtihad occurred during the first four centuries of Islam when the 
interpretation of the God’s word was at its maximum development. As I shall argue, 
with the Abbasid policy and their (unsuccessful) attempt to create an Islamic nation-
state under a fixed Sharia law, the door of ijtihad closed. Although the Abbasid deeply 
limited the principle of ijtihad, different schools (madhhab, literally, ‘way of 
proceeding’) of Islamic thought still exist associated with different centres of the vast 
Islamic empire.334 The Hanafi School of law, founded by Abu Hanifa (d. 150-767) based 
in Iraq gives particular emphasis to reason and today is followed by Muslim believers 
mainly on the Indian continent, in central Asia and in Turkey. In contrast, the Maliki 
school, founded by Malik ibn Anas of Medina (d. 179-795), privileged text over reason 
and considered the practices of Medina’s people at the time of the Prophet as 
authoritative: this school is actually followed in north and west Africa. The Hanbali 
School, founded by the traditionalist Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 240-855) who collected 
around fifty thousand Hadith,335 relies deeply on the main texts while confining the 
qiyas (analogy) and the ijma (consensus) to insignificant historical categories. Similarly, 
the Shafi’s Islamic law school is mainly based on a literal interpretation of the Qur’an 
and the Sunna.336 The main Shi’a school of Thought (Ja’fari) differs from the Sunni 
schools in their method of authentication of the Hadith: for them, only the Hadith 
recounted by the Prophet’s family members or his descendants can be considered valid 
sources for authentication.337 As Reinhart observes, the different approaches to Islamic 
law developed over the centuries by Islamic scholars have important outcomes: firstly, 
due to the pluralism expressed in Islamic jurisprudence, the doctrine is based on ‘juristic 
probability’ more than ‘certainty’ as is (supposedly) the case in western law. Secondly, 
                                                             
332 Saeed (n 38) 50–1. 
333 Ibid, 50. 
334 Kevin Reinhart, ‘Law’, in Jamal J Elias, Key Themes for the Study of Islam (Oneworld 
Publications, 2010) 229. 
335 Muhammad Zubair Siddiqi, The Hadith for Beginners: An Introduction to Major Hadith Works 
and Their Compilers (Goodword, 2001) 105. 
336 The (Sunni schools) tend to agree on the most important points but they disagree on details. 
See  Sedgwick, (n 42). 
337 Saeed (n 38) 51–2. 
83 
 
“in their mutually acceptable differences they occasionally provided a resource that 
could be exploited creatively to effect change or reform”:338 praxiologically, scholars and 
believers rely on different schools of Islamic thought and combine different aspects in 
order to deal with different situations.339 
Islamic law does not only include the codified interpretations of Islamic jurists and 
scholars within the main Islamic schools of thought which survived until today, but also 
the understanding of local Ulama who issue fatwas. The fatwa, as I have argued, 
represents the ‘practical’ aspect of Islamic law and it is promulgated in response to a 
precise need of a particular Muslim community: in the past as well as nowadays, fatwa 
is a tool of accommodation to bring tribal societies into the orbit of normative Islam.340 
This suggests a multiplicity of ways for Muslims to comply with obligations and to 
practice their rights under Shari’a law. In the evolution of Islamic law, the Ulema, the 
clerical body, and the Muslim legal scholars are engaged in the study of Islamic law; they 
are better known as judges of Shari’a law because of their role in interpreting ‘God’s 
word’ for the local community. The translation of ‘Ulama’ as an Islamic clerical body 
should be read with caution in view of the absence of a corporate body of Muslim 
clerics. In fact, in contrast with Christianity, in which the clergy body has a specific 
hierarchical structure, “the Ulama do not possess or monopolize a unique mediating 
role between the believer and God; they cannot promise or refuse salvation or grace […] 
there is no mechanism of confession or penitence that they operate, and they are not 
God’s substitute on earth. They are different, therefore, to a church hierarchy through 
which the believer must go to approach the Divinity.”341 They are the interpreters of 
‘God’s word’ by virtue of their knowledge and their position in the local community: for 
this reason they are seen as the representatives of the ijma ‘consensus’ of the Ummah 
or the representatives of scholarly or learned consensus. The Ulama lack, today as well 
as in the past, a clear hierarchical structure and leadership which makes it “possible for 
every Muslim to have a voice in religious debates on issues about which they are 
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knowledgeable.”342 This is an important feature of the analysis of Islamic law because it 
allows a myriad of interpretations by local religious clerics that vary from place to place 
based on specific socio/political/economic contexts. Hence, there is no obvious singular 
response to the question: ‘how should a Muslim behave? What interpretation(s) of 
Islam is normative and applicable?’ 
In fact, although Sunni Islam includes four main books of Islamic law, local Ulama follow 
diverse legal schools based on their own reasoning: the principle of ijma provides an 
umbrella for the accommodation of various and different interpretations of Islamic law. 
It is possible to say, therefore, that when Muslim jurists don’t agree ‘they agree to 
disagree’: as a matter of fact, in order to reduce the tension between different schools 
of thought, Muslim scholars have set up the principle that each Muslim is free to follow 
the school of his/her choice and to change his/her school of law on particular legal 
issues.343 This pluralistic concept of law emerges from the lack of authoritative 
hierarchical structure within scholarly and Islamic schools of thought and it is based on 
the idea that no human interpretation can be the unique and final legal authority. This 
notion is clarified by a famous saying of the Prophet that “difference of opinion within 
my community is a sign of the bounty of Allah”.344 This quote amply justifies the 
pluralistic vision of Islamic law and differences between doctrines. To express the unity 
and diversity within Islamic law, Coulson refers to an old Arab proverb which assumes 
that “the person who does not understand divergence in doctrine […] has not caught 
the true scent of jurisprudence (Man la ya’raf al-ikhtilaf lam yashumma ra-ihata ‘l-
fiqh)”.345 
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2.2 Islamic law and the assimilation of the monotheistic frame of mind 
Based on Nancy, one of the auto-deconstruction characteristics of monotheism is the 
assimilation of Greek philosophical consciousness and Roman/statistical juridical legacy. 
For him, Christianity, in its auto-interpretative history, presents itself not simply as a 
mythology but as a composition of Greek and Roman philosophy which involves the idea 
of sovereignty in the name of God. This, in turn, had profound consequences in the 
development of legal and political power in the West.346 In contrast, as I shall argue, 
although Islam historically assimilated Greek philosophical concepts and the Roman 
juridical legacy, it never developed a western like form of sovereignty. Nevertheless, the 
assimilation of western concepts during the Abbasid period profoundly changed the 
essence of Islamic law and, along with it, bolstered a new concept of sovereignty. 
The history of Islam is marked by three important periods: the first is characterized by a 
clear separation between political and legal power in which local judges enjoyed great 
freedom in their legal adjudications; the second is marked by a partially successful 
assimilation of Graeco-Roman-Christian elements, which was fundamental for the 
creation of an ‘expansionist nation-state’; while the third is signed by the 
‘westernization’ of Islamic law, which found its expression in concepts such as 
nationalism, liberation/decolonization and self-determination theology, typical of the 
‘new modern secular ideology’. 
In the first period of Islam, law was marked by unconditional freedom for judges in the 
administration of legal affairs. Political and legal powers were completely separated and 
the legal interpretation of ‘God’s word’ was at its most prevalent. After the death of the 
Prophet (632), the policy of the central Muslim government during the period of the 
conquest (632- 661) was clear: the conquered populations regulated themselves exactly 
as they had before the arrival of Islam.347 The Caliphs employed proto-qadis (earlier 
judges) to administrate, locally, the garrison towns: despite their lack of legal training, 
they were wise people recognized and respected by the local community, expert in 
adjudication. The proto-quadis were accustomed to adjudicating legal cases based on 
the principle of ra’y, discretionary opinion, which was based on Sunna Madiya (past 
exemplary actions including the life of the Prophet and the earlier Caliphs) and common 
                                                             
346 Nancy (n 13). 
347 Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (n 303) 36. 
86 
 
sense, while “rules of law as the Qur’an and the Sunna established were regarded 
simply as ad hoc modifications of the existing customary law.”348 Thus, the first period of 
Islam was characterized by a lack of centralization policies; the qadis were appointed by 
the central government and used to adjudicate legal cases locally, far from the central 
capital, Medina. The legislative role of the Caliph was purely occasional and only 
enforced when special need arose. In fact, the so called ‘pious Caliphs’ (632-661) 
considered themselves equally subject to the dominant religious and sunnaic values. As 
I pointed out, the early Caliphs and their companions were acting within the Arabian 
tribal culture and society where ‘consensus’ and the observance of an ‘exemplary path’ 
(Sunna and Sunnan) was a normative practice. It was this ‘freedom of interpretation’, 
combined with the general culture of the area, that had favoured a growing interest in 
the Prophetic sunna; the values that guided the qadis at that time mirrored the general 
culture of the Near East and the Qur’an’s precepts were only partially altering pre-
existing customs.  
With this premise, it is not difficult to understand how the Prophetic sunna slowly 
started to be part of the Sunnan of the conquered populations. Although the legal 
administration of the garrison towns was the main duty of the qadis, in the beginning 
they performed many other functions; they were secretaries of treasury, tax-collectors 
and ‘story tellers’: they recounted stories about the life of the Prophet or gathered 
people to discuss the hermeneutical interpretation of the sacred text and the Hadith. 
This fundamental duty provides evidence of the gradual development of qadis’ religious 
character, their specialization in ‘legal affairs’ and the formation of the scholarly circle in 
Islam. The isolation of Prophetic sunna to pre-Islamic customary Sunnan is fundamental 
in understanding the transformation of the qadis’ function and character and the 
assimilation of Prophet’s model as expression of religious and legal authority.349 As 
Hallaq argues, this transformation was the result of an epistemic and pedagogical 
development: 
“epistemic, because the need to know what the Prophet says or did became increasingly 
crucial for determining what the law was. And pedagogical, because, in order to 
maintain a record of what the Prophet said or did, approved or disapproved, certain 
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sources had to be mined and this information, once collected, needed in turn to be 
imparted to others as part of the age-old oral tradition of the Arabs that is now imbued 
with a religious element.”350 
The seventh century marked a profound change in the function of the qadis: they were 
no longer wise people recognized by the local population but experts in law, appointed 
solely for judicial functions. The development of a class of legal specialists characterized 
a new stage in the evolution of Islamic law; “the increasing specialization of the judge’s 
office manifested itself in the growing dependence of the qadi upon legal specialists 
who made their concern to study the laws and all emerging disciplines with which it was 
associated”.351 The domain of legal procedures was in the hands of the new ‘specialized’ 
class while the study of legal discipline was in the hands of the mufti, or Ulama, who 
served as legal consultants for the qadi and on the issue of fatwas when it was needed. 
The activities of the Muftis are often underrated by many western scholars, who see 
their role as less institutionalised than that of the qadi. The growing legal power of the 
Ulama, however, caused a serious entanglement in the relationship between political 
power and legal authority.352 If the source of law was the Qur’an and the Sunna, only 
jurists, those able to interpret the word of God, had the authority to promulgate the 
law: “those men in possession of a greater store of knowledge grew more influential 
than others less learned; gaining in the process […] an authority that began to challenge 
the legal (but not political) authority of the Caliphs”.353 
This historical moment of Islamic law’s evolution marked not only the 
professionalization of the qadis and the development of specialized legal scholars 
(Ulama), but also the pluralistic textualization of the law and the development of many 
Islamic juridical schools.354 The study of the Hadith and religious texts brought about a 
specialized circle of learning, or halaqa, which organized public discussion about 
Qur’anic interpretation. During the first three decades of Islam halaqa was usually held 
in mosques, which offered a space to discuss and interpret Sunna and Hadith. As jurists 
developed many different interpretations of the sacred texts, mufti, qadis and scholars 
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started to follow different legal doctrines. Jurists generated fiqh, the body of legal 
knowledge, in the main Islamic centres scattered throughout the vast Muslim Empire 
and elaborated a heterogeneous system of law, differing from place to place and from 
school to school (or madhhab). The scholars of each madhhab followed the legal 
doctrine of a particular Ulama who, in turn, followed the positive doctrine of his 
predecessors. Interestingly, “the personal schools afforded the first step toward 
providing an axis of legal authority, since the application (in courts and fatwa) and the 
teaching of a single, unified doctrine- that is, the doctrine of the leading jurist around 
whom a personal school had formed- permitted a measure of doctrinal unity”.355 
However, the schools, which were open to anyone who possessed intellectual and 
moral qualifications, were far from being formal educational institutions, nor were they 
considered an ‘official law-making body’. This is an exceptional situation that 
differentiates Islamic law from other legal systems: while in early Roman law, for 
instance, the main legal sources were endorsed by an official law-making body and in 
the canon law first the Pope and then the Emperor were the source of legal rules, the 
alleged-divine character of Islamic law helped to reinforce its authority. As a matter of 
fact, ‘God’s law’ was applied equally to the rulers and to the population. In short, the 
first period of Islam was characterized by a pluralist interpretation of Islamic law and by 
the gradual development of a professional, but not hierarchically organized, judiciary 
body. The Caliph performed the role of mediator only in exceptional cases, mostly when 
the qadis asked for his advice, and the Umma observed the law established by their 
local knowledgeable men; “this could be why sovereignty was stillborn in Muslim 
empires and, also, why the highly complex and elaborate systems of Islamic law 
incorporate in legal practice diverse understanding of key concepts to the point that a 
litigant can rely on different madhahib (‘school of interpretation’) in relation to different 
aspects of the same legal case.”356 The legal and cultural accommodation operated by 
the firsts Caliphs assured the safeguarding of the conquered population’s customary law 
and pre-Islamic practices. The established law included all the subjectivity of the 
heterogeneous society of the time (including Christians and Jews, considered part of the 
Umma, the Muslim community, in the Qur’an). 
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This “version of law-bound-universality”357 represented a challenge for a new 
generation of Caliphs, the Umayyad, who attempted to create a centralized state: “the 
advent of Umayyad rule set in motion a process of continued expansion and 
centralization of authority that would transform the Islamic community from an Arab 
shaykhdom into an Islamic empire whose rulers were dependent on religion for 
legitimacy and the military for power and stability […] This permanent shift […] 
symbolized the new imperial age”.358 The Umayyad period (661-750) witnessed the 
gradual separation of the ruling elite from the people and the egalitarian form of 
governance of the firsts Caliphs. Scholars, story tellers and qadis started to identify 
political power with dishonesty, corruption and depravity in contraposition to the pious 
jurists. By the eighth century, anti-Umayyad sentiment had spread and tension between 
political and legal powers increased when many jurists began to defend the population 
in preference to the ruling class. This tension between the ruling elite and the religious-
legal class is not only the result of the Umayyad’s centralized policy but also the 
outcome of a new historical environment in which religious sentiment was growing 
within the population. The literature is full of stories of jurists who rejected 
appointment by the Caliph, or preferred to be imprisoned rather than accept. That was 
the destiny of many Muslim scholars such as Abu Hanifa or Ali b. Abd Allah Al Muzani, 
who alleged to be ignorant when they refused to assume the post assigned by the 
Caliph.359 This phase of Islamic law’s evolution is marked by the separation between the 
ruling elite and the religious-legal class, where the Ulama used the hermeneutic system 
of interpretation of the Hadith as a tool to struggle against the central political power. 
The development of a sharpened technique of Prophetic Hadith’s authentication by the 
Ulama “was precisely a means to control the process of legitimation of state power by 
association with (invented) good practice.”360 In essence, it was a clash between local 
and centralized concepts of power, where the Ulama played a radical ‘politic role’ in 
defending their legal authority from the appropriation of legal affairs by the central 
political power. Clearly, the ruling elite needed control of the law in order to govern the 
population and jurists represented the link between the ruling political elite and the 
masses; in other words, they were the only ones that could give legitimacy to the 
political authority. This had diverse political implications in the history of Islamic law: “a 
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ruler who has no say at all in the definition of the law by which his subjects have chosen 
to live cannot rule those subjects in any but a purely military sense […] rulers were 
obeyed as outsider to the community, not as representatives of it […] The state was thus 
something which sat on top of society, not something which was rooted in it”.361 It is 
also worth remembering that the two powers were reciprocal; qadis and Ulama 
depended on the financial favours of the political elite, while the ruling elite needed the 
legitimisation of the law to reign and to assure absolute control over the conquered 
population. The struggle between legal and political power came to an end in the 
middle of the fourteenth century, when the political power, lacking the support of the 
local population, recognized that only the Ulama could interpret the law of God. 
Although the Umayyad dynasty never succeeded in creating a canonical version of the 
Sunna, they marked the ‘Arabization’ and ‘Islamization’ of the Muslim Empire through a 
process of conversion and assimilation of ‘non-Muslims’: with the Umayyad, Islam 
witnessed the first (unsuccessful) attempt of ‘secularization’ in the name of a new 
‘Islamic identity’.362 
The process of centralization under a unique Caliph was further pursued by the Abbasid 
dynasty and it coincided with the moving of the capital from Damascus, in the 
Mediterranean, to Bagdad. The new ‘centralized Islamic theocracy’ (750-1258), which 
witnessed an important cultural and economic development thanks to the so called ‘pax 
islamica’ (unified ‘Islamic world’), tried to concentrate political and legal power in the 
figure of the Caliph to gain absolute power over the vast Muslim Empire;363 what the 
Abbasid dynasty sought to create was a form of law similar to the Roman one, a canon 
law, where the Caliph (or the sovereign, using Nancy’s term) is the ultimate interpreter 
of the ‘God’s word’. 
The first Caliph of the Abbasid dynasty, Mansur (754-775), tried to create a 
comprehensive body of law valid for all the conquered population. He offered the 
founder of the Maliki school of thought an endorsement of his book of law as the 
unique law valid for the whole Empire: surprisingly, however, Maliki refused, alleging his 
respect for the other schools of Thought. The successor of Mansur, Al Mahdi, continued 
to develop the policy of his predecessor: if, on the one hand, Al Mahdi knew that he 
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could not gain political legitimacy by coercion and/or oppression of the ruled masses, 
then on the other, a total conformity to the law would signify a decline of his political 
power and legitimacy. It is exactly this symbiosis and precarious balance that 
determined, in the history of Islam, a continuous negotiation between legal and political 
authority. In order to gain legitimacy, the Caliph decided to surround himself with 
competent scholars and jurists, loyal to the central government, to assist him in ‘legal 
affairs’ when it was needed. If the earlier Caliphs could acquire legitimacy based on their 
knowledge of the law, he needed to supplement the caliphal office with jurists due to 
the long and difficult process of law’s textualization and the use of reasoning and 
hermeneutics. Like his predecessor, Al Mahdi needed to fashion the new and vast 
‘Islamic empire’: he engaged Christian intellectuals escaping from the theocratic 
Byzantine Empire to translate classical Greek work into Arabic and a new form of 
dialectic argumentation started to be part of Islamic doctrine.364 This marked not only 
the introduction of ‘western’ concepts of logic and dialectic disputation in legal 
interpretation, but also the attempt to promote a monotheistic frame of mind within 
the Empire. For the first time in the history of Islam, legal scholars employed by and 
loyal to the Caliphs started to use dialectic concepts in the hermeneutic interpretation 
of the Sunna; “the Abbasid dynasty needed to fashion an imperial ideology with 
universalist claims in the basis that the new state was pre-ordained, by the starts and by 
God, to be the successor of all preceding empires both governing over and employing in 
its ranks all its subjects, including Jews and Christians.”365 
However, that was just the beginning of the slow closure of the door of interpretation in 
Islamic law. Al Mamuun (813-833) was a fervent reader of Aristotle. The legend 
recounts that Aristotle used to appear in Al Mamuun’s dreams and to give him advice 
on justice and sovereignty. He adopted the title ‘God’s Caliph’ by alleging direct descent 
from the Prophet and imposed the Mihna, or inquisition, on those who refused to obey 
the sovereign and its law.366 His imperialist and expansionist dreams were mirrored in 
the war against the Byzantines, who were considered infidels and culturally inferior. Al-
Maamun strongly supported the use of logic and dialectic argumentation by 
intellectuals loyal to the dynasty, and he created institutions to contain political and 
religious opposition, while asking Islamic scholars to compose books based on logic and 
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dialectic argumentation to oppose the ‘heretics’.367 If, previously, Islamic law was a 
comprehensive narrative which covered common interests and religious practices, with 
the Abbasid, the four main Sunni Islamic schools of Thought were officially formed and 
the book of fiqh was produced: Islamic law started to cover systematic legal principles. 
During the Abbasid period (750- 1517) there was a complementary relation between 
legal and political powers. On the one hand, Caliphs needed to comply with the law to 
gain political legitimacy, while on the other, jurists employed by the royal court became 
accustomed to asking Caliphs for legal advice. The Caliphs’ participation in the 
resolution of legal disputes gave them an authority similar to that held by the Ulama, 
although they were subject to the same ‘God’s Law’, while the advantage and honour 
the jurists received gave them easy access to the circle of the political elite and the royal 
court: jurists became influential also in governmental policies. By the middle of the 
Abbasid era (750-1258), judicial appointments were made upon the recommendation of 
the chief of justice at the royal court. In other words, in spite of the great change in 
relations between legal and political power, 
“Islamic law did not emerge out of the machinery of the body politic, but rather arose as 
a private enterprise initiated and developed by pious men who embarked on the study 
and elaboration of law as a religious activity. Never could the Islamic ruling elite, the 
body politic, determine what the law was. This significant fact clearly means that, 
whereas in other legal cultures the body politic was the source of legal authority and 
power, in Islam this body was largely, if not totally, absent from the legal scene.”368 
Although the Abbasid period witnessed the closing of the door of legal interpretation, 
the Caliphs never succeeded in creating a unique canon law similar to the ‘western 
model’. The reason for this failure in establishing an absolute power similar to the 
‘European style political theology of sovereign’369 can be found in the 
resistance/rebellion of the Ulama. As Diamantides points out, 
“what is thought-provoking in the narratives around medieval Muslim jurists is that 
even as, for reasons of state, the doors of interpretation of Islamic law were declared to 
be closed […] their founding jurists’ faith-driven rebellion constitutes an exemplary act 
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of powerless resistance as well as an assertion that the Umma (the Islamic community) 
may retain its integrity despite- perhaps because of- lacking in representable doctrinal 
and political unity be it of the Kelsenian (normative) or the Schmittian (substantive) 
sort”.370 
In essence, although the Abbasid tried to transform Islam into a proselytising state 
religion, through a process of assimilation of Greek philosophical consciousness and 
Roman/statistic/juridical legacy, they never succeeded: their project of creating a 
centralized theocracy where the Caliph (sovereign or Pope in Nancy’s terms) is the 
ultimate legislator, at the end, failed due to the rebellion of many Muslim scholars who 
never accepted the outcome of a unique canon law, by referring to a famous dictum of 
the Prophet; ‘my community will never err’.371 As a matter of fact, in the past as well as 
nowadays, jurists frame fatwa based on two or more recognized schools of thought 
when they face difficult legal cases. 
Toward the end of the Abbasid period the practice of Mihna was slowly dismissed and 
the Caliphs became even less a challenge to the legal power.372 In the following period, 
Caliphs and Ulama kept a careful balance between those two powers. On the one hand, 
Caliphs managed to preserve this balance through compliance with the religious law, 
while on the other, jurists didn’t compromise their law: “on balance, if there was any 
pre-modern legal and political culture that maintained the principle of the rule of law so 
well, it was the culture of Islam.”373 However, this historical period has signed a 
profound change in the history of Islam and Islamic law: in fact, the war between 
political and legal power has developed the extra-textualization of Islamic law. By 
transforming Islamic religion into refined legal rules, the process of ‘secularization of 
religion’, using Nancy’s terms, was almost complete. 
While in the West as well as in the East, the process of ‘secularization’ was facilitated by 
the assimilation of a new monotheist frame of mind and Greek dialectic concepts, only 
in Islam this assimilation signified a shift from a relative freedom of judges and jurists to 
a more structured legal system. Hence, despite both the Christian and Islamic worlds’ 
passing through a process of symbiosis with Greco-Roman consciousness and the 
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monotheistic frame of mind, what differentiates the two legal systems is the work of 
Muslim scholars; in the West, the codification of Roman law by theological experts 
marked the embodiment of ‘God’s will’ with the political power, while in the Islamic 
world the struggle between legal and political powers, between scholars and Caliphs, 
prevented the process of law codification. Henceforth, if in the West the symbiosis with 
Greco-Roman concepts and the logico-techno-juridical universality served the European 
‘nation-state’, in the Islamic world, this symbiosis reduced the freedom of legal 
interpretation but never succeed in creating a ‘canonic form of Sunna’. In fact, despite 
the remaining tensions between legal and political powers, the Ulama never accepted 
the centralized policy of the Caliphs. 
And yet, Islamic law’s appropriation by political power did happen. The disintegration of 
central power and the gradual development of ‘garrisons’ commanded by the army, 
along with the conquest of the capital by the Mongols, determined the end of caliphal 
period and the beginning of the era of the Sultans (1299-1922).374 The Ottoman Empire 
was the new ‘defender of Islam’ and conducted a holy war (jihad) in the name of the 
new worldwide religion. The new Sultans assumed the title of ‘defender of the Sharia’ 
and the Ottoman Empire became the greater force of Islam.375 
The Sultans set up a new form of centralized administration in which Ulama and jurists 
were incorporated within the state’s bureaucracy. The Ulama became part of a rich and 
aristocratic political apparatus; their role was to assist the sultan in his effort to control 
the educational, legal and social system of the newly centralized ‘Islamic nation-state’. 
The Shayk al Islam (the head of Muslim clergy), appointed directly by the sultan, 
became the head of the new state’s religious bureaucracy.376 The political and 
administrative reorganization operated by the Ottomans marked the formation of an 
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‘Islamic nation-state’, similar to the ‘western model of state organization’ but unfamiliar 
with the heterogeneous local cultures of the area. As Hallaq interestingly points out, 
 “The creation of the nation-state meant, indeed required, a decisive transfer of power –
largely devoid of authority- from the hands of the traditional legal elites into those of 
the new state. The traditional legal profession stood at the heart of the old institutions 
that were the target of modernization, while the nation-state could not have become a 
reality without appropriating these institutions.”377 
The aspiration of the Ottomans, as well as other ‘Islamic Sultanate nation-states’ formed 
in this historical period, was to fashion a comprehensive ‘Muslim identity’ by absorbing 
Islamic institutions within the state:378 “Islam becomes an identity defined by external 
differences from ‘others’ and law frames the points of distinction.”379 In the attempt to 
develop a structure similar to the ‘European sovereign nation-state’, Ottomans declared 
the Hanafi school of Thought the only ‘state law book’ and qadis appointed by the 
sultan started a (partial) process of law’s codification. With the Ottoman, the attempt to 
concentrate legal authority in the hands of the political power was almost completed: 
the world started to be divided into ‘the house of Islam’ (dar al islam) and ‘the house of 
war’ (dar al harb) and the sultan became the guardian of a new Islamic order; law, 
education, citizenship, defence and welfare were based on a fixed and monolithic 
Islamic religion. As Hallaq argues, 
“the transfer of control over law from the hands of the traditional legal profession to 
those of the state represented the most important phenomenon of the so called 
modern legal reform, one that signified simultaneously the eternal loss of epistemic 
authority and the dawning of the much-abhorred authority and, indeed, oppression, of 
the nation-state. The emergence of the state as the source of legal power (in opposition 
to authority) is seen as doubly repugnant because the state not only appropriated law 
from the religious lawyers (whose roots were in the community) but it also showed 
itself […] to be an entity severely lacking in religiosity”.380 
The beginning of the eighteenth century marked the gradual decline of the Ottoman 
Empire: this coincided with the industrial revolution and modernization in the West. The 
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rise of Europe as a new major military and political power challenged the Ottoman 
Empire by embarking on a policy of colonization. With the colonial period came not only 
an exceptional wave of military and economic violence but also a ‘modernizing’ and 
‘westernizing’ process; “this move ushered in a new era during which the traditional 
legal profession gradually lost control over its own sources of power, making its 
members heavily dependent on state allocations which in turn diminished in a steady 
and systematic manner.”381 The powerlessness of the religious elite was exacerbated by 
the creation of an ‘alternative’ legal system; by the middle of the nineteenth century, 
legal scholars were people educated in the West or by ‘western style institutions’. With 
the ratification of the new ‘western-legal-system’ the new legal elite was assimilated in 
the emergent legal structure while religious scholars were marginalized as they were 
considered unable to deal with the new reality. As Hallaq argues, “the ruin of the 
traditional law college […] was the ruin of Islamic law, for the college’s compass of 
activities epitomized all that had made Islamic law what it was.”382 To guarantee the 
subordination to the law, colonial power imposed the law codification, which became 
the standard mode of legislation; “codification is not an inherently neutral form of law-
making, nor is it an innocent tool of legal practice, devoid of political or other goals. It is 
in fact a deliberate choice in the exercise of political and legal power, a means by which 
a conscious restriction is placed upon the interpretative freedom of jurists, judges and 
lawyers.”383 If the hermeneutical method was the backbone of Islamic scholars’ 
understanding of the law, the new codified legal system created a link between divine 
texts and positive legal stipulations. By the 1970s the ‘Islamic legal system’ was deeply 
westernized: 
“Having codified the law on the basis of western legal models, and having virtually 
decimated the infrastructure of the traditional legal profession, the nation-state 
jettisoned Islamic law altogether and reigned supreme as the unchallenged center of 
legal and political power.[…] This effort at pushing traditional Islamic law aside and 
rendering it inoperable if not defunct should have alerted many to the fact that not only 
                                                             
381 Ibid, 1712. 
382 Ibid, 1712–3. 
383 Ibid. 
97 
 
had the rule of law come to an end but that a major gap, a virtual black hole, had fairly 
suddenly been created without any real substitution or replacement”.384 
The mechanisms of interpretation, which linked divine texts and human reasoning, was 
substituted by a new ‘western law’ inherited from the French or the English legal 
system: the only area that remained untouched was that of ‘family law’. The collapse of 
the traditional Islamic legal system opened the door for a new political order, no longer 
in the hands of the legal authority of the Ulama; legal and political authority was 
embodied by a new ‘sovereign’ who, from the Ottoman Empire, was not anymore 
subjected to the law but started to embody ‘God’s law’. Despite the legal authority of 
the Ulama, who were pushed aside by the new ‘nation-state’ but continued to issue 
fatwa and to be influential in local legal affairs, there was no longer an independent 
legal system that could limit the power of the new autocracies: “to make things far 
worse, these autocracies harnessed the best of technology and tools of modernity to 
enhance their dictatorial regimes, with brutal and tragic consequences.”385 As a matter 
of fact, nowadays, the majority of Muslim countries are led by dictators or, as I shall 
argue, after the so called ‘Arab Spring’ by the emerging Islamist movements/parties 
which seek a unique and fixed Sharia law. Where Islamists won, the secularization of 
Islam, initiated by the Abbasid, can be considered completed. 
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2.3 From Imperial Islam to Islamist movements: towards a ‘secularization of Islam’ 
Many western scholars, journalists and columnists see in the veil the symbol of a ‘clash 
of civilizations’.386 Perhaps, this (orientalist) understanding is the result of a colonial 
discourse which has constructed the veil as the most powerful symbol of the 
backwardness of Muslim culture. As I have argued in the previous Chapter, the veil has 
been used by both western colonizers and Islamists as a useful tool to create a singular 
and abstract identity. Although the veil is worn for many reasons and carries different 
meanings, Islamists advocate the use of the veil as a fixed symbol of compliance with 
Islamic precepts. Before them, another Muslim Empire tried to impose women’s veiling 
through a misogynist interpretation of Islamic texts: the Abbasid.387 For this reason, my 
argument distances itself from the prevalent discourse, which sees Islamic 
fundamentalists as a creation of the violent western colonization of the Muslim world 
during the nineteenth century and the veil as a visible symbol of a ‘clash’ between two 
different worlds.388 This argument is, in fact, disclaimed by Islamic history and its 
encounter with Roman law and dialectic Aristotelian concepts during the Abbasid 
period. It is exactly the encounter with western forms of power during the Abbasid era, 
along with the positivization of Sharia law and the introduction of western legal rules by 
the Ottomans, that have given rise to Islamist movements.389 As Diamantides argues, 
“In the light of this history […]  the terrific intensity of today’s fundamentalist desire for 
the rule of Islamic law appears far more complex than a case of ‘Muslims’ reacting to 
the modern, colonial and neo-colonial secular western globality. In its own modernity 
imperial Islam had already produced a relatively short-lived version of God’s Caliph’ as a 
principal secular fiction, which figures truth over the conflicting claims of different 
identities”.390 
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 In fact, the body of Islamic law that fundamentalists are fighting for reflects the 
Manichean division operated by the Abbasid and then by the Ottoman between dar al 
islam and dar al harb, Muslim and non-Muslim, good and bad: specifically, the idea of a 
state committed to the enforcement of a unique and monolithic Sharia law, as called by 
important Islamist scholars such as Al Rashid Rida, Syed Qutb, Maududi, and Qaradawi, 
founds a parallel in the Hanafi notion of “dar-al-islam (the abode of Islam) which refers 
to a territory that is ruled by the Sharia even if the majority of its inhabitants happen to 
be non-Muslims”.391 Similarly to the Abbasid and the Ottomans, Islamist movements call 
for the establishment of a ‘positivized’ (Sharia) law able to bind subjects to a fixed 
unique national identity: in this sense, Islamists try to finish what a previous 
expansionistic Muslim Empire tried, unsuccessfully, to achieve and, using Nancy’s terms, 
to operate a ‘secularization of Islam’. In fact, if the ‘demystification process’ operated by 
monotheistic religions ultimately means the creation of a legalism as substitute for 
God’s supreme power, then in the West, the ‘secularization of religion’ founds its 
political expression in principles such as democracy and human rights, while in the 
Islamic world it founds its political expression in ideas such as nationalism, liberation 
theology and self-determination; thus the ‘post-colonial instrumentalization’ of Islamic 
law operated by Islamists corresponds to an unconscious return of western elements 
where law is uniform and centrally produced.392 As a matter of fact, Islamic 
fundamentalists, a phenomenon that occurred in the nineteenth century and it is often 
associated with the political, social and legal development of Muslim majority societies 
during and after the colonial era,393 call for an immutable, all-encompassing guide to 
human life. 394 Although many scholars have read the rise of Islamism as the failure of 
Muslim majority societies to embrace secularism, Islamists adopt a secular political 
system within a religious ideology drawn on the western model of territorial ‘nation-
state’: in this way, they ‘secularize’ religious principles in the name of fetishized rules of 
a centrally interpreted law able to homogenize subjects in a unique, fixed identity and 
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to safeguard the interests and power of the elite. In other words, Islamists try to 
complete the process started with the Abbasid. In this sense, Islamic political extremism 
emerges “not [as] a case of fervor by subject embodying a monotheistic religion that 
never separated itself from the political but, on the contrary, of attachment to a state-
indebted science of legal interpretation that is embodied by a revered interpreter. 
Fundamentalists love is not for Allah but the legitimate and great leader who, much as 
Legendre’s analysis of the western juridico-political culture, act as a ‘feigned divinity’ or 
‘theatrical ploy’ standing in the place of the holy text”.395 
Although the Qur’an does not justify bonds, whether nationalist, racial, linguistic or 
territorial, Islamists call for a ‘Muslim state’ within specific territorial borders and stress 
that the only ‘salvation’ is the creation of an ‘Islamic state’ where subjects are bound by 
a unique and just (Sharia) law able to fashion a national identity. Al-Banna and Sayyd 
Qutb, founders and ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, an Islamist party 
founded in 1928, integrated the western concept of nation-state with Islamic political 
discourse in order to lay down the theory of an ‘Islamic nation-state’ modelled on the 
Abbasid’s pax islamica, considered the ‘golden age of Islam’: in fact, Islamists see in the 
destruction of the Abbasid Empire a turning point in the history of Islam.396 While they 
reject democracy, considered a direct violation of God’s sovereignty because the ‘law of 
people’ is positioned as a higher authority than that of God, as well as Arab nationalism, 
secularism, and socialism, understood as the expression of an imported western 
decadence, they paradoxically model their ideal of Islamic state on western concepts 
such as the rule of law and political participation. Qutb equates freedom to ubudiyya (a 
term absent in the Qur’an and interpreted by Islamists as the ‘equal submission to 
God’), a term that recalls that of western natural rights.397 Kepel and Lawrence398 see in 
Qutb’s political theory a preoccupation with the post-Enlightenment loss of values and, 
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at the same time, it “reveals the extent to which a modernity originally defined in terms 
of western experience is no longer a western experience alone”.399 In this sense, “the 
appropriation of alien forms and norms, albeit justified in terms of Islamic discourse, 
reflects both the influence of the culturally dominant west (if only unconsciously) and 
the extent of the authors’ pragmatism in accommodating existing realities and 
maintaining a certain openness to these”.400 
Al-Nabhani, a prominent Islamist thinker and founder of the Hizb al-Tahrir (Islamic 
Liberation Party) in Jerusalem, calls for the restoration of a ‘pure’ Islamic state and the 
elimination of the secular order established by western legal and political imperialism in 
the Middle East after the First World War. However, his theory of an Islamic state is 
drawn on the forms and norms of the modern ‘nation-state’, inherited firstly from the 
Abbasid and then the Ottoman Sultans and colonizing forces. He attempted to 
rehabilitate the Ottoman Empire in its Islamic dimension, and advocated for a complete 
return to the medieval caliphate in contrast with democracy and, ironically, the western 
model of ‘nation-state’. Paradoxically, however, “in exhuming the perceived paradigm 
of authentic Islamic government, al-Nabhani drew heavily on medieval Sunni juristic 
theories of the Caliphate (such as Abu-l-Hassan al-Mawardi and Taqi al-Din Ibn 
Taymiyya) undeterred by the fact that these were typically formulated as an apologia 
for the historical status quo and constituted an endeavour to harmonize existing 
political realities with the Sharia”.401 Similarly, Ayatollah Mutahhari, an important Shi’a 
scholar, clearly states that Islam is “a religion that sees its duty and commitment to form 
an Islamic state. Islam came to reform society and to form a nation and government. Its 
mandate is the reform of the whole world”.402 As Zubaida argues, although the policy of 
various Shia scholars draws on traditional sources, they reach novel conclusions which 
can be possible only if we assume the existence of a modern nation-state.403 Therefore, 
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by seeking to play the ‘politic game’ within the framework of an existing nation-state, 
both Shi’a and Sunni fundamentalists succumb to secularizing logic associated with 
economic development and the territorial state. In other words, Islamists respond to 
the same secularizing logic that they ostensibly combat.404 
 
This ‘secularizing’ logic is not inherited from western colonizers (which strengthened the 
creation of a western style nation-state) but from the Abbasid’s pax islamica. In fact, it is 
during the Abbasid that, in Islam, there was an attempt to westernizes/secularizes 
Islamic law. However, as Diamantides reminds us, although the Abbasid’s effort, Muslim 
theo-politics is characterized “by a gap between god and political power rather than 
fusion,”405 like in the west. In fact, central to Islamic law is the concept of umma which is 
not an ‘imagined (national) community’ waiting to be (re) unified by an absolute 
sovereign, “but a theologically defined space enabling Muslims to practice the 
disciplines of din [religion] in the world:”406 as Diamantides argues, “the umma […] may 
retain its integrity despite […] lacking in representable doctrinal and political unity be it 
of Kelsian (normative) or Schmittian (substantive) sort.”407 In contrast with the western 
concept of nation as an ‘imagined community’ in which people come to be united 
thanks to the construction of a particular imagination, “the Islamic Umma presupposes 
individuals who are self-governing but not autonomous. The Sharia, a system of 
practical reason morally binding on each faithful individual, exists independently of him 
or her. At the same time every Muslim has the psychological ability to discover its rules 
and to conform to them.”408 Therefore, when Islamists refer to the Umma ‘arabiyya’ 
(Arab community), they do not refer to the universalist theological concepts expressed 
in the term, but to an ‘imagined community’ which founds it expressions in a specific 
(secular) politic and legal system: a sovereign territorial nation-state like the Ottoman 
one. 
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Clearly, medieval scholars represent the main political, legal and theological reference 
of Islamist movements today: in fact, they often refer to Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), who 
stated that “Islam is both religion and government,”409 and they rely more on the body 
of fiqh, textualized under the Abbasid, than the Qur’an or Sunnah, which are the main 
legal sources for Muslims. Al-Nahbani, for instance, grounds his concept of a ‘unified 
Muslim state’ on the principles that Sharia law -and not ‘people’s law’ – is sovereign, 
and that the Umma should appoint a unique Caliph who has the right to adopt legal 
rules and to ratify the constitution of other legal principles. 
Likewise, Abu al-Hasan Al-Muwardi (972-1058), loyal scholar of Abbasid dynasty, paid 
more attention to the political realities of the Abbasid rather than the foundation of 
Qur’an and Sunna. In his ‘Ordinances of Government’,410 Al-Muwardi legitimized the 
legal and political authority of the Caliph within a delimited territory and claimed the 
loyalty of the governed people: he stated that “God […] ordained the caliphate of the 
Prophet through whom He protected the people; and He entrusted government to him, 
so that the management of affairs should proceed [on the basis of] right religion […] and 
affairs of common interest were made stable”.411 Similarly, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-
1111) argued that the establishment of the caliphate is “demanded by the ijma 
(consensus) of the community”,412 and it is more important than the burial of 
Muhammad’s body or the notion of God’s unity.413 Also Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) 
affirmed that the caliphate is important because Muhammad saw it as a necessity for 
the Muslim community,414 while for Ibn Taymiyya (1263- 1328) a Caliph appointed to 
govern the affairs of the Muslim community is a religious requirement as, based on his 
point of view, religion cannot survive without the control of the government.415 
Therefore, based on medieval Muslim scholars, the Caliph should be appointed to 
protect Islam, to be the judge of Sharia law, to implement Sharia, to guard the borders 
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of the ‘Islamic territorial nation-state’, and to undertake jihad against the infidel.416 It is 
worth noting that this concept of sovereignty is not restricted to Sunni Muslims, but it is 
an integral part also of Shia Islamists: as a matter of fact, the Iranian Constitution recites 
that the “absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God”.417 
 
The recognition of the ruler’s legal, political and religious authority, which occurred first 
during the Abbasid, represented the first attempt of legal authority’s appropriation by 
political institution in Islamic history; this legitimacy was further pursued through an 
alliance between the Ottoman Sultans and the Ulama and it is nowadays recalled by 
Islamist groups.418 This reveals that the idea of an absolute form of sovereignty in which 
legal and political power merge does not come from the colonial period, which 
strengthened the western model of a centralized nation-state, but from the 
introduction of Greek dialectic concepts and the Roman-statist-juridico legacy during 
the Abbasid dynasty. As a matter of fact, the writings of many important Islamists such 
as Qutb, al-Mawdudu and Khomeinei are a clear result of the elaboration of Greek 
philosophy on Islamic theology: if, for Aristotle, man is a political animal by nature, 
contemporary Islamist movements appropriate this notion and merge it with Islamic 
theology by claiming that man is essentially a religious creature. However, the idea that 
a ‘Muslim state’ needs an absolute sovereignty represented in the figure of the Caliph 
has important consequences in the Muslim world: accepting the arbitrariness of the 
rulers’ discretionary legal power and closing the gate of ijtihad without the consensus of 
scholars on the precise point of law has resulted in a ‘deficient’ solution for the unity of 
Islam. Moreover, the emphasis on the obedience of medieval traditional theory and the 
absolute political order, recalled nowadays by Islamist movements/parties, has created 
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a situation in which, from the eighteenth century on, the importance of the monarch is 
connected to the defence of the land of Islam and Islamic identity.419 
In the second Gulf War, for instance, Saddam Hussein called all Muslims to be united 
against ‘infidels’ in order to gain consensus over his expansionist claim. He ordered to 
write on the Iraqi flag the slogan ‘Allah w Akhbar’ (God is Great) and he convinced his 
people that it was a war between believers and infidels; as during the most expansionist 
phase of the Abbasid dynasty, the world was divided into diametrically opposed spheres 
(dar al harb and dar al islam). In fact, concepts such as jahiliya (pre-Islamic ignorance), 
and jihad (the holy war, against infidels), amply used by Saddam but absent in the 
Qur’an, appear for the first time during the Abbasid period. Saddam’s calls attracted 
many Islamist groups which joined the Baghdad cause at the point where the Islamic 
Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami) called on Saddam to declare him the new 
Caliph of the whole Muslim world.420 
Moreover, in contrast with traditional Muslim scholars who recognize different books of 
Sharia law, for Islamists, Sharia is not a flexible legal system able to adapt to ever 
changing circumstances; rather, what should be applied are Islamic law’s unlimited 
rules, developed by medieval Islamic scholars.421 In fact it was firstly with the Abbasid 
and then with the Ottomans that the door of ijtihad was officially closed in the name of 
a ‘secularized’ Islamic nation-state which adopted regulations from the French legal 
system and propounded a fixed, unique, and ‘secularized’ form of a positivized Sharia 
law. For Ibn Taymiyya the implementation of a unique and monolithic Sharia law is the 
final project of Islam: he stated that “people are in need of a book to guide them, and a 
victorious sword represents force, and human life depends on both of them”.422 
Likewise, contemporary Islamists such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926-) argue that 
individuals cannot interpret the Koran as they prefer,423 while Qutb points out that as 
long as Sharia law is not fully implemented people will live in jahiliyya (ignorance).424 
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The claim of Islamists to adopt one fixed and monolithic version of all-encompassing 
Shari’a indicates more similarity with the Abbasid/Ottoman as well as western model of 
sovereignty, than with the pluralistic and localized Islam of the first 150 years after the 
death of the Prophet. If Islamist groups express the ideal of a return to a ‘pure Islam’, 
they should rely on, and refer to, the period of the ‘pious Caliphs’, when the 
interpretation of ‘God’s word’ was in its maximum development and not to the Abbasid, 
when the door of legal interpretation in Islam (partially) closed in the attempt to create 
a unified ‘Muslim nation-state’ through the enforcement of a unique (Sharia) law.425 
Moreover, by transforming Islamic law into systematized (positive) universal rules and 
regulations, Islamic fundamentalists deny the Islamic principle of ijma, namely scholarly 
localized consensus, in the name of a papal autoritas interpretativa. In fact, Islamists 
aim at creating a law “in which all disputes over meaning are subject to state arbitration 
‘because’ law made by formally trained ‘experts’ sets forth religious truth without the 
need for contemporary moral re-evaluation even in the light of the general principles 
contained in Islam’s primary source […] without the need to demonstrate that it serves 
the public interests”.426 In other words, Islamist fundamentalists re-interpret legal 
principles developed in a specific historical moment of the Muslim Empire in a modern 
and more secularized way. Diamantides points out that Weber’s criteria that give rise to 
the legitimacy of law are met by fiqh: “its norms were developed by professional jurists, 
they are generally applicable and abstract and the judiciary and state to apply them 
without need for discussion of their morality in relation to faith and/or the secular telos 
of public interest.”427 Diamantides’ thesis reveals that Islamist fundamentalists 
anticipate post-enlightenment western positivism by creating a law able to control the 
subject’s life: in other words, for Islamists as well as for western liberals, the rules of law 
are what bind a people, and not shared moral values. 
By recalling medieval Islamic scholars, who started to depart from the initial conception 
of politics as the given consensus of the Umma in order to create a fixed and unique 
Islamic identity in the vast Muslim Empire, Islamists desire a form of sovereignty where 
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differences are bound into a monolithic ‘state identity’; a state with a social order 
assured by unconditional rule of law able to facilitate centralized state control. As Qutb 
points out, “Arabs did not succeed in conquering kingdoms and destroying thrones until 
they had become oblivious, for the first time in the history, of their Arab identity”.428 In 
this sense, Islamists’ anxiety with state power is not only related to the adoption of 
specific nationalist ideas, but to the constitution of a specific social identity. The veil, 
which becomes a strong symbol of identity and belonging in nationalist thought, is 
promoted by today’s Islamist groups as an attempt to create a common identity through 
the use of symbols and myths typical of nationalist regimes. As Esposito argues, 
“Muslim family offered a clear and easily identifiable starting point for implanting a 
strong sense of faith, identity, values. […] as wives and mothers, women have been 
regarded as the culture bearers, exemplars, and teachers of family value. Contemporary 
Islamic revivalism has fostered new changes and concerns that Islam will be used to 
justify a forced return to the veil, separation of the sexes, and the restriction of 
women’s role in public life. […] As a result, any attempt to change these customs is 
simply dismissed as an attack on the Islamic ideal under the influence of the west”.429 
As a matter of fact, before Islamists started to call for the re-veiling of Muslim women, 
the Abbasid tried to render the veil compulsory.430 This indicates that Islamist 
ideologues are moved by the desire for “a stable and predictable social order 
guaranteed by the absolute rule of positive law that is, law authoritatively distinguished 
as law, as a means to no end other than its own operation.”431 Therefore, what Islamist 
movements are seeking is the law of the Abbasid period which, as for the ‘western 
Emperor’ or ‘Pope’, reinforces central political power by binding the community to a 
unique national and homogeneous ‘Muslim identity’ protected by a new version of 
‘God’s Caliph’ who is able to create unity irrespective of cultural differences. 
The Islamist system, however, faces many challenges. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, 
where an absolute theocracy applies an austere, anti-intellectual and inflexible version 
of Salafi Islam, known as Wahhabism, groups of youth started to call for a re-
examination of Islamic precepts by conforming to the ‘pure Islam’, that of the ‘pious 
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Caliphs’. They assert that “no one can claim monopoly of truth or righteousness in the 
name of Islamic law (Sharia) […] We are young citizens who seek to create a community 
that follows the example of the Prophet, peace be upon him, under pluralism of thought 
[…] [and] we reject this patriarchal guardianship which forbids us from practicing our 
God-given right to think and explore for ourselves, as we can listen and judge.”432 
Clearly, Saudi Arabian theocracy has been drawn from that of the Abbasid dynasty 
where the community was bound by a unique sovereign who promotes a singular and 
monolithic Sharia law. 
Similarly, in Iran, where a theocracy was established after the 1979 revolution, the 
powerful clergy is now divided over the right interpretation of Sharia law. The Grand 
Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, one of the most influential clerics in the country and a 
marja' taghlid (source of emulation) in Shiite Islam, has often attacked the government 
for not applying the principle of the Shiite book of law.433 He has also issued a fatwa 
accusing the Supreme Leader of working for the government and against religion and 
called people to take action against injustice.434 Montazeri played an important role 
against the government of Ahmadinejad, which has deeply divided the clergy body, and 
opened the door for a (slightly) more moderate Islam in the country. 
This indicates that both Shia and Sunni Islamists serve European and western ideals of 
nationalism, patriotism and freedom: their theories are generally characterized by a 
political structure with an acute statism, legalism and bureaucracy such as the colonial 
and post-colonial regimes that they vehemently oppose. However, a fundamental 
distinction should be made between the Caliphal-Ayatollah and the Taliban system of 
governance: the first is a quasi-pontifical system where debate is allowed but the final 
knowledge of the law is in the hands of a Caliph/Ayatollah who decides what is legally 
acceptable, while in the latter the debate about legal interpretation is kept at a local 
                                                             
432 Caryle Murphy, ‘Saudi Youth Question Traditional Approach to Islam' ( Al-Monitor, 2012) 
<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/02/saudi-youth-question-mohammed-al-ari-
tom-cruise-of-
wahhabism.html?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=6053%20,%204%20Feb.%
202013> accessed 5 March 2016. 
433 Michael Slackman, ‘Cleric Wields Religion to Challenge Iran’s Theocracy’ (The New York Times, 
2009) <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/world/middleeast/22ayatollah.html> accessed 23 
May 2016. 
434 Muhammad Sahimi, ‘Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s Fatwa’ (Frontline - Tehran Bureau, 2009) 
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/07/grand-ayatollah-
montazeris-fatwa.html> accessed 23 May 2016. 
109 
 
level, consequently, the social bounds of citizens remain extremely precarious.435 In 
essence, while the Iran of Khomeini, for instance, looks like the reign of al-Maamun, 
who established intellectual circles for the interpretation of Islamic law and created his 
image as the absolute legal and political ruler, the Taliban system is characterized by a 
weak central authority and it mainly focuses in the administration of hudud 
(punishments). Hence, on one hand, the ‘quasi-pontifical’ system of the Ayatollah in Iran 
mirrors the power of the Abbasid Caliphs where the space of legal argumentation is 
limited to the central authority, while on the other, the ‘Taliban system’ is based on the 
mere application of fixed legal concept as developed in Medieval Islam. Only in the first 
case it is not the text but the ‘interpreter’ that is ‘fetishized’ as a unique authority. 
Nevertheless, both Shia and Sunni Islamist movements are facing a problem: it becomes 
difficult to face the ideological dilemma of the formation of a ‘pure’ Islamic state 
without relying on modern forms of secular power such as ‘nation-state’, 
patrimonialism and authoritarian rules of law developed by medieval scholars loyal to 
the Abbasid. If Islamists are advocating a ‘pure’ Islamic state, as they claim, they should 
refer to the first period of Islam after the death of the Prophet, when the law was made 
locally from revered jurists far from the political entourage. As during the Abbasid, 
Islamists try to justify their absolute legal and political power with reference to 
something ‘external’ to the ‘pure’ Islamic precepts. In this way, however, they forget 
that the Abbasid effort to transform Islam into a proselytizing religion through dialectic 
Greek concepts and the Roman-statist-juridical legacy for their own legal and political 
legitimation, in the end failed. In other words, although the introduction of western 
concepts restricted the freedom of legal interpretation in the name of a superior raison 
d’état, it never succeeded in creating a ‘Canonic form of Sunna’ valid for all its subjects 
irrespective of cultural and religious difference: where Islamists won, the secularization 
of Islam can be considered completed. In fact, if, as Nancy argues, law emerges as the 
primary expression of all monotheistic religions, in Islam the first step of this 
transformation was the assimilation of Greek dialectic and juridical concepts during the 
‘centralized theocracy’ of the Abbasid. This process continued with the Ottoman 
Empire, which adopted part of the French legal system and recognized the validity of 
only one book of Islamic law. The ‘collapse’ of classical legal authority was pushed 
further by western colonizers who imposed the codification of part of Islamic law in an 
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attempt to re-create a western-style power structure. Therefore, the rise of Islamism 
can be understood as the final link in a long chain that aimed to secularize Islam and to 
transform it into a proselyting religion. 
As a matter of fact, the aftermath of the colonial period has witnessed a continuous 
attempt by ‘secular’ as well as Islamist powers to appropriate the law. In post-colonial 
Egypt, for instance, both ‘secular’ and ‘Islamist’ governments have “virtually 
incorporated al-Azhar [the most influential centre of Islamic studies ] as an arm of the 
state through purges and control over Azhar finances, and by gaining the power to 
appoint al-Azhar’s key leadership […] [and] by securing fatwas legitimating their 
policies.”436 The process of incorporation and cooperation between al-Azhar and the 
state started with Nasser’s project to create a unified nation-state. In order to control 
the most important Islamic centre, he established alliances with Imams and Sheikhs 
willing to reform the institution: through the incorporation of al-Azhar within the state 
institution, Nasser not only limited the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood but he also 
assured the legitimacy of his regime. With Nasser and the later Presidents, al-Azhar 
came formally under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Endowments who finances and 
appoints the Shayk al-Azhar: “the forced expansion of al-Azhar into secular fields of 
study ensured that an increasing number of deans representing non-religious fields 
would be represented in the Azhar High Council. The impact of this reorganization was 
profound. Al-Azhar was transformed from an institution with a high degree of 
independence to one with very little autonomy from government interference.”437 
Despite that, the process of inclusion of al-Azhar within the state has never been fully 
completed. A further attempt to appropriate legal power was made by President Morsi, 
the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood elected after the 2011 Egyptian uprising, 
who tried to build an ‘Islamic nation-state’ and to unify different and heterogeneous 
identities in a unique ‘state identity’ under the political and legal authority of a ‘God’s 
Caliph’. The political programme of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist forces in the 
country reveals a desire for power typical of the Abbasid period; they asserted that the 
‘only truth’ resides in the supreme guide of the Brotherhood or in the hands of the 
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Salafist Sheikh.438 In September 2012, the members of the Senior Ulama Council, under 
attack from the new ‘centralized Islamic state’, emphasised the need for the full 
independence of religious scholars from the government. They stressed the importance 
of protecting the second article of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution, which asserts the 
total independence of the scholars on issues related to Islamic law. They point out that 
“the principles of Islamic law cover all necessary issues, along with jurisprudential and 
fundamental rules adopted by Sunni doctrine” and that “Christian and Jewish Egyptians 
should apply the principles of their religions regarding personal affairs and religious 
rites, and choose their spiritual leaders”439 as the Qur’an, the primary source of Islamic 
law, quotes. The referendum to reform the constitution, strongly desired by the new 
Islamist government, created a profound crisis in the country as the president granted 
himself immunity from the judicial body. If the former dictator, Hosni Mubarak, “was 
astute enough to co-opt and accommodate judges in a way that neutralized, if not 
spoiled, them in the political arena”,440 the new Islamist president expelled judges and 
military officials from the political arena: the attack on the constitution determined the 
end of Morsi’s presidency and the beginning of a new era for the country. 
With the emergence of Islamist movements/parties and their political victory in many 
countries, it is possible to argue that the westernization of Islam has been completed. 
The analysis of Islamic law’s evolution and its relationship with political power leads us 
to reconsider the so called ‘clash of civilization’ between the West and the East. While in 
the West, religion and politics are (supposedly) separate spheres but in reality they 
merge, in the Islamic world, it seems that religion and politics combine but in reality the 
political power never succeeded in creating a canon law. Thus, as Diamantides argues,441 
the difficulties between the Islamic and western world are not related to a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ as much of the media echoes, rather they express the tensions between 
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two universal-ist monotheisms: when these monotheisms face each other, they are 
confronted with their own internal incompleteness. Therefore, 
“[we should] move the debate on fundamentalism away from unhelpful and historically 
inaccurate frameworks of analysis (e.g. clash of civilizations) by recognizing that the 
logic of fundamentalists Islam poses the problem of informed choice between two 
distinct models of subjectification through attachment to the rule of man-made law of 
which the currently predominant, western, one faces problems of implosion rather than 
external hostility, while the Islamic one is faced with the pragmatic problem of its 
accelerating marginalization, if not outright destruction, in a globalized context”.442 
Despite differences between western and Islamic monotheisms in their historical 
trajectories and the relationship between the state and religious authority, the 
expansion of territorial rules remains a significant feature in both the Christian and 
Islamic world. The operation of western Christian scholars, who reinterpreted Roman 
law to found the canon law, is similar to the operation requested of Islamic scholars by 
the Abbasid Caliphs, which substantially consisted in the (unsuccessful) attempt to 
create an ‘Islamic canon law’: recalling Nancy’s thesis of ‘monotheist model of social 
organization’, law becomes central in the sense that all monotheistic religions seek to 
be materialized in a collective conscience.443 The process of ‘desacralization’, or 
‘secularization’, of Islamic law, performed firstly (unsuccessfully) by the Abbasid and 
then by Islamists is similar to the one operated by Christianity, in which the law 
becomes the primary expression of religion. In fact, Islamist fundamentalists rely more 
on the body of fiqh, which they invest with an absolute political power, than on the 
Islamic legal primary sources (Qur’an and Sunna). This fetishization of law has occurred 
at the expense of religious moral values to the point that “the reduction of the 
worldview of Islam into [a totalitarian] ideology is a form of secularism”.444 
Therefore, the Islamists’ desire for the rule of law is not related to a simple rejection of 
‘western values’, but it is intrinsically linked to their version of ‘God’s Caliph’ who 
embodies an absolute power and authority in a ‘new’ expansionist Muslim Empire. This 
indicates that the reaction of Islamists towards the ‘secular state’ is not the result of a 
                                                             
442  Ibid, 107. 
443 Nancy (n 13).  
444 Sohail Inayatullah and Gail Boxwell, Islam, Postmodernism and Other Futures: A Ziauddin 
Sardar Reader (Pluto Press, 2003) 170–1. 
113 
 
cultural difference; rather, it is the same process of ‘demystification’ that Christian 
scholars operated in the West. In this light, the assault of Islamists on the secular forces 
of a ‘decadent’ western colonizer can be theorized not in terms of difference but, 
rather, in terms of sameness.445 
But while Christian modernity managed to create a legal system able to bind the 
individual to a text which was incorporated first by the Emperor and then by the Pope as 
absolute and final interpreter of the law, in Islamic history, despite the Abbasid’s efforts, 
the resistance of many Muslim scholars prevented the creation of a unique canon law. 
Therefore, unlike the development of Christian law, the question over legitimacy 
remained unresolved in Muslim majority societies, as did the split between the Ulama 
and the government.446 Hence, Islamic monotheism cannot be seen as part of the 
western tradition of totalitarianism, as many scholars and Islamic modernists argue. 
Rather, the development of Islamic monotheism started during the ‘pax islamica’ when 
the Abbasid imposed the use of Aristotelian concepts and Roman law in order to frame 
Islam as an identity defined by external difference where law marks the point of 
distinction. In this sense, the Islamist political system emerges as a secularized form of 
Islamic religion, exactly as secular contemporary western governments are a secularized 
form of the Christian religion in the name of an absolute, binding, power. As in the 
West, the political transformations in which Islamists believe are to happen through 
law’s enforcement: in this sense, both secular constitutional order and Islamist 
theocracies are the result of the creation of a centralized state in which the doors of 
legal interpretation are closed in the name of a unique sovereign legislator: “in both 
cases law produces the subject and that is why it carries an absolute value”.447 
In short, while liberals, as well as ‘humanists’ are simply reiterating the Christian 
‘monotheistic model of social organization’; a ‘monotheist provenience’ that they 
denied, in the same way, Islamists are reiterating a ‘secularized’ and ‘westernized’ form 
of state that they formally reject. However, the history of Islamic legal scholars teaches 
that it can be a form of resistance to prevent the assimilation of law into political 
authority. The ‘pluralist’, ‘local’ legal system based on the consensus of the community 
clashed, in the whole history of Islam, with the ‘absolute sovereign’ in love with power. 
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2.4 The dis-similar mirror of the West 
 
The secularization paradigm is based on the premise that “the shift of social, political, 
and economic power from church to state, advances in modern science and technology 
led to the gradual disenchantment of the world and experience in it. From this point of 
view, as modernity waxes, religion seems to wane".448 In other words, western 
modernity is understood through the (apparent) division between secular and religious 
in which the latter is supposedly withdrawn from the public sphere to relegate itself into 
a private matter between God and believers. However, as Asad argues, "there cannot be 
a universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and 
relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical 
product of discursive processes."449 In this case, as I shall argue, western discourse has 
produced a legalism which is nothing more than the substitute for God’s supreme 
power in the ‘city of men’: this, in turn, does not entail a separation of spiritual and 
temporal powers, but a reconfiguration of religion within the secular. Recalling Nancy,450 
in the West the sacralisation of power had made possible the gradual substitution of 
God’s supreme power to make law with the Pope/King and, nowadays, with ‘secular’ 
values such as democracy, human rights, individual rights, separation of power between 
the church and the state etc.451 As Diamantides points out, 
 
“the evolution of modern western government, from absolute to popular sovereignty 
through to governmentality, is nothing if not part of a theo-politics modelled on the 
‘division of labour’, which followed the theological consensus on the triadic nature of 
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God, between a glorious God who reigns without consequence to this world and His Son 
who governs”.452 
 
The metaphysical shift operated by medieval Christian jurists and theologians made 
possible the development of a specific notion of Christian/secular/political and legal 
structure. In fact, the codification of Roman law in the name of the ‘public good guided 
by God’ had developed a power that expressed itself through legislation. The result of 
this operation is twofold: on the one hand, law acquires a universal value supposedly 
suitable outside European borders, while on the other, tribunals act in the place of God. 
In fact, in the West, natural law (humanism) and positive law essentially agree that 
there is a stability of legal process (positivist) or legal values (humanist); this specific 
notion of law could not exist without the western concept of ‘universal’ sovereignty. 
 
In the case of the ‘Judaeo-Christian’ world it was the symbiosis between Greco-Roman 
consciousness and the ‘monotheistic frame of mind’ developed during the Hellenic era 
that strengthened the idea of universality of the logico-techno-juridical system and its 
splits from the realm of salvation. In fact, medieval western theologians created the 
concept of an absolute transcendental sovereignty by essentially remodelling Roman 
law in the name of a new bound community: this, in turn, implied a break with the 
historical and the mythological occidental narrative which led to the substitution of God 
with immanent politic.453 In other words, while in the past, a king was simply substituted 
with another, the operation of medieval theologians, who re-elaborated the Roman law 
of heritage and translated it in favour of a unique sovereign, be it the King or the Pope, 
represented a ‘political’ re-elaboration of Christian mythologies in the name of a 
common identity. What the medieval theologians brought about was a domestication of 
the divine omnipresence by “rendering transcendence immanent in the form of 
unlimited power, without telos and inherent in natural, including biological matter:”454 
in this way, they established a system that could assure an ‘infinite and absolute power’. 
In essence, by sacralising the institutional body, they managed to establish a continuity 
of power and to create the concept of ‘institution’. In fact, for medieval Christian 
philosophers and theologians, the Incarnation represented a break between “the ruler 
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of the chosen people and God and left the king of this world only a much reduced 
power, shared with the Church and sacralized through the intermediary of the 
clergy.”455 In other words, western medieval theologians managed to create a new 
concept of absolute ‘sacred sovereignty’ (absent in the Muslim world) through the 
sacralisation of the institutional body, in which the royal power emerges as the ‘rightful 
power’ to rule both the relationship between humans and that between God and 
humankind:456 this, in turn, took the form of a new modernity. 
 
In contrast, the symbiosis between spiritual and temporal powers was difficult to 
achieve in the Eastern Roman and Muslim Empires: as a matter of fact, the Byzantine 
effort to fill this gap through the notion of priestly government and the Abbasid attempt 
to sacralize the Emperor through neo-Platonic concepts, created what Diamantides calls 
a ‘deficient sovereignty model’.457 In the Christian Byzantine Empire the king/priest tried 
to match political and spiritual power through a slow and ritualized coronation. 
However, the result of this process was an ineffective and illegitimate endorsement of 
power: as a matter of fact, the king/priest was often seen by the people as a usurper of 
the biblical title of ‘just king’. This developed, in Byzantine history, into conflicts and 
conspiracies. By contrast, in the feudal West, where the Pope/Emperor was sanctified 
through a series of rituals,458 the perception of the feudal lords as usurper was absent. 
 
In other words, while the Christian Byzantine Empire and the Islamic world presented a 
constitutive weakness, in the West, this gap was filled by medieval constitutional 
theories which have made possible the idea of an absolute sovereignty through an 
integrated political theology. While, in the West, the temporal has merged the spiritual 
to express the modern notion of sovereignty, the Christian Byzantine and the Muslim 
politics are characterized by a gap between temporal and spiritual power.459 As 
Diamantides argues, “the collapsed dialectic immanence-transcendence of natural 
theology is absent in medieval Arab-Muslim empires; absent, consequently, is the 
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spectacular product of an integrated political philosophy, which could conceive an 
absolute sovereignty that, however, is to be exercised pragmatically.”460 
 
In contrast, western theologians created the concept of an unlimited power without  
telos through an operation of philosophical and theoretical synthesis between temporal 
and spiritual power in order to develop a coherent notion of political authority and to 
overcome the ‘deficient genealogy’ of power. The assumption of an absolute power 
without telos is mirrored in the western self-construction of collectiveness in which 
people are subjected to an infinite and transcendent normative power. Modern 
regimes, as Nancy argues, are ‘theistic’ in the sense that they passed through the 
idolatry of a single will of the collective. This (modern) theory of a ‘pure’ law able to 
bind citizens more than any sovereign, has facilitated the spread of constitutional 
positivism outside occidental borders and has strengthened the claim that 
liberal/secular western law is the only just universal form of social organization. 
 
“This theological shift made possible the notion that the king’s divine right to ‘bind and 
loose’ through legislation and, in principle, irrespectively of results, was to be used ever 
increasingly so that it matched changes on the ground. Centuries later, the 
presupposition of the sovereign decision are respectively the normative and material 
secularized versions of this potentia absoluta, which is at once presupposed by and 
requiring the potentia ordinata, or ordinary legislation”.461 
 
Occidental constitutional theories, based on the distinction between constituted and 
constitutive power, correspond to a purely political and normative understanding of the 
state. If it is true that all modern western concepts of the state are secularized 
theological concepts and that the secular itself is a form of deistic theology where the 
state becomes a creature of law, then in western understanding of the state the 
constituent collapses into constituted power, the political into law. As a matter of fact, 
political and normative positivism employ a ‘superpower’ derived from natural theology 
and in the service of social unity without reference to domestic or external ‘others’. In 
this sense, western metaphysical understanding of a universal, centered, absolute 
power as substitute of a withdrawn God has created a situation in which the 
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colonization of the ‘others’ is seen as an ‘expansion’ of the corresponding form of legal 
and political organization (translated, nowadays, into the ‘exportation of democracy’ 
through war).462 In the western tradition, normative constitutionalism presupposes that 
the ‘unity’ of the people can be achieved only through the rules of (secular) law, 
understood as morally neutral; since liberal theories assume that conflicts between 
individuals would arise naturally, the most civilized framework for the operation of 
private law, based on the ‘social contract’, is the state-enforcement of positive law.463 It 
is precisely through this mythology that the concept of ‘state of nature’ justifies the 
contractarianism. 
 
In essence, while the philosophical and legal history of western modernity made 
possible the development of an integrated political theology which becomes the 
foundation of the modern, ‘secular’, western political and legal systems, in the Muslim 
world, until the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent colonization period, political and 
legal powers were continuously in need of negotiation, resulting in a ‘deficient 
sovereignty’ model’.464 If western constitutional philosophers were obsessed with the 
unity of the people represented by a singular authority through law, in the Muslim 
world, previous to the Ottoman Empire and the colonization period, this problem did 
not exist: collective representation was never totally embodied by a (unique) sovereign 
authority. In fact, unlike Christian ecclesiastical law and positive law, in Islamic law the 
concept of Umma is central. The Umma, which includes a plurality of heterogeneous 
religions, suggests that not all human associations need an absolute sovereign that 
separates ‘us’ from ‘them’: “the Umma retains its integrity despite lacking in a 
corresponding theory of doctrinal and political unity- be it of the Kelsian (normative) or 
the Schmittian (substantive) sort. The famous distinction dar al harb/dar al islam would 
belong to the latter but for the fact that the decision lies not with the Muslims but their 
others who can choose to unilaterally convert any time”.465 In fact, as I have argued, 
Muslim Ulama had developed a rational and coherent jurisprudence without relying on 
Hartian theories and Islamic law was not dictated by the state but, rather, by local wise 
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men recognized by the whole community. The reasons for the stillborn sovereignty in 
the Muslim world can be found in the absence of a hierarchical structure within the 
clergy body; the disinterest of jurists in gaining power out of their local Umma; the 
scholars’ rebellion against centralized political power; and the understanding of Islam as 
a universal religion. Therefore, the difference between western and Islamic legal 
systems can be found in a different assimilation of Greek dialectic and Roman-juridical 
legacies. While in the West as well as in the East the political authority tried to be 
‘sanctified’ through a process of legal authority’s appropriation through the assimilation 
of Roman statist/juridical legacy and Greek dialectic argumentation, only in the West 
did this process develop a form of sovereignty where initially the Pope, and then the 
Emperor, had the absolute/divine right to legislate. In contrast, in Islam this process was 
never completed. As a matter of fact, although the Abbasid tried to institute a unique 
positivized form of Sharia law, they failed to create a state able to control the 
production of a singular, codified body of law. This attempt reveals that the ‘God’s 
Caliph’ was (unsuccessfully) ‘Islamized’ just as the ‘western Emperor’ was ‘christianized’. 
As Diamantides argues, 
“In the west we went from Jesus ‘rendering unto Caesar’ […], to Popes and Emperors, in 
the person of whom the temporal and the spiritual merged as expressed by the notion 
of sovereignty […]. In Islam, by contrast, the similar early endemic attempts to invest 
exclusive interpretative authority in the image of a ruler, as both just and sovereign, was 
undermined by the same jurists that created the sophisticated body of Islamic laws 
because that image was reserved exclusively for Mohammad, the Prophet and first ruler 
of Islamic state.”466 
Thus, while in the West, the spiritual and temporal powers were separated “in order to 
create, outside modern states, not so much a spiritual power as impotent and 
unenviable theocracies,”467 in the Muslim world spiritual and temporal powers were in 
continuous need of negotiation. The ‘deficient sovereignty’ of the Byzantine and Muslim 
Empires was resolved, in the West, through the construction of a theo-political notion of 
sovereignty and, in time, a sacralized nationalism able to bind people to a (territorial) 
sovereign state. Western legal and political development made possible the transition 
from landed nobility to a Divine King and then to the right of people to use property for 
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profit. “In their secular polities belief in salvation through obedience to the omnipotent 
God’s will on earth is not eliminated but transformed; ‘God’, originally a mysterious 
maker (as He still is in Judaism, eastern Christianity and Islam), became something 
terrestrial if equally abstract: the Nation, the Market or the Revolutionary Mass”.468 
Similarly, Carl Schmitt argues that 
 
 “all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological 
concepts not only because of their historical development – in which they were 
transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the 
omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver- but also because of their systematic 
structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these 
concepts. The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle theology”.469 
 
Recalling Nancy, if all monotheist models of social organization have an ‘auto-
deconstructive’ element as they are based on a blind faith in a withdrawn God, the 
auto-deconstruction of Christianity culminated in the establishment of the modern 
‘Christian/secular/liberal’ state. In contrast, in the classical Islamic states the problem of 
the ‘deficient authority model’ was left as it was until the Ottoman Empire and the post-
colonial nation-states which emulated the western model of social organization. Hence, 
the self-deconstruction of Islamic monotheism was kept apart until the creation of a 
westernized (exported) model of ‘nation-state’. However, in the West, the withdrawal 
of God from human affairs has been replaced by a growing dependence “on various 
‘deficiently immanent’ models of omnipotence and omniscience”.470 This is mirrored in 
western political and philosophical theories of ‘sovereignty’ in which law gradually 
acquires an ‘unlimited’ power, as a carrier of universal values. 
 
Therefore, compared to the West which managed to fill the gap through philosophical 
and political speculation, the Byzantine as well as the classic Muslim empires ran a 
significant ‘deficit of authority’. In contrast to the West, where the rules of law are 
understood as central to European civilization, Islamic culture, in its historical 
development, comes to know the difference between ruling by and ruling of law. 
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Muslim scholars have developed a rational jurisprudence far from the western positivist 
Hartian model. The Ulama, who were the representative of the consensus of the Umma, 
exercised practical freedom in the interpretation of the holy texts: “in practice the 
message was to obey the law neither because authoritatively dictated by a state official 
nor because it passes some philosopher’s test but as pronounced by your local wise 
man whose authority depended on popularity and oscillated according to local political 
dynamics.”471 In the West the claim for a universalist law ruled by an absolute authority 
was justified with reference to a ‘divine right’ to rule: therefore, what was a gap in 
Islamic history emerges as a ‘legitimacy deficit’ in the West. Hence, although western 
legal tradition is considered a secular-rational model marked by a rejection of what goes 
beyond secular rationality, in reality it has profound roots in religious narratives and it is 
the expression of a specific monotheistic model of social organization. As a matter of 
fact, the distinction between secular and sacred/religious is typical of western countries 
and it is inherited by Christian tradition (Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, 
and to God the things that are God's); this distinction is absent in Islamic or Jewish 
law.472 
 
The comparison between the Muslim and the western world helps to unfold the so 
called ‘clash of civilizations’. Similar to the West, the systematization of Islamic law into 
a body of extremely particularistic regulations responds to a desire for a sovereignty 
which possesses a universal-ist law as a substitute of a withdrawn God. In essence, 
Islamic law “acquired the same universalizing tension that we attribute to secularly 
dressed Christianity today, namely between the spreading of a civilization and its 
inability to dialectize its domination via its ideals and norms”.473 But while in Islam, due 
to the failure to create a Canonic form of law, “the problem of universality was not 
successfully side-lined by the thought of cultural pluralism grounded in a global 
consciousness”, 474 the western system demands that the citizen live according to fixed 
rules of positive law that, often, in the name of an abstract equality, simply highlight 
differences. Therefore, the so called ‘clash of civilizations’ is false: “since monotheistic 
‘religion’ has been irrevocably imploded under the impact of globalizing tendencies, 
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spirituality has been pushed to the level of the esoteric and conflicts of legitimacy are 
managed through the cult of legalism, the ‘priests’ of which are, respectively, the 
morally ‘neutral’ Western lawyers and the morally ‘perfect’ Muslim mullahs.”475 
In this regard, the veil, which emerges as the symbol of the incompatibility between two 
different worlds, in reality is revealed as the emblem of both eastern and western 
anxieties over their own internal legal shortcomings and incompleteness which develops 
on both parts a mechanism of defence and attachment to their respective law. The 
comparison between western and Islamic models of sovereignty unfolds exactly this 
tension: 
 “In the west, the fact that secularism is incomplete (possibly inevitably) means that 
universality is still a source of anxiety even as the prevailing logic of ‘management’ 
channels most energy into efforts to ‘deal with’ cultural difference in the ‘global village’ 
(multiculturalism versus integration etc.) […] In Islamic context, likewise, the 
secularization of the faith through its transformation into a body of extremely 
particularistic, sophisticated legal rules and principles of interpretation covering ever 
more aspect of collective life by ‘revered jurists’ barely hides the impossibility of 
constructing a ‘purely’ Islamic identity.”476 
When the western and eastern worlds meet, their internal incompleteness becomes 
apparent: this develops a mechanism of defence and attachment to their respective 
legal systems. In sum, the so called ‘clash of civilizations’ is nothing more than anxiety 
over the condition of incompleteness between two dogmatic (desired) legal systems. In 
fact, both Christian and Muslim legal scholars are prompted by the desire for a 
universal-ist positive law that can guarantee a social order “that is, law authoritatively 
distinguished as law, as a means to no end other than its own operation, which both 
presupposed and facilitates centralized state control.”477 Therefore the veil emerges as 
the expression and the mirror of two dis-similar (desired) legal systems: that of 
European imperialism and that of Islamist nationalism. Both aspire to create a 
universalist legal system able to bind the community into a precise identity through the 
control of women’s body. 
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It is exactly the troubled universality of western law that emerges from the analysis of 
the so called ‘hijab cases’ decided at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as well 
as in different European national courts, which I will take into consideration in the next 
Chapter. The law’s development in the West indicates that the universality of ‘modern’ 
‘secular’ values, translated nowadays into blind belief in human rights as a global 
formula, is inherited from the work of medieval jurists who translated the Christian 
concept of natural law into a secular device which becomes the expression of the 
secularization of Christianity. As Jacob observes through the analysis of the intrinsic 
relation between secular rituals and modern political values, the development of new 
secular sentiments (associated with eighteenth century Europe) has become a new form 
of religion which contributes to the formation of liberal society and the sacralisation of 
concepts such as ‘reason’, ‘civil society’, ‘democracy’ etc.478 This indicates that 
western/secular modern concepts, which carry a religious essence, are not neutral 
positions, rather, liberal thought expresses a specific form of governmentality in which 
religion and national politics are re-defined.479 In other words, the emergence of a new 
secular (social) space facilitated the re-definition of religion and religious 
sentiments/practices into the modern secular world. In this sense, secular is not 
intended as the gradual withdrawal of religion from the polity, but as the regulation of 
religion and religious sentiments in the modern Christian/liberal/secular world.480 As 
Asad argues, “secularism doesn’t simply insist that religious practice and belief be 
confined to a space where they cannot threaten political stability or the liberties of 
‘free-thinking’ citizens. Secularism builds on a particular conception of the world 
(‘natural’ and ‘social’) and of the problems generated by that world.”481 
 
As the analysis of the legal decisions concerning the practice of veiling will reveal, the 
universality attached to modern Christian/secular values in reality acts to absorb the 
plurality of different laws, traditions, and customs into the universality of western law. 
This, in turn, has facilitated the creation of the modern law’s subject (the ‘autonomous’ 
individual) along with a specific form of universalist sovereignty which has been 
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‘exported’ (and sometimes imposed) as the only valid model of social organization. 
However, as I shall argue, the break that the ‘secular’ West operated with its own 
Christian mythologies in the name of a common, unique and fixed identity, contradicts 
its own claim to be the most suitable form of social organization, through the 
exportation of democracy and human rights permeated by the same Christian narratives 
in which all the ‘other’ political and legal organizations appear incompatible from a 
western point of view. As Diamantides argues, “late-modern contract theories and legal 
positivism operate as master signifiers not ‘anywhere’ and not ‘just because’ but 
specifically in the context of the European nation-state and only as always already 
justified i.e. as the equivalent of what, in the earlier times, was seen as justified with 
reference to now abandoned, albeit still operative, substantive theological structures 
and beliefs”.482 
In this regard, as I shall argue, human rights activists and the ECHR essentially agree with 
the monolithic vision of Islamists on Islamic law. In fact, western constitutional theories 
tend to see Shari’a law as shaped by a dichotomy between traditionalists and 
modernizers. Based on this dichotomy, the emphasis of western discourse on the hijab 
and Islamic law in general is related to the ‘clash’ between traditionalists and 
modernizers over the constitutional structure of the state and whether this structure 
can be legitimated by Sharia, which is imagined as a fixed body of law.483 This passionate 
debate between Islamophobes and Islamists mirrors “their animosity […] [to] jointly 
essentialize the ‘civilizational’ differences between, on the one hand, a ‘European’ 
culture that is presented as classical Greek, early Roman and western Christian 
(downplaying its Jewish, Byzantine/eastern Christian and Islamic influences) and an 
‘Islamic’ one, which is presented as essentially ‘other’ which could never have absorbed 
the influences of classical Greece and Christianity but emulates the Jewish theocratic 
model or, at best, the ‘deficiently Christianized’ Caesaropapist model of mixed power in 
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the Eastern Roman Empire with which it first came to contact”.484 Furthermore, as I 
argued, “the essentialism of this modernist-legalist position- jointly held by liberal [neo-
colonial defense] and [post-colonial] Islamists orientalists- further consists in conceiving 
the Shari’a as the primary expression of the religion of Islam”.485 The new (secularized) 
law, which becomes central in both western and Islamist thought, was thus able to 
construct a universal metaphysic which is supposed to be suitable for every society. 
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Chapter 3: The ‘humanity’ of the Secular Subject 
In recent years, the female headscarf has been at the centre of many polemical debates 
in the West. Politicians, judges, journalists and columnists have even ‘over-debated’ the 
practice of veiling in the secular European public space, filling pages of journals and 
social media with stories of Muslim women who have been forbidden to work, to walk 
in a public place, to have appropriate education, and even to stand in a court room, 
because they are veiled. Sirine Ben Yahiaten, a 17-year-old French Muslim girl, was 
obliged to change schools as her attire was considered an ‘ostentatious religious 
sign’.486 Sirine was wearing a long skirt complete with sweatpants underneath and a hair 
band that cover her hair. One day the school principal called her in to inquire about her 
attire. While waiting to speak with the principal, the school’s secretary told her that she 
should not wear sweatpants under her skirt because of the French law banning 
‘religious symbols’: “she told me that my skirt was too long and students walking behind 
me could fall because of its length, so she said that I was posing a threat to the security 
of the students. As for the headband, she said it prevents me from hearing well during 
the class.”487 As Sirine was forbidden to wear what she wanted, she was obliged by the 
head of the school to attend study period class every day: “Every time I entered the 
school, someone was waiting for me to accompany me to the study period class since I 
was no longer allowed to have any contact with other students. I was not allowed to go 
out during class breaks. I was given exercises to do but I was never given makeup 
material for the courses that I had been missing.”488 As she could not reach an 
agreement with the school over her attire, she was obliged to find another school which 
did not consider a ‘long skirt’ as an ‘ostentatious religious symbol’. Rabha Chatar, a 40-
year-old French woman and mother of three, was forbidden to accompany her children 
to school because she was wearing a veil. Although she tried to challenge the ban at the 
national French Court, her claim was dismissed because of the new French law on 
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secularism and the wearing of ostentatious religious symbols.489 Hanane Karimi, a 36-
year-old teacher at the University of Strasbourg, had been obliged to leave her school 
when she was young because she wore a veil. It was not until 2004 that she decided to 
resume her education: she gained a Master’s and a PhD and started work at the 
University of Strasbourg.490 As students in the university focused on her veil, she 
decided to wear a turban: “I feel more comfortable than with a traditional veil, which is 
often rejected. Yet, even with the turban I stay who I am and I am identified as a 
Muslim.”491 Leila Glovert, a 33-year-old British citizen who converted to Islam more 
than 10 years before, lost her job because she was wearing a veil: “I became jobless. I 
applied to jobs and got called for interviews. Once I showed up at the interviews, I was 
being told ‘we will call you back’ or simply ‘we don’t want the Islamic veil.’ I sent 
hundreds of resumes and each interview ended up that way.”492 As she could not find a 
job in her city, she decided to move to London and to separate from her children in 
order to have a job. 
These and many other Muslim women in Europe have seen their personal freedoms 
limited in the name of defending secular values and gender equality. In recent years, 
tensions over the veil have reached many European national courts, as well as the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), all of which have legislated over the possibility 
for Muslim women to wear a veil in the western/secular public space. In this Chapter I 
will analyse some cases decided at the ECHR in order to highlight the controversial 
points of these decisions. As I shall argue, what emerges from the analysis of the legal 
cases related to the practice of veiling is that, by essentializing religion and Sharia law, 
western law protects a specific liberal/Christian/secular law’s subject and, by so doing, it 
excludes different subjectivities. 
My analysis, outlined in the previous Chapter, reveals a symmetry between the use of 
western positive law and Human Rights law and ‘positivized’ Sharia law –such as the 
one proposed by Islamists- not so much to physically dress or undress Muslim women, 
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but to bind their bodies to a fixed, transparent and singular identity. The Sahin case,493 
for instance, to which I will return, reveals a common view among Islamists and liberals 
that the matter falls under Sharia law, which is misrepresented as a comprehensive and 
transparent code of unalterable revealed law. By referring to the Refah Partisi case,494 
the judges stated that Sharia law would oblige people to obey static rules imposed by 
religious concerns. However, the pluralist legal system proposed by the Refah Party was 
quite different from the unique Sharia law proposed by Islamist movements. 
Interestingly, in the case, the rejection of a plurality of legal systems was compounded 
by a rejection of the pluralistic practice of veiling: the blindness of the ECHR to this 
pluralism of intentions and of performative outcomes of the act of wearing a veil, 
reveals that, instead of a clash of civilizations, what we really have is a clash of two 
imperialistic-universalistic discourses: the triumphant secular discourse of a world that 
is re-humanized through human rights and the reactive Islamist discourse. Both systems 
aspire towards establishing a universal-ist law able to bind the subject to a monolithic 
and static identity. While Islamists aspire to bind the entire world to a universal singular 
and fixed Sharia law, in the West, Human Rights law aspires to redeem the whole of 
humanity through the inclusion of the human within the pale of the law. 
To understand how the universalist claim of Human Rights law has created an intrinsic 
relationship between positive law, Human Rights law and the ‘human’, I will recall 
Esmeir’s work495 on the emergence of juridical humanity. Through examining the history 
of the British protectorate in Egypt, she reveals that the imposition of a new positive law 
by British colonizers aimed to deliver humanity to a people (supposedly) ‘de-humanized’ 
by earlier barbarian and ‘backward’ political and legal systems. As humanity is delivered 
through the inscription of the individual within the pale of positive law, the human 
becomes the telos and the theological end of the law. Consequently, the human 
becomes nothing more than a ‘juridical person’. Esmeir’s articulation and theoretical 
analysis allows us to re-think the current debate on human rights as a means of 
effective development; if ‘humanity’ is delivered only within the pale of the law, then 
becoming the subject of human rights can ensure both a temporal humanity and its 
possible suspension. Hence, Human Rights law protects an already-given-human and it 
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claims jurisdiction over the declaration of its status. Therefore, what transpires from 
Human Rights law is the imposition of a new universal law that in principle ‘saves’ the 
part of humanity that has yet to be allowed to enter into the arrangements of liberal 
law but, in reality, it reinforces its own absolute power and, as a transcendent Christian 
God did before, it controls and guides the individual by creating a specific secular 
subject who enjoys the abstract equality of a (supposedly) neutral secular state within 
the jurisdiction of the law. In this sense, the cases I will analyse can be understood as 
instances of modern law constructing a ‘de-humanized’ female, victim of chauvinistic 
religious law, who must be re-humanized as an abstract individual, at once legislator 
and subject of law. If the law’s subject fails to be reborn and rejects being included in 
the modern law’s project of ‘juridical humanity’, it immediately returns to a condition 
that is ‘pre-human’. 
In fact, as I shall argue, western and Human Rights law protects a specific 
Christian/secular/liberal individual whose secular practices and/or sensitivity “is one 
that depends on, one that cannot be abstracted from, the secularist narrative of the 
progressive replacement of religious error by secular reason – what Asad calls the 
‘triumphalist narrative of secularism’. A secular sensibility is one considered from the 
standpoint of its contribution to that progressive narrative.”496 By introducing a 
secularized concept of religion and religious practices, those decisions reveal that 
western law protects a specific Christian/secular/liberal citizen whose speech and 
behaviour incorporates western/liberal categories of religious and secular. 
Therefore, although Human Rights law claims to redeem humanity through the force of 
the law, it actually acts to eradicate cultural differences in the name of a fixed and 
monolithic Christian/secular/liberal law’s subject. This emerges as a paradox of 
liberalism; if, on the one hand, the citizen is free, then on the other, in order for these 
freedoms to be guaranteed, the individual has to surrender to the police state. Likewise, 
on the one hand liberalism justifies itself by claiming a separation between the spiritual 
and the temporal, the private and the public, while on the other, the private life of the 
individual has become extremely regulated. In the case, in order to ‘save’ western 
secular values, some personal rights of Muslim women and their possibility of agency 
have to be limited. 
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In this sense, European legal decisions over the practice of veiling reveal that secularism 
articulates and defines specific forms of knowledge and emerges not as the mere 
separation between the private and the public, but as the re-configuration of religious 
sensitivities and religious practices in the public secular space.497 
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3.1 The western/Christian/secular subject of law 
In mid-August 2016, Rania El-Alloul was attending the hearing of her son who had been 
caught driving with a suspended licence in Montreal, Canada. During the hearing, Judge 
Eliana Marengo asked Rania to remove her headscarf, stating “the courtroom is a 
secular place and you are not suitably dressed.”498 When Rania refused, alleging her 
right to wear the veil based on the fact that no ban existed on wearing religious items in 
the courtroom, the judge refused to hear the case of her 21-year-old son. In the name 
of secular principles, supposedly violated by a person who was not even the claimant or 
the accused, Rania’s son could not have his hearing.499 Rania is not the only woman to 
have seen her possibility of agency limited by legal decisions in the name of secular 
values: many Muslim women in Europe are still struggling for their right to wear the veil. 
Before analysing the so called ‘hijab cases’ decided at the ECHR, it is necessary to 
explain how the concept of secularism has developed in western/liberal thought in 
order to comprehend the main concept to which the ECHR referred in deciding whether 
Muslim women could wear a veil. 
Secularism as a political ideology was born and developed in western history: it is based 
on the concept that religious and secular powers are two separate spheres of life.500 The 
notion at the centre of secular ideology is that political public institutions should be free 
from religious/ethnic influences and allegiances.501 For secularists, the strict division 
between Church and state, private and public, is essential for the formation of modern 
democracy in liberal societies. Public space comes to be considered neutral and 
egalitarian once it is free from personal sentiments.502 In other words, the secular 
modern state is conceived primarily as the separation between Church and state: this, in 
turn, is associated with the rise of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and 
constitutionalism. However, as I shall argue, ‘secularism’ should not be understood as 
the mere separation between Church and state, but as a specific western ideology 
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which defines particular forms of knowledge and behaviour.503 In this sense, 
western/liberal/secular ideology presupposes and creates a specific 
Christian/secular/liberal law’s subject (an abstract, autonomous individual who obeys 
rational/universalist rules of law) which emerges as the result of the law’s intervention 
in shaping the subject: in fact, law, a cultural product which forms and is formed by a 
structure of meanings, has the power to define its subject through its bodies. The law’s 
subject portrayed by western/secular/liberal thought is a secular, self-conscious, 
autonomous individual whose actions correspond to its thought.504 This specific concept 
of subjectivity is today embedded in western/positive/universalist law; it is mirrored in 
the legal decisions over the practice of veiling, and derives from western historical, 
political and legal developments. 
In the Middle Ages, western societies witnessed a combination of local, customary law 
and universal canon law based on Roman law. The various religious wars in Europe, 
culminating in the so called ‘papal revolution’ and the consequent fragmentation of the 
authority and unity of the Catholic Church, favoured the creation of important notions 
which have persisted to this day, and are the foundation of modern western law.505 
Firstly, the aftermath of the papal revolution witnessed a separation between spiritual 
and temporal power, whereas religion was relegated to the private sphere.506 Secondly, 
the separation between secular and religious power favoured the emergence of a new 
form of governmentality507 that culminated in the shift from government (in which the 
state intervenes in specific areas), to governance (in which the state sets standards).508 
Along with a new form of governmentality, this period has witnessed the emergence of 
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a new concept of ‘Man’: driven by rational judgments and individual reason, the new 
man is now independent from his Father and in the place of the Holy Spirit.509 
The various religious conflicts in Europe pushed the idea of the necessity to subordinate 
the religious domain to institutional political power in the modern nation-state. As 
Locke argued,510 a delimitation of the political and religious realm was necessary, as 
conflicts between political and religious powers were incapable of being resolved by 
rational means: the division between secular and religious power, then, has been seen 
as a useful tool to establish the lowest common denominator between different 
Christian sects and to link the individual to the power of the state.511 The 
religious/secular distinction, at the foundation of modern western law, accompanies the 
idea of the creation of a fundamental dichotomy between private/public, state/church, 
religious/secular.512 This is attested by the obsession of the Enlightenment philosophers 
with the proper definition of religion:513 while the term comes to be understood as a 
trans-historical and transcultural phenomenon, an illogical and un-real belief, a myth, 
human life has started to be conceptualized as divisible into different spheres of human 
action.514 As Cavanaugh argues, “what is at issue behind these wars of religion is the 
creation of ‘religion’ as a set of beliefs which is defined as personal conviction and which 
can exist separately from one’s public loyalties to the State.”515 
Herbert, a prominent Victorian English philosopher, defined ‘religion’ in terms of belief, 
practices and ethics: a religious individual is a person who believes in a supreme 
transcendental power and follows certain practices based on a set of conducts and 
recommendations which will have, as a result, reward or punishment after life. For 
Herbert, this definition of religion is valid in every society and confirms the thesis of the 
necessity to relegate religion and religious sentiments to a private sphere.516 However, 
the universalization of the concept of religion as a private belief neglects the 
particularities of different faith communities. Cavanaugh observes that the descriptive 
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definition of religion has not only facilitated a new form of governmentality but it has 
also created a fundamental problem: by defining religion as a mere private/un-
real/mythological belief, religion itself becomes a normative concept which acquires a 
specific meaning based on particular power relations. In other words, the definition of 
religion depends on who has the power to define it in different cultural and historical 
contexts.517 
The idea that religion is a personal, irrational, transcendent, and mythological belief was 
accompanied by the creation of a new rational knowledge, now ‘desensualized’ from 
human invisible experiences. For Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophers, it is essential to 
limit the sensible in order to secure the purity of the moral will. This can be achieved 
only by creating two distinct worlds which can assure the autonomy of moral will to the 
domain of the ‘supersensible’ while passions and emotions are relegated to the sphere 
of sensible private life. Practices of self-cultivation (which form the religious subject) 
have a positive function of disciplining the self, but they cannot contribute to the 
subject’s moral reasoning.518 
However, as I have pointed out, the Enlightenment did not produce a separation 
between Church and state power, or a decline in religiosity in the name of human 
reason. Rather, it simply transferred religious devotion from the realm of the Church to 
that of the world: this new religiosity, which in western history has been expressed in 
concepts such as secularization, modernization, nationalism, etc.,519 becomes the 
foundation of modern/positive/western law.520 In fact, in western history, elements of 
the state’s apparatus come to be secularized according to new sacred narratives. 
Hobbes describes the state as ‘a mortal God’ whose life is ‘eternal’ because the duty to 
protect the worldly life of the individual is given to the state.521 The state is 
transcendent in part for its sacredness,522 due to its claim to protect the life of its 
citizens, and in part because it acquires the power to shape the individual’s life and to 
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create an obedient ‘citizen’ through the force of the law.523 Although the state is not a 
living human, the state is accorded the same sacrality of human life. The modern 
secular/liberal state is thus founded on a political myth, an original mythical narrative 
which provides the infrastructure of its political values (freedom, equality and tolerance) 
within a framework of private and public morality.524 In this sense, as Cavanaugh 
observes, the modern concept of religion, as well as that of the nation-state, undergo a 
process of naturalization: “the secular nation-state […] appears as natural, 
corresponding to a universal and timeless truth about the inherent dangers of 
religion.”525 Since the state (or the Leviathan) claims eternal life, it is also entitled to 
defend itself by any means. As the Leviathan is authorized to do whatever is necessary 
to maintain the commonwealth, including the use of violence, secular violence becomes 
legitimated over religious violence. The founding of western law and mode of 
sovereignty, then, is intrinsically linked to a discourse of self-legitimation which also 
justifies acts of violence to enforce the law and to defend the state. However, as Salecl 
argues, this is one of the paradoxes of the modern/secular/liberal concept of politics: 
“just as the violent act of enforcing law establishes conventions which then guarantee 
the validity of this performative act itself, so a state, by means of its funding gesture, 
sets up conventions which then retroactively give legitimacy to its creation.”526 The 
state, like the Kantian subject, is creator and created, it produces and imposes law on 
itself.527 The subject of modern/western/liberal law acts by reference to transcendent 
rules which each citizen has to obey. By assigning to religious practices and religious 
beliefs a proper place, the ‘secular’ state has created the conceptual conditions to 
secure the loyalty of its citizens, irrespective of different religious allegiances. 
This new form of governmentality was accompanied by positivization of the law, as 
articulated by Hart.528 He locates the foundation of universalist positive law in the 
practice of officials who recognize the law as the primary rules to which citizens must 
obey: not anymore natural law or ‘community based legal systems’ but law processes 
and procedures have become the ultimate expression of the law itself. Law’s 
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codification has led to the abandonment of a substantive legal concept of justice in the 
name of proceduralist rules of law.529 As the state was run by the rules of law, positive 
law acquired a universal power which was a substitution of God‘s supreme power: 
“grounding the study of the law in codification, while restricting it to such forms of legal 
ordering, generated […] the effect of universality, abstraction, and coherence.”530 In 
fact, the rules of positive law were general, fixed, and established a unique system 
which everybody had to obey within the borders of western nation-states.531 As positive 
law presupposes an individual able to turn desires into rights, the individual acquires 
his/her natural identity by having rights. Thus, western law’s development has 
transformed the individual into a homo juridicus.532 
Positive law conceives the individual as ‘abstractly equal’ to others. For Hobbes, “if 
nature…has made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged: or if nature has 
made men unequal; yet because men that think themselves equal, will not enter into 
conditions of peace, but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted”.533 In other 
words, although egalitarianism may not be supported by nature, abstract equality is a 
precondition for political life.534 The concept of abstract equality, which is at the 
foundation of positive law, rests on the idea that every individual is equal before the 
law. As the individual is conceived in abstract terms, the legal subject inevitably emerges 
as a mask, a theatrical artifice, a product of mere institutional performances. This 
persona, or mask, comes to life as law’s progenitor, but, at the same time, it also comes 
before the law and maintains its maker. Schlag points out that the abstract (juridical) 
subject is a “metaphysical or calculating, self-interested being, conceived in an asocial 
way in a world whose socially was no more than the coming together of individuals in a 
social contract…the law knew no real individuals, only their mystical abstraction”.535 The 
western development of contractualism has boosted the liberal/secular concept of 
autonomy whereas, from mercantile society, contract (including the later concept of 
‘social contract’) was understood as composed of isolated juridical subjects within 
specific power relations. In this sense, the relevance of the Kantian philosophy and its 
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notion of a rational/self-master/abstract individual remains at the foundation of 
western and Human Rights law. Therefore, Western/liberal democracies could not exist 
without the abstract and empty concept of the individual and nor could western and 
Human Rights law exist without the concept of an abstract subject of law, the cogito.536 
For Supiot, the idea of abstract equality is associated with the concept of contract 
which, in turn, is profoundly linked to Christianity: as a matter of fact, the concept of 
pacta sunt servanda (‘the agreement must be kept’) was developed by western 
Christian theologians and imposed on all Christians as a duty.537 He states that the 
imago dei rests essentially in three fundamental western concepts: Man as individual, 
subject, and person. Man is an individual because he is unique and, at the same time, 
identical; in other words, Man is conceived as a ‘whole’ and, at the same time, as a 
separate individual. Meanwhile, each man is also considered to be identical to the other 
because part of a shared humanity: as they are created in the image of God, they are 
‘brothers’, identical. For Supiot, these Christian concepts define the modern subject of 
law.538 
Marcel Gauchet also links the emergence of secular modernity to Christianity’s historical 
development.539 For him, it is Christianity that created a dynamic which culminated in 
the emergence of the abstract autonomous individual of modern democracy and it is 
Christianity that allowed the emergence of an earthly absolute power as substitute for a 
withdrawn God. The separation between ‘the divine’ and ‘the human’ has opened a 
space for human action and the rise of the modern notion of sovereignty. Christianity’s 
attention to the concept of conscience has encouraged individual interpretation and 
evaluation of sacred authority, furthering, in this way, the western/liberal concept of 
autonomy. This process, in turn, has led to ‘Christianity’s own overcoming’ which has 
resulted in the modern Christian/secular/liberal political order and the relegation of 
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religion as a private belief.540 Thus, the genealogy of the secular comes, in western 
history, to be fused with the genealogy of the ‘modern’: for Locke, western modernity is 
founded in the distinction between secular and religious power, public and private, 
state and Church. As I shall argue, one way in which judges, journalists and politicians 
frame the issue of veiling is by reducing it to a pre-modern or anti-modern practice;541 as 
the secular has become synonymous with ‘modernity’, that which is in contrast with 
western/secular/liberal values is considered ‘backward’ or ‘pre/anti-modern’. In other 
words, as Muslims are supposedly unable to distinguish between religion and the state, 
they are seen as ‘backward’ people in need of a positive law to ‘rescue’ them from their 
backwardness. 
Thus, Christianity persists and it is inseparable from the modern western world.542 
Although God seems to have disappeared, He remains in the western legal human 
being, conceived in His image:543 “the unity of the divinity – the uniqueness of the one 
God, and the correlative singularity of the sovereign –was mirrored by the unitary 
identity of the subjects of law”.544 Since the secular is in reality theological, the legal 
subject is also a theological construction. 
Supiot finds that Christianity is the only religion in which God is perceived as law giver 
(as creator of the law of nature) but is, at the same time, bound by it: similarly, the 
modern/Christian/secular subject is creator and, at the same time, is subject to state 
law.545 This is the paradox of the Christian/secular/liberal subject of law: that its intrinsic 
nature is both obedient and free and self-governing. In other words, while on the one 
hand the Christian/secular/liberal subject of law enjoys a freedom guaranteed by the 
state, then on the other s/he must to be subject to state power in order for her/his 
freedom to be protected. The liberal/Christian/secular subject of modern western law is 
the citizen, the individual, bearer of rights and duties: an individual who has the 
freedoms that the state allows and guarantees while, at the same time, for the sake of 
these freedoms, s/he must to obey the static rules of law. As Diamantides points out, 
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the paradox of the western law’s subject “lies in the fact that modern man conceives 
himself ironically: he acts as ‘natural’, pre-fall, Adam but he thinks himself as Crusoe. 
The modern subject, that is, possesses the ideological means to act as if justifiably, 
whereas it privately thinks itself solely as desiring machine and intelligent exploiter of 
opportunities without a ‘history’ and therefore without responsibility.”546 
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3.2 The ‘humane’ subject of law 
In March 2016, the French minister for women’s rights, Ms. Laurence Rossignol, 
compared women who wear the veil to ‘Negroes who supported slavery’.547 In the 
interview, Ms. Rossignol criticized western fashion companies for selling items such as 
the burqini and new, fashionable and ‘modern’ hijabs. For Ms. Rossignol, a legal 
regulation over the practice of veiling was necessary to ‘save’ Muslim women from a 
backward anti-secular religion that oppressed them. Similarly, Amin Qasim, considered 
one of the main thinkers of Egyptian liberal feminism, condemned veiling and women’s 
seclusion and advocated a more ‘humane’ and positive law able to deliver humanity to 
women.548 Strongly influenced by British colonial ‘humane’ rules and a western life style 
brought to Egypt by the English mandate, he stated that women should be considered 
‘humane’, exactly like men.549 
Much has been written about the concept of humanity: however, most scholarly work 
tends to read the term as carrier of an all-embracing category with a single essence. 
Esmeir’s analysis, however,550 reveals how the concept of humanity has profound roots 
in the work of colonial jurists and is nowadays embedded in Human Rights law. Through 
a compelling analysis of the concept of humanity by important thinkers such as 
Agamben, Arendt, Foucault, and Fanon,551 she reveals a new relationship between law 
and the ‘human’ within the colonial project. Esmeir explains how the imposition of the 
new, modern, positive law during the British occupation of Egypt (1882-1956) was a 
precise project of colonization which presupposed the inclusion of the human in the law 
as an instrument of subjugation, able to eliminate the past in the name of an eternal 
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present, and thereby to deliver humanity.552 Her work shows how the new legal 
reforms, alongside the adoption of positive law, claimed to deliver Egyptians from their 
‘inhuman’ existence under a ‘despotic’, ‘lawless’ and ‘inhumane’ pre-colonial past. In 
order to deliver humanity, the new law confined the past to a place unrelated to the 
present: this ‘absolute now’ created not only the ‘human’ but also the ‘inhumane’ 
backwardness of what preceded it. As Esmeir points out, 
 “the binding of positive law operates through presentist practices; in colonial Egypt, 
historicization of the past turned the past into an era that preceded the present but no 
longer claimed it. This new temporality, itself a modern power, secured the authority of 
positive law by citing its own present and repeatedly writing down its foundational 
texts. This authority no longer bore any relation to the meanings of authority in Islamic 
law.”553 
The rejection of the past and the repetition of textbooks in and for the present were 
necessary to create a rupture with the former legal tradition. Consequently, Egypt 
witnessed a loss of traditional authority and the rise of a new authority embedded in 
the obedience to a universal, positive, fixed legal order. The law becomes strictly bound 
to state power and the human has become chained to the universal power of law 
because law itself delivered humanity. 
For Esmeir law incorporates the ‘human’ in three ways: firstly, by claiming authorship 
and source to be human; secondly, by rendering the human the theological end of the 
law, and finally by defining the human according to the law.554 Consequently, “the new 
men are either the governed or the orderly governors; one becomes a new man by 
learning the art of being governed or of governing.”555 With the colonial project 
humanity is no longer a category of birth,556 but a juridical category that defines the 
                                                             
552 As Festa argues, the encounter between colonizers and colonized produced emotions that 
could threat the integrity of the colonizers. One way in which the colonizers’ integrity could be 
reasserted was to define the colonizer/colonized relations in term of the asymmetry of 
sympathy: this, in turn, has articulated a relations between the colonizers’ sympathy and the 
colonized suffering. Lynn M Festa, Sentimental Figures of Empire in Eighteenth-Century Britain 
and France (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) 7. 
553 Esmeir (n 15) 24. 
554 ibid, 73. 
555 ibid, 69. 
556 Conversely, Fanon argues that humanity is not something delivered by the colonizer but a 
category of birth. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (n 551).  
142 
 
legal subject itself as human/inhuman. As ‘man is not born but made’,557 humanity has 
become the telos of the new, modern, positive law which is the prerequisite for a new, 
universal humanity. 
Thus, positive law emerges as a tool for the education of a new man and, along with it, a 
new ‘woman’.558 For Qasim, the inferior status of women was the main evidence of the 
backwardness of Egypt; he argues that British people were able to occupy Egypt 
because of the perfection of their species and because, thanks to the power of positive 
law, western European countries were able to move from despotic to democratic law, 
from chaos to order.559 He proposed extending the concept of humanity to women, 
although colonial officials argued that humanity has been delivered to all Egyptians, 
irrespective of their gender: in fact, for the British, the humanity given to women was 
the result of a broader ‘humanity project’ in which the introduction of new legal reforms 
acted to elevate women from their animal status.560 For colonizers, what distinguished 
the humans from the animals was that the former, unlike the latter, had awareness that 
punishment is attached to the infringement of moral/legal rules: hence, only a subject 
who has awareness of its rights and duties can be defined as ‘human’. One of the first 
legal reforms of British colonizers was the banning of the veil, understood as a symbol of 
an uncivilized and backward society. Yegenoglu observes that the obsession over the 
practice of veiling was “characterized by a desire to master, control, and reshape the 
body of the subjects by making them visible”.561 This, in turn, has signified an imposition 
of western modernity, which privileges the visible as a primary route of knowledge:562 
interestingly, what Amin and the colonial officials shared was not only a specific concept 
of ‘womanhood’, but also the idea that humanity is a status that may be delivered or 
taken away. In declaring Egyptian men and women as ‘human’, British colonizers 
combined coloniality, judiciality and humanity. 
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The principle advocating a government of laws and not of men was central to the 
operations of the colonial state in Egypt. However, by defining and delivering humanity 
through law, the British never succeeded in determining the transition from pre-human 
to human or from violence to non-violence; since the law delivers humanity, it continues 
to contain the inhuman. 
In contrast with Arendt’s work,563 in which the juridical person and the human overlap 
and so the subject’s dehumanization corresponds to the collapse of its juridical status, 
for Esmeir the juridical subject coincides with the human because law locates the human 
as a product of the law itself. Moreover, contrary to Agamben,564 for Esmeir, 
colonization did not suspend the law; rather, through colonization, law was expanded 
and it contained multiple legalities. Law has become “a technology of colonial rule and 
modern relationship of bondage;”565 it has not only delivered humanity, but it has also 
assured total domination through functional, utilitarian violence. “The principle of utility 
recognizes […] and promotes happiness and felicity through the law reason […] because 
the principle of utility is the property of every object, pleasure is always objectively 
produced and pain avoided.”566 
British officials focused on reforming five main state practices: banning the veil, banning 
the use of the whip by state officials against peasants, establishing a taxation system to 
which the fellahin (peasants) had to contribute, monitoring the rural administration and 
abolishing forced labour (also called corvee labour). 
“By identifying these reforms as humane, colonial law also named the human protected 
by them. Humane reforms were not only legal means to teach Egyptians how to be 
human through the cultivation of a sensibility of humaneness; they were also practices 
aimed at establishing the human status of the receiving subjects.”567 
Esmeir saw the inclusion of the individual within the pale of the law not as an 
instrument aiming to protect, but as the vehicle of a ‘functional’, ‘repressive’ violence 
and domination.568 She unfolds the double face of the colonial project; if, on the one 
hand, the British aimed to eliminate the arbitrary, non-instrumental khedival legal 
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system,569 then on the other, they established an arbitrary distinction between 
‘humane’, utilitarian, colonial violence and ‘inhumane’ pre-colonial violence. In fact, 
through a systematic reconstruction of historical and legal documents, Esmeir unmasks 
the true face of the colonial project: corvee labour was not abolished, but regulated. 
Similarly, harsh punishments such as the use of the whip, no longer used in the Ottoman 
Empire, were not prohibited but allowed for “hard-labor convicts refusing to work, 
disobeying orders, encouraging disobedience, intentionally destroying clothes or 
property belonging to prison authority etc.”570 In colonial Egypt the use of violence 
against rebels and criminals was regulated according to the offence committed: for 
serious offences the use of the whip was limited to twelve to twenty-four lashes, 
followed by minor offences punished with solitary confinement, leg irons, a diet of 
bread and water, etc.571 
“Crucially, the idealized stance enabled the British to turn law’s ideals of humanity into 
violent weapons aimed at protecting their very purified ideals. The resort to exceptional 
measures enabled, in turn, purified ideals of humanity.”572 
As Lord Cromer, the British controller-general of Egypt, famously stated, “civilization 
must, unfortunately, have its victims”.573 In other words, the process of becoming 
human required certain sacrifices: in this way, British colonizers established a distinction 
between necessary suffering and wasteful pain. In this regard, the local customs that 
European colonizers outlawed were not concerned with indigenous suffering but with 
“the desire to impose what they considered civilized standards of justice and humanity 
on a subject population - that is, the desire to create new human subjects”.574 
Interestingly, colonizers’ legal language not only legitimized oppressive practices, but it 
also had the power to transform those practices into humane ones. The combination of 
the concept of ‘benevolence’ and ‘cruelty’ should not surprise western eyes. In fact, as 
Asad argues, although the meaning of the term ‘humanity’ has been linked since 
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antiquity to the notion of ‘threatening others kindly’, medieval Christian theologians, in 
an attempt to justify the Crusades, stated that love was not incompatible with violence 
(asserting, inter alia, that the Crusades were conducted ‘with love’) by referring to St. 
Augustine, for whom punishment (if inflicted with love) was a method to redeem 
sinners. Therefore, in Christianity, sin and salvation are part of the human being, while 
the process of salvation requires penitence.575 The European Enlightenment, with its 
insistence on the power of reason, did not eliminate this paradox: violence (in the form 
of an ‘utilitarian’ or ‘necessary’ violence) and benevolence remain inextricably linked. 
Likewise, the concept of humanity, inherited from the western/Christian/secular past, 
embraces both benevolence and cruelty. 
In colonial Egypt, as Esmeir argues, “humanity is truly universalized when in the colonies 
pain is properly measured, administrated, and instrumentalized… pain marks the 
distinction between human and inhuman [...]. Only pain that serves an end is admitted. 
Useless, non-instrumental pain is rejected”.576 Henceforth, juridical humanity aims to 
eliminate ‘unproductive’ pain. In this regard, Esmeir does not see any distinction 
between ‘arbitrary cruelty’ and ‘productive cruelty’; the impossibility of that distinction 
reveals all of the law’s violence as arbitrary and signals a collapse of ends into means. 
“Significantly, it was the colonial iteration, more than their khedival history of sovereign 
power, that corresponded to the particular meanings and operations of sovereign 
power that the rule of law claimed to have overcome”577 through the consolidation of a 
regime of private property. In fact, within these newly established estates, peasants 
cultivated cotton for the world market and lived under legalities constituted and 
executed by the estates’ private owners who acted as absolute monarchs. The hallmark 
of the abolition of forced labour was in reality the creation of a labour free from the 
state (and so not subjected to its power operation) in the hands of private landlords: 
“progress triumphed. Left behind were free peasants to be managed by the technology 
of private property.”578 These new estates established a system of supervision and 
coercion in which the state intervened only when asked by the management of the 
estates. 
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Thus, with the colonial project, ‘absolute khedival rights’ were substituted for ‘absolute 
private property rights’ which became the new technology of management579 while law 
had become nothing more than a set of rules which acted towards ‘normalizing’ and 
‘modernizing’ Egypt.580 Foucault argues that modernity can be conceptualized as a 
“triangle of sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the 
population and as its essential mechanism the apparatus of security”.581 In his analysis, 
law emerges as “a permanent vehicle for relations of domination, and for polymorphous 
techniques of subjugation”;582 since society contains multiple subjugations, modern law, 
and not any more the sovereign, emerges as a vehicle for relations of domination. In the 
Egyptian case, the absolute sovereign power, which constituted a continuity between 
his land and his principality, was fragmented into pieces of land owned by private 
landlords. Henceforth, plurality of estates signified, in colonial Egypt, a plurality of 
law.583 The legal reforms established a new relationship with the ‘non-human’ and a 
new subjugation to law and violence.584 As Esmeir points out, 
“modern law and colonialism occupy the same space of humanity/nonhumanity, 
humanization/dehumanization: colonialism negates humanity and the modern rule of 
law, both of which stand united in their idealized form against colonial forces: 
colonialism dehumanizes; modern law recovers the human. The result of these accounts 
is to reinforce both the necessity and the superiority of the modern rule of law.”585 
Esmeir’s work reveals all the paradoxes of positive law. If, on the one hand, the British 
instituted ‘humane’ legal reforms such as the abolishment of the use of the whip and 
corvee labour, then on the other, they established a number of exceptional legalities 
used to suppress and punish political activism and banditry. In other words, in the 
colonial period, positive legal order emerged as productive of a specific relationship 
between “law’s idealized humanity and factualized violent measures. The splitting of the 
law was parallel to a corresponding split between the British normative legal gaze and 
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Egyptian factual operation of law […] Crucially, the idealized stance (a technique of 
purification) enabled the British to turn law’s ideals of humanity into violent weapons 
aimed at protecting their purified ideals (a new technique of hybridization).”586 Positive 
law, therefore, emerged as embracing a split between the ideal of humanity and the 
factuality of its own violence. 
The universalist claim of positive law can now be understood as a constitutive part of 
Human Rights discourse.587 Human Rights law has replaced the ‘metaphysical 
conceptions of natural law’ and the universalistic claim of positive law. Paraphrasing 
Nancy, in the West, the supreme and absolute law passed from God to the Pope/King 
and then to the ‘mass’:588 today, this universalist law, based on legal process and 
procedures, is embodied in Human Rights discourse. In the modern world, though 
universal categories have been challenged, Human Rights remains something sacred, 
universally just, and unquestionable. As Human Rights law emerges from the 
secularization of the Christian idea of natural law589 which enabled a wider notion of 
humanity that extends its scope to non-Christians,590 the history of human rights is not 
much concerned with the creation of a universal humanity (its object), but it is 
intrinsically linked to the interpretations that nineteenth- century European scholars 
gave to medieval Christian literature and how the medieval concept of natural law as 
divinely inscribed ethics was translated into a secular device which inscribed the 
plurality of the world’s culture into the transcendentality of western universal law.591 As 
per positive and natural law, Human Rights law is based on the idea of an original sense 
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of the rights, which inevitably rely on the notion of an authority, a transcendental order, 
the imago dei.592 
 ‘Juridical humanity’ allows to re-think Human Rights and international law today; in 
fact, the association between the human and the law has profound roots in the work of 
colonial jurists.593 Contemporary human rights discourse, derived from a combination 
between natural and positive law, is based on some principal assumptions which echo 
the assumption of positive law exported during the last century: firstly, despite the 
difficulties in organizing pluralistic societies, the liberal democratic positivized order is 
considered the only just able to produce the most equitable outcomes. Hence, Human 
Rights law as well as positive law were exported by the West as a universally valid global 
formula.594 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights aimed to announce an 
‘internationalization’ of human rights and pave the way for a new international 
jurisdiction which would exist outside the borders of national countries while 
presupposing an individual within the pale of a new universal law. Secondly, gender 
equality can be defined in global terms: “in other words women around the world can 
be considered one indivisible group, historically silenced and oppressed by men. Thus, 
the solution offered by international Human Rights discourse must be global 
(universal).”595  
It is important to point out that long before Human Rights discourse was concerned 
with the idea of gender equality, positive law was concerned with the idea of abstract 
equality. Feminist legal theory has found the concept of abstract equality extremely 
problematic. For many feminist scholars, Human rights carry a patriarchal character 
exactly because it presupposes an abstract notion of the subject of law which is deeply 
informed by individualism.596 For Olsen, the discourse of human rights does not resolve 
social conflicts, rather, it reformulates them: as human rights discourse defines a very 
specific Christian/secular/liberal subject, along with a specific idea of womanhood, they 
act to use sexuality as a matter of social control, allowing new forms of sexual 
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violence.597 Similarly, Gilligan argues that Human Rights law presupposes an individual 
to be detached from society and, by so doing, it hides relations of power and 
domination.598 For Foucault the notion of human rights is nothing more than the 
sacralization of law which emerges as a useful tool for relations of power and 
domination, whereas the subject needs to articulate its relation to power in a clearly 
apparent neutral and abstract legal discourse.599 
With the concept of abstract equality, the individual becomes bound to the state and its 
central law maker and not any more to her/his own community. Likewise, the abstract 
concept of human rights allows political and legal authorities to determine who is 
‘human’ and who is not, or who can rightly be threatened ‘inhumanly’: “precisely 
because it is an inclusive category, ‘the human’ belongs to an exclusive universe that 
does not contain mere life”.600 The liberal/secular idea that we need more ‘humane 
legal reforms’ is in reality a further attempt to include the individual within the pale of a 
universalist law that defines which behaviours have to be considered ‘humane’ or 
‘inhumane’. As Asad points out, 
“the abstract concept of humanity can serve as a mediator between the timeless 
universality of international law and the particular incidents of lethal force because of 
its double sense of biological species and compassionate behavior. Humanity is able to 
play this role, passive and active, because of the metaphysical conception of life that 
underpins it.”601 
 
The secular/liberal/abstract subject of human rights is the autonomous, rational, 
individual, citizen of the modern nation-state, who must be subjected to the law in 
order to become a law’s subject: its humanity, theorized by Human Rights law only 
tautologically, is given through the inclusion within the pale of a universalist law which 
aims to maximize the pleasure and minimize the pain. Taylor traces the sensibility of the 
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secular/modern world as profoundly inherited from Christianity: prominent to secular 
sensibilities is the concept of universal benevolence, of redeeming the human through 
the elimination of violence, seen as a “moral imperative to reduce suffering,”602 which, 
as I have argued, is intrinsically linked to the idea of ‘inevitable’ or ‘necessary’ violence. 
The concept of (necessary) suffering is a common feature of positive and Human Rights 
law: in both, pain is a necessary means to progressively replace suffering by pleasure.603 
Western liberal seculars believe that, unlike those of barbarians, their own violent acts 
are justified by a moral/legal framework: since barbarians act outside a western 
moral/legal framework, they are considered not fully ‘human’.604 What is interesting in 
the secular concept of cruelty, then, is that “in a secular system like human rights, 
responsibility is assigned for it.”605 In fact, as Asad argues, for Human Rights law the 
human essence of a person is not violated if s/he is victim of military action or market 
manipulation permitted by international law.606 This leads to a paradox: although the 
universality of human rights, the identification and application of Human Rights law 
does not exist independently from the legal institutions of the nation-state, and nor 
does it exist independently from the individual’s civil/political status. In fact, the liberal 
approach presupposes that, in order to ensure the survival of the 
liberal/Christian/secular model, rights cannot be conceivable outside a strong authority 
that punishes any violation of the law: therefore, the minimal state called for by 
libertarians is paradoxical, as liberal rights are intrinsically linked to a strong state 
apparatus. 
Therefore, Human Rights law protects an already-given human and it claims jurisdiction 
over the declaration of its status: “Human Rights law, like modern law more generally, 
aspires to name, define, call into being, redeem the human”.607 Since the legal subject is 
a human and, at the same time, a human-yet-to-become, becoming the subject of 
human rights can ensure both a temporal humanity and its possible suspension. In fact, 
positive and Human Rights law aspire to constitute a ‘human’ who would otherwise 
remain non-human. Both, positive and Human Rights law, aspire to name, to define a 
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law’s subject who would not exist outside of the law: in fact, if it is true that there is no 
legal system without a legal subject, it is also true that there cannot be human rights 
without the ‘human’. By defining the human through its inscription within the pale of 
the law, Human Rights law defines also the pre-human or non-human that preceded it. 
Hence, as Esmeir points out, 
“becoming subjects of human rights ensures recognition of their (temporary) humanity 
and its (possible) suspension. A person is, therefore, at once a human and yet-to-be-
human, a member of universal human kind and its de-humanized figure. This 
contradiction does not constitute a failure in logic but is related to the law’s aspiration 
to call into existence, and by so doing to constitute a human who would otherwise 
remain non-human.”608 
However, the problem in conceptualizing the human as a legal status allows for a double 
movement: dehumanizing and re-humanizing. Moreover, because any government can 
violate one’s legal status as a human, there is always the risk of being de-humanized: 
consequently, the concept of human as inscribed in the law is extremely fragile. 
As I shall argue in the analysis of the ‘hijab cases’, the subject of Human Rights law is a 
Christian/secular/liberal subject waiting to be rescued, ‘re-humanized’, through its 
inscription in the law. Muslim women who have rejected removing their veils and being 
included within the pale of Human Rights law have been seen by western judges as ‘de-
humanized’ subjects, victims of a chauvinist religion and in need of ‘salvation’. The call 
to humanize de-humanized individuals responds to a desire to establish secular reason 
as the only true, universal form of humanity. As Esmeir points out, 
“The problem is that the law’s power of constituting humanity carries the risk of erasing 
all other humanities, not only in imposing its particular vision of humanity but also, and 
more crucially, in erasing their past existence before the law’s intervention.”609 
Thus the key questions are: first, are we really sure that the inclusion of de-humanized 
people within the pale of Human Rights law does not reproduce a colonial logic? 
Second, what political possibility do those subjects have, other than being victims 
awaiting (humanitarian) intervention? 
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3.3 Revealing paradoxes: Sahin, Dahlab, Shabina and the others 
 
In 2011, few days before the ‘burqa ban’ came into force in France, Kenza Drider, a 32 
year-old French citizen who wore a niqab, declared that neither the state nor any 
mosque could order her how to dress. Oddly, a full-face veiled woman has become the 
face (or the symbol) of the ‘country's burqa brigade’ who claim that their personal rights 
to freedom of religion and gender equality have been severely limited by the new 
law.610 Perhaps those women did not realize that although western/Christian/secular 
law is founded on the freedoms of the individual, it actually imposes many boundaries 
on those freedoms. 
This is what emerges from European legal decisions over the practice of veiling which 
rely on the assumption that Islam (and the veil, which supposedly represents it) is 
incompatible with western secular democratic values and conflicts with the principle of 
gender equality. Many cases concerning Muslim women’s veil have been decided in 
national courts in different European countries and it would be difficult to analyse all of 
them in this context. I have chosen therefore to analyse some prominent cases decided 
at the ECHR: Dahlab v Switzerland (2001), Sahin v Turkey (2005) and SAS v France 
(2014).611 Through these cases, I will try to analyse not only the ECHR’s legal reasoning 
but also that of the national courts. I will also analyse the Begum case (2007) which,612 
although it was decided in a UK national court, is based on the analysis of art. 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.613 Although diverse European national courts 
have disclosed different concepts of secularism, subject’s autonomy and women’s 
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freedom in dealing with the matter,614 I consider these cases particularly exemplificative 
of secular/liberal paradoxes concerning women and religious freedom. All the applicants 
claimed an infringement of their rights under art. 8, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention.615 
However, through a considerable emphasis on state neutrality and secular values, along 
with the distinction in art. 9 between faith and its manifestation, the ECHR widened the 
‘margin of appreciation’,616 leaving considerable discretion to states to define what kind 
of religious manifestations are allowed in the secular public space; in this way, the ECHR 
remained unbiased when imposing a limitation on individual’s personal freedoms. Thus, 
the regulation of women’s bodies and the limitation of their personal freedoms 
becomes the emblem of the intrinsic contradiction of human rights discourse in general 
and liberalism in particular. In fact, if, on the one hand, liberalism operates a separation 
between spiritual and temporal, private and public, then on the other, the private life of 
the individual becomes extremely regulated. In this sense, secularism and western 
positive law act to eradicate differences and to protect a ‘secular citizen’ through the 
control of women’s body. This, in turn, reveals western incapacity to think juridical 
plurality: as I have argued, this incapacity is inherited from western medieval legal 
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origins and the consequent strength of the territorial ‘nation-state’. Therefore, although 
secular thought is accepted unconditionally, it limits Muslim women’s personal 
freedoms while expressing a specific form of power. As Gunn argues, 
 “Despite the popular beliefs that laïcité and religious freedom are founding principles 
that unite the citizens of their respective countries, they actually operate in ways that 
are more akin to founding myths […] in current controversies involving religion and the 
state, where the doctrines are cited for the ostensible purpose of resolving conflicts, 
they continue to be applied in ways that divide citizens on the basis of their beliefs and 
that belittle those whose beliefs do not conform to popular preferences.”617 
This is well shown in Dahlab v Switzerland.618 Ms. Dahlab was a teacher in a primary 
school in Switzerland. After a period of deep spiritual searching she converted to Islam 
and started to wear the hijab. She wore the veil for four years; during that time there 
was no complaint from her young students or their families. When students asked her 
why she was wearing long clothing and covering her head, she used to answer that it 
was to keep her ears warm.619 After four years, an inspector visited the school and 
reported that Ms Dahlab was wearing ‘Muslim’ garments. The Director General of Public 
Education asked her to remove the veil: when Dahlab refused, alleging her right to wear 
the headscarf, she was dismissed. She appealed the decision in the Swiss Court which, 
while upholding the decision of the School, found odd the request of Ms Dahlab against 
the norm of a Christian country and prohibited the wearing of the headscarf based on a 
law on states’ neutrality. The domestic court pointed out that it was impossible for the 
law to cover all state school teachers’ behaviour and that some margin was allowed in 
circumstances where the conduct would be regarded by the average citizen as being of 
minor importance. Ms Dahlab appealed at the ECHR which, in line with the Swiss Court, 
pointed out that Switzerland was pursuing a legitimate aim to ban the hijab in public 
schools in the name of gender equality (as the veil has been seen by the judges as a 
chauvinist practice imposed by the Koran) and state neutrality, considered an 
expression of state’s secularism. 
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In the case, the ECHR found that the principle of laïcité could be interpreted in such a 
way as to allow states to restrict personal freedoms and it emphasized the importance 
of weighting “the requirements of the protection of the rights and liberties of others 
against the conduct of which the applicant stood accused”:620 suddenly, the right-holder 
woman has become the accused. In fact, instead of weighting the rights of Ms Dahlab to 
wear the hijab with the rights and freedoms of others, the ECHR presented an 
(imaginary) undefined ‘other’ in need of protection from the ‘wrongdoing’ of Ms. 
Dahlab. The Court presupposed that, because Ms. Dahlab was working with young 
children and the student-teacher relationship is a powerful one, her hijab could have 
‘proselytizing effects’. However, the Court did not find any coercive or proselytizing 
action carried out by the applicant to induce students to behave or believe in the same 
way she did. It is not clear what kind of ‘bad influence’ or ‘proselytizing effects’ Ms 
Dahlab was exercising on ‘vulnerable children’ since she did not even tell them that she 
had converted to Islam. Moreover, in four years, it should have been possible to 
produce further evidence from students who had suffered as a result of her wearing the 
hijab. Many of those children were probably exposed to religious rituals by parents, 
relatives and other figures of authority; consequently, it is difficult to understand how 
Ms Dahlab would defy the authority figures of a child’s life. Indeed, what kind of 
message is sent to ‘young and vulnerable children’ when their teacher is dismissed for 
the clothing she wears? Many Muslim children attended the school and they might have 
asked why a teacher who dressed like them had been dismissed. Those children, who 
probably suffered from mistrust or discrimination, may have received the message that 
stereotypes about Muslims are valid.621 Moreover, if it is true that we live in a pluralistic 
society, how can we justify the fact that, when the individual works in public places she 
has to comply with ‘liberal’ values?622 If wearing a hijab creates tensions and conflicts, as 
stated in the Strasbourg decision, then the parties should take measures to reconcile 
and not to prohibit group manifestations. 
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The weakness of the accusation of proselytism moved against Ms Dahlab is evident 
when comparing the case with Kokkinakis v Greece,623 decided at the ECHR. The case 
involved two Jehovah’s Witnesses who were charged with the criminal offence of 
proselytizing after knocking on the door of diverse Greek Orthodox priests in order to 
try to convince them of the truth of their religion in a country where it is illegal.624 
Hence, on the one hand, a woman, by wearing certain clothes, wants to hide her body 
and her religion from her students, while on the other a man knocks at the door of an 
orthodox priest trying to convince him of his truth. Oddly, for the ECHR, Ms Dahlab’s 
clothing represented a greater threat to liberty than Mr Kokkinakis’s attempt to 
proselytize: in fact, the former was considered by the ECHR as a form of proselytism 
whiles the latter was not.625 Hence, although the Court has taken into consideration the 
principle of proportionality and necessity, it has applied them inconsistently. While, for 
the Court, it was not necessary to regulate proselytizing actions such as that committed 
by Kokkinakis in a country where this action was considered illegal by the domestic 
court, in Switzerland, removing a woman from the public space because she has started 
to wear the veil has been presented by the ECHR as a necessity to save the principle of 
‘state neutrality’. Thus, the principles of proportionality and necessity, as applied by the 
ECHR, do not restrain western/liberal paradoxes; rather, they allow them to be 
perpetrated. In fact, if the rule of law is ultimately a promise of predictability, the very 
idea that one has to wait and see how the Court will in each case employ the tests of 
proportionality and necessity is paradoxical. What transpires from this decision is that, 
in general, in order for the ‘sovereign nation-state’ to remain strong and unified, certain 
performances of some rights have to be limited. In the event, a Muslim woman’s dress 
choice is more threatening than a Christian man’s speech. 
Moreover, the fact that a woman who never tried to proselytize was removed from the 
public space just because her image did not conform to the ‘western conception of 
liberated woman’ is a significant feature: not only does it reveal that in liberalism the 
individual emerges as an abstract entity who, while enjoying the allowed freedoms, is 
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also subjected to the state’s rules, but it also unmasks the intrinsic paradoxes of positive 
and Human Rights law. In fact, if the individual has ‘equal rights’ those rights can be 
regulated more or less depending on how abstractly or concretely the individual is 
perceived to be using these rights. The protection afforded to the individual by the rule 
of law –certainty, predictability – follows this pattern. If Kokkinakis’s proselytizing is 
protected, it is because ‘he did nothing but speak’ with the intention to convert another 
who is free to accept or not; if Ms Dahlab was removed from sight it was because she 
demonstrated, performed, acted out her right to be different, which carries 
illocutionary force. In other words, Kokkinakis’ proselytizing speech befits the model of 
the Christian/secular/’human’ protected as an abstract equal citizen from the state; by 
contrast Dahlab, whose body already assigned her to the order of an asset for concrete 
societal reproduction, engaged in a performative speech-act that has to be regulated by 
the state. Otherwise she should be removed from the public space; she should 
disappear. In essence, by presenting her with the alternative ‘unveil or lose your 
teaching job’ the law hid Dahlab much more efficiently than any veil could ever do. For 
the veil, as all clothes do, does not hide but presents humans to each other, whereas the 
persona juridica, in modern law, isolates people from each other and connects them to 
the state. 
Another controversial case decided at the ECHR is Sahin v Turkey.626 In 1998, Istanbul 
University released a circular prohibiting students from wearing the headscarf (along 
with ‘long beards’) during lectures and examinations. A few months later Sahin, in her 
fifth year of medical school at Istanbul University, was denied access to a written 
examination because she was veiled and disciplinary measures were imposed as a result 
of her failure to comply with the circular. One year after that, she was also suspended 
for six months by the Dean of the Cerrahpa Faculty of Medicine for taking part in a 
demonstration concerning the right to wear the headscarf in Turkey. As no university in 
the country allowed the wearing of the veil, Sahin was forced to move to Vienna 
University in order to complete her studies. She applied to the Istanbul Administrative 
Court, claiming her right to wear the hijab in the university; the Court, however, 
dismissed her application. In 1998, she lodged a complaint against the Turkish 
government, claiming that the ban on wearing the headscarf in higher education 
violated her rights under Articles 8, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention and article 2 of 
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Protocol No.1.627 The case reached the ECHR and in 2005 the Grand Chamber decided 
that the university’s refusal to allow her to wear a headscarf did not violate Article 9 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights on freedom of thought and religion and 
confirmed the decision of the Fourth Section of the Court of June 2004. 
The ECHR found that the ban on wearing the veil applied by the university was sought to 
‘preserve the secular nature of the institution concerned’628 and so was considered 
admissible. The decision was based on two main problematic assumptions: Sharia is a 
substantively static and unchangeable revealed legal system, and the values of Sharia 
law are illiberal and incompatible with western secular democratic principles. Rather 
than trying to understand whether wearing a headscarf in the university violates Article 
9 of the Convention, the judges focused on the question of how to 
incorporate/accommodate Islam within ‘secular’ western values. In the case, the 
Strasbourg Court felt the need to retell the master narrative of the rise of the secular 
state in Turkey629 and the supposed difficulties in convincing Muslim religious groups to 
accept the privatisation of their religion.630 With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the 
Kemalist ‘secular’ revolution (1924) started a western-style modernization process in 
the attempt to establish a strong nation-state. Kemalists wanted to ‘civilize’ Turkish 
society, understood as backward for its inability to embrace western secular 
modernity.631 The new secular/republican632 project put a great emphasis on women’s 
emancipation and on their un-veiling as a necessary condition for the modernization of 
the nation.633 Although Kemal never legally banned it, he strongly discouraged the 
practice of veiling: in this way, Turkish women’s hair became the symbol of a new 
nation, an (apparently) de-Islamised, westernized, and modernized nation-state. In the 
1980s, as a result of the secularization process operated by subsequent governments, 
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the veil started to be legally banned in public offices. For women who were wearing the 
veil, this represented a denial of their presence in the public sphere. After years of 
passionate debate, the ban was lifted in 2013, but at the time of the ECHR’s decision 
over Sahin’s case, the ban was still in force. According to the ECHR, since the formation 
of the secular (nation) state in Turkey, the country has been constantly struggling with 
political and religious forces that try to overthrow the secular, liberal, state. In fact, the 
abolition of the caliphate and the formation of the Turkish Republic were described by 
the Court as if they were actual ones: “the constitutional court underlined that the 
principle of secularism is the major force of shifting Turkey from umma- based country 
toward a nation-based republic.”634 Thus, it seems that instead of judging Sahin’s claim, 
the Court was preoccupied with judging the challenge of political Islam for the Turkish 
‘secular’ Republic. The Court stated that 
 “in a country like Turkey, where the great majority of the population belong to a 
particular religion, measures taken in universities to prevent certain fundamentalist 
religious movements from exerting pressure on students who do not practice that 
religion or on those who belong to another religion may be justified under article 9 (2) 
of the Convention […] the Court does not lose sight of the fact that there are extremist 
political movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole their religious 
symbols and conception […] The regulations concerned have to be viewed in that 
context and constitute a measure intended to achieve the legitimate aims referred to 
above and thereby to preserve pluralism in the university”.635 
It seems that the approach of the ECHR sets forth a general rule for Turkey which 
implies that, because in the country the majority of the population is Muslim, it is 
essential to ban the hijab in order to protect the freedom of others, public order, and 
the principle of secularism and gender equality. However, by focusing on the history of 
Turkey and the (supposed) existence of extremist religious movements attempting to 
overthrow the secular state, the ECHR made a mistake: it “substituted Turkey for the 
University of Istanbul and Islam for the headscarf”.636 In the case, the Court defined the 
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wearing of the veil as a symbol of affiliation with religious/political movements. 
However, the Court failed to prove the existence of extremist Islamist groups in the 
university and to explain the relation between the claimant and those groups. It also 
failed to give evidence that wearing a headscarf in a higher educational institution can 
“pressure students who are not wearing the hijab”.637 As Sahin was a university student, 
and not a teacher in a primary school like Dahlab, the argument that veiling can be seen 
as a tool for proselytism is extremely weak. 
To emphasize the impossibility of reconciling the Turkish Republic’s secular, liberal and 
democratic values with ‘extremist’ (Islamist) religious movements in Turkey, the Court 
referred to the Refah Party, which was subsequently banned. Refah Partisi,638 an Islamic 
political party founded in 1983, participated in the first national election in 1991, gaining 
growing consent until 1998, when the Constitutional Court of Turkey officially banned 
the party for violating the constitutional secular principle of the separation between 
religion and the state: in 2003, the ban was upheld by the ECHR based on the premise of 
a general incompatibility of an Islamic-based-politico-legal system with secular western 
democracy. In fact, for the ECHR, Refah was allegedly attempting to introduce Sharia 
law which “would oblige individuals to obey […] static rules of law imposed by the 
religion concerned”.639 In the case, the Strasbourg Court concluded that: 
“Sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, is 
stable and invariable[…]. Principles such as pluralism in the political sphere or the 
constant evolution of the public freedoms have no place in it. The Court notes that it is 
difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human rights while at the same 
time supporting a regime based on Sharia, which clearly diverges from Convention 
values, particularly with regard to […] its rules on the legal status of women and the way 
it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious 
precepts […]. Refah’s policy was to apply some Sharia private law rule to a large part of 
the population in Turkey [namely Muslim], within the framework of a plurality of legal 
systems. Such a policy goes beyond the freedom of individuals to observe the precepts 
of their religion […]. This Refah policy falls outside the private sphere to which Turkish 
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law confines religion and suffers from the same contradictions with the Convention 
system as the introduction of Sharia”.640 
Through the reference to the Refah case, the ECHR accepted the understanding of the 
Turkish Court which conceived Sharia law as a non-negotiable code whose authority lies 
outside the human horizon and, certainly, outside the authority of a modern (nation) 
state. In the Refah case, the Court also observed that “there was already an Islamic 
theocratic regime under Ottoman law”641 and that this system was dismantled with the 
introduction of the republican regime in Turkey. 
The Ottoman Empire applied a legal system (namely the ‘Millet system’) based on 
religious identity where every religious group responded to different laws in relation to 
family law.642 The Court’s ignorance of the Millet system is astonishing: it confused 
Refah neo-Ottomanism, which called for a plurality of legal systems, with Islamic 
fundamentalism, which calls for the establishment of a unique, fixed, territorial Sharia 
law. Oddly, in the Court’s view, a political party whose actions seem to be aimed at 
introducing Sharia along with other religious legal systems in relation to family law, as is 
the case of modern Israel, is seen as an association which hardly comply with the 
democratic ideals that motivates the Convention. 
The reference to the Refah case, at the centre of the ECHR’s decision in the Sahin case, 
is particularly striking as it seems that the Court’s ignorance of the plurality of Islamic 
traditions regarding the veil was compounded by its rejection of a plurality of legal 
systems within the same territory qua political unit. It is clear, therefore, that in seeking 
to forcibly expose Turkish women’s bodies to their natural rights the ECHR was also 
seeking to subjugate them under the logic of singular state sovereignty. In this regard, 
liberals and Islamists are on the same side, as both aim to create a universal(ist) law that 
will bind the individual to a fixed and monolithic identity.643 What is not on their side is 
the historically documented legal pluralism of Muslim-majority societies: in fact, as I 
have argued, in Islamic history, political and legal powers were always separated and in 
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continuous need of negotiation.644 But while, in the West, law was in the hands of the 
Pope/king/sovereign state, in Muslim medieval societies Sharia was in the hands of 
scholars who were accustomed to adjudicating legal cases within the limits of the four 
main (Sunni) schools. In this context, Diamantides’ examination645 is particularly 
revealing. The result of his comparative study of ‘two structurally similar and 
contingently dissimilar’ legal systems of religious origins, is that on the one hand, the 
West conceives a universal, abstract identity valid for everyone which is historically tied 
to Christianity and was exported to Muslim-majority societies during the colonization 
period, while on the other, Islamists respond by trying to change the content but 
maintain the same Christian/liberal/secular western structure of one universal law 
imposed by the appropriate authority. In fact, what Islamists are seeking is not the 
‘true’, ‘pure’ Islam where the law was made locally and reflected the plurality of 
cultures of the Umma, but a law that reinforces the central political power by binding 
the community in a singular all-encompassing legal code as well as a ‘national’ ‘Muslim’ 
identity’. In this sense, the veil emerges as a symbol of the contrast between two 
versions of sovereignty, that of European imperialism and that of Islamist nationalists 
who aim to create a singular Muslim identity by reducing Islamic law into a monolithic 
codified legal system. Although the veil is not an Islamic symbol but rather a pre-Islamic 
custom,646 the compulsory veiling promoted by contemporary power-hungry Islamist 
groups, as well as the compulsory un-veiling proposed by many western and non-
western countries, appears to be an attempt to symbolically forge a common fixed and 
monolithic (national) identity through women’s body: both (patriarchal) regimes aim at 
legally regulating and controlling women’s attire by inscribing women’s bodies as 
monolithic symbols of cultural belonging and not as subject of culture and history. In 
fact, the female figure and/or dress code are common collective group and also 
nationalist symbols. 
In the Sahin case, through a crusade in the name of western/secular/liberal values, the 
ECHR shows a confused reasoning: although the Court stated that there was no 
interference with article 9 (1), the commission considered whether the interference was 
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justified under article 9 (2).647 According to the ECHR, the decision of Istanbul University 
to ban the hijab was motivated by the need to protect the rights of others and public 
order,648 in accordance with article 9 (2), which justifies restrictions on freedom of 
religion. However, based on article 13 (para. 29) of the Turkish Constitution, 
fundamental freedoms and rights can be restricted only by a parliamentary act and not 
by an institution such as a university. Despite the absence of statutory bases to ban the 
headscarf in universities, the Court accepted as a legal basis the transitional section 17 
of law No. 2547 which states that “choice of dress shall be free in institutions of higher 
education, provided that it does not contravene the laws in force”.649 Through this 
choice, it was not difficult for the Grand Chamber to understand the restriction on 
wearing Islamic headscarves merely as an internal rule of Istanbul University, rather 
than a limitation of personal freedoms.650 In the case, the ECHR particularly emphasized 
the role of state neutrality and its responsibility to interpret domestic law in the respect 
and harmony between different ethnic/religious groups,651 relegating its role to 
examining whether the domestic law is in line with the European Convention of Human 
Rights.652 By widening the margin of appreciation, the ECHR stated that “it is the 
principle of secularism, as elucidated by the Constitutional Court, which is the 
paramount consideration underlying the ban on the wearing of religious symbols in 
universities”.653 Even if Sahin declared that she embraced the principle of secularism, 
the Court, without any analysis of the actual circumstances or of whether the headscarf 
was a danger for social order, discharged Sahin’s claim, obliging her to change country in 
order to obtain a university degree.654 In other words, by stressing on the principle of 
secularism, the Court not only limited Sahin’s individual rights of freedom of religion, 
but it also “assumed the religious task of describing which Islamic duties are suitable to 
be performed at secular universities; practising Muslim students in Turkish universities 
are free ‘to manifest their religion in accordance with habitual forms of Muslim 
observance’ (para 118 and 159). The Court did not explain which religious duties were 
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being carried out in Turkish universities. Since no example was presented, this argument 
was not only futile, but also misleading.”655 
Clearly, the ECHR has identified ‘religion’ as a force that aspires to regulate human life 
and to subordinate secular to religious values: it relies on the assumption that religion 
should be relegated to a small private sphere in order to safeguard a wider secular 
public sphere. However, by defining religion as a simple private belief, not only has the 
Court circumscribed the role and place assigned to religion and religious practices but it 
has also imposed a narrow definition of religion on other cultures.656 
This is particularly evident in France, where the matter of the veil has been particularly 
troubling. In 1989, after the expulsion from school of young Muslim girls because they 
were veiled, the Conseil D’Etat ruled that wearing religious symbols in public schools is 
permissible as long as they do not “constitute an act of intimidation, provocation, 
proselytizing, or propaganda”657 or threaten the dignity and freedom of the other: this 
allowed schools to ‘interpret’ which religious symbols could be shown in educational 
public institutions. The decision sparked a passionate debate and in 2003 the former 
President Chirac commissioned an inquiry on French secularism:658 the commission 
found that a ban was necessary to implement the secular values of the country.659 
Immediately after, in 2004, a law was passed forbidding religious symbols in public 
schools.660 Although, in the last decade, many young Muslim girls have tried to legally 
challenge the French ban, the ECHR has always upheld the irremovable decisions of 
French national courts. In 2010, the French government decided to ban the 
concealment of the face in public places (also known as the ‘burqa ban’).661 This latest 
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ban has been challenged by a young girl in the case SAS v France decided at the ECHR.662 
The case is of particular interest as the ECHR’s judges have justified the ban differently 
than in previous cases, further widening the application of the ‘margin of appreciation’. 
The case concerns a young French girl who wears the burqa or niqab based on her 
personal convictions. The claimant stressed that no one from her family had exerted any 
pressure to wear specific garments; that she does not wear it ‘systematically’ (adding 
that she might not wear it when she goes to the doctor or when she meets friends and 
she wants to socialize); that, by wearing the veil, she did not want to annoy anyone but 
to “feel at inner peace with herself”;663 and that she did not have any problem taking off 
her niqab for security reasons (in banks, airports etc.) and showing her face if required 
by a public officer.664 Her request was not to wear the niqab/burqa always, but when 
she needed to, based on her spiritual inclinations. She claimed that the ban interfered 
with her fundamental rights as it could not be proved that it was a legitimate aim to 
protect ‘public safety’ or to ‘ensure respect for the minimum requirements of life in 
society’. For her, the ban was based on a purely visual form of communication which 
does not consider the rights of minorities, and it is based on chauvinist and paternalistic 
stereotypes of Muslim women.665 In the case, the Human Rights Centre of the University 
of Ghent presented an empirical study on the uses of the veil. The research points out 
that women who wear a face veil in Belgium understand it as “part of a life project that 
considers Islam as ‘a lifestyle’” and that the burqa does not limit communication 
between people: indeed, the report adds that the “profile that emerges from the 
studies of women who wear the face veil in Europe, is not one of ‘submissive’ 
women.”666 
The French government reiterated that the ban was within the limitations established 
by art. 9 (2) of the Convention and that it was justified as it pursued a legitimate aim 
within a democratic society. For the government, the ban was necessary to ensure 
identification; to protect the rights and freedoms of others; and to prevent fraud. 
Moreover, the government reiterated the importance of the face in human interaction, 
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as its concealment would break ‘the social tie’ and manifest a refusal of the principle of 
‘living together’667 and gender equality (as the concealment of women’s face has been 
understood as a denial of women’s existence).668 
 
The ECHR declared inadmissible the applicant’s claim under art. 3, 11, and 14, and did 
not find any violation by the government of art. 8 and 9 of the Convention.669 Although, 
for the first time, the ECHR dismissed the idea that the veil limits the principle of gender 
equality, it approved France’s ‘burqa ban’ based on the principle of ‘living together’, as 
expressed by the French government: for the majority “the respect for the minimum 
requirements of life in society […] [can be associated with the legitimate aim of the] 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.670 The notion of ‘living together’, at 
the basis of the decision, is a principle which is not covered by art. 9 (2) and it 
encounters many problems when applied in a legal reasoning. Firstly, the idea that an 
individual needs to be ‘available’ for contact and communication as an obligation 
imposed by the state and against the individual’s will,671 contradicts the ‘right to private 
life’.672 By understanding the veil as a mere communicative barrier,673 the Court imposes 
a specific sociability on the individual’s public sphere. Secondly, the fact that ‘living 
together’ implies that people need eye contact encounters strong empirical and 
normative objections,674 taking into consideration that a number of social and sporting 
activities involve the wearing of clothing that conceals the face (such as motor-cycling, 
carnivals, folkloristic events etc.). These, however, are considered exceptions of the law. 
Exactly because the law recognizes these exceptions, it shows that people can also live 
together with face covering (as in many other societies). Therefore, the ‘burqa ban’ did 
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not aim at liberating women or favouring human interaction. Although the ECHR 
restated that pluralism is the basis of democratic society, it has upheld a law that affects 
a specific minority in France without any empirical proof that the burqa limits people’s 
interaction.675 As Nußberger and Jäderblom, the dissenting judges, argued, the concept 
of ‘living together’ “sacrifices concrete individual rights guaranteed by the Convention 
to abstract principles.”676 Hence, the ‘burqa ban’ could not be legitimate. It seems 
therefore, that the Court upholds a specific idea of secularism as intended by the French 
government. 
Although the United Kingdom has developed a concept of secularism different from that 
of France,677 the issue of Muslim women’s veiling has been particularly controversial. 
Shabina Begum678 is a case that has been decided by UK national courts and it focuses 
on the analysis of art. 9 of the European Convention. Shabina was a young student at 
the Denbigh High School, where 75-80% of students are Muslim. The school, in view of 
its recognition of a multicultural/multi-faith environment, has imposed a uniform code 
in accordance with parents, pupils and three local imams which permits young Muslim 
girls to wear a shalwar kameez.679 One day Shabina arrived at school with a jilbab (a long 
dress that covers the whole body except for the face), claiming that the shalwar 
kameeze does not comply with the requirement of her faith. The Head of School’s 
Assistant noted that when Shabina entered school with a jilbab many young students 
felt “threatened” as the garment was “associated with extreme views and it would 
identify them as belonging to extreme Muslim sects”.680 As a compromise was 
impossible, Shabina was expelled and she sued the school based on religious 
discrimination: in 2004 the Administrative Court dismissed her claim, while she won in 
the appeal. Finally, the case reached the House of Lords which ruled in favour of the 
school. 
Various issues were considered by the courts. Firstly, the judges considered whether 
Shabina has been excluded. In the Administrative Court, Bennett J argued that Shabina 
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had not been excluded: rather, she had excluded herself by choosing not to wear the 
school uniform as she was aware of the school uniform policy when she started the 
school. For this reason, the limitation was justified by art. 9 (2) as the school’s decision 
to allow the shalwar kameeze was a means of inclusion. 
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument: Brooke LJ noted the existence of various 
interpretations of Islamic law in relation to female clothing, suggesting that Shabina’s 
freedom to manifest her religion had been limited.681 By referring to the Sahin case,682 
the Court argued that a certain margin of appreciation was allowed when considering 
section 2 of article 9. Lord Bingham noted that the right to manifest a belief made a 
distinction between the right to hold a belief and the right to manifest a belief, which 
can lead on to  consideration over the ‘rights and freedoms of others’.683 It is exactly this 
principle of respecting the ‘freedom of others’ that has activated the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ in previous cases decided at the ECHR. Although the margin of 
appreciation is a principle of the ECHR and so is not an option for national European 
courts, the United Kingdom has applied the legal reasoning of art. 9 in the Shabina case. 
Lord Bingham stated that “[i]n applying the principles of Sahin v Turkey the justification 
must be sought at the local level and it is there that an area of judgment, comparable to 
the margin of appreciation, must be allowed to the school.”684 For Lord Hoffman, the 
school was “in the best position to weigh and consider […] [its]…wish to avoid clothes 
which were perceived by some Muslims (rightly or wrongly) as signifying adherence to 
an extremist vision of the Muslim religion and to protect girls against external 
pressures”.685 However, as in other cases related to the wearing of the veil in Europe, 
the Court failed to provide evidence of the pressure on others and it failed to prove that 
banning the veil could be the best choice to protect other young girls. The Court also 
took into consideration whether Shabina, at that time 14 years old, has freely chosen to 
wear the jilbab: as Lord Scott pointed out, “the confrontational nature of the 
peremptory manner in which the jilbab issue was raised with the school was very 
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unlikely to have been chosen by Shabina, not yet 14 years of age”.686 Also Baroness Hale 
expressed a particular preoccupation with the ‘free will’ of young Muslim girls in the UK: 
she stated that “if a Sikh man wears a turban or a Jewish man a yamoulka, we can 
readily assume that it was his free choice to adopt the dress dictated by the teaching of 
his religion.”687 The sentence is quite contradictory as it is not clear how a man is free to 
choose his garments if they are ‘dictated’ by religious beliefs but a woman is not.688 By 
referring to Raday, an ex-member of the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, Baroness Hale advocated the necessity for schools’ 
neutrality to enhance the principle of gender equality: for Raday, “‘mandatory policy 
that rejects veiling in state educational institutions may provide a crucial opportunity for 
girls to choose the feminist freedom of state education over the patriarchal dominance 
of their families”.689 It seems that Baroness Hale operated a separation between gender 
and culture, implying that they are two concepts in opposition and so needing to be 
balanced by the state.690 However, as I will argue in the next Chapter, the liberal 
paradigm of choices does not help us to understand different religious practices and 
sensitivities.691 All in all, the assumption of the Lords was that the law should ‘save’ a 
young girl (in the case, Shabina) from Islamic radicalism, otherwise she should pay a 
price for her choice.692 As Lord Hoffman pointed out, “people sometimes have to suffer 
some inconvenience for their beliefs and choices”.693 Lord Bingham stated that the 
claimant had chosen to study in a secular institution, presupposing a rational abstract 
self-mastering individual free from any constraints without any reference to whether 
the applicant could obtain the same education in another school.694 As Gies argues, 
“enrolling a child at a particular school is underpinned by informed consent and 
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unconstrained choice appears to ignore the difficulties involved in sending a child to a 
different school”.695 Moreover, the Court did not consider the emotional challenge of a 
young girl in changing school: “having to change school at the age of 13 in order to 
manifest one’s religion should be prima facie seen as a sufficiently serious and 
disruptive step”.696 Brown found that the rhetoric of choice is often used to hide 
western chauvinism towards non-liberal cultures: “what makes choices ‘freer’ when 
they are constrained by secular and market organizations of femininity and fashion 
rather than by state or religious law?”697 For Brown, western clothes are constructed as 
expressing a freedom of choice while Islamic ones are constructed as expressing a 
complete lack of choice: “we need fundamentalism, indeed, we project and produce it 
elsewhere, to represent ourselves as free”.698 Surely, as I shall argue in the next Chapter, 
the individual’s choices are influenced by a number of factors and so it is difficult to 
think about a completely ‘free choice’. 
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3.4 Reconfiguring religion and religious practices in the secular space 
Analysis of some of the many European juridical decisions over the practice of veiling 
reveals that banning the veil, framed in the defence of secular values and gender 
equality, in reality works to exclude differences and to limit Muslim women’s agency. 
This limitation has been implemented through the crucial distinction made by art. 9 
between faith and its manifestation. 
According to the European Convention on Human Rights, religious freedom is not 
limited to belief but also extends to its manifestations and is “one of the foundations of 
a democratic society”;699 however, not every act based on religious belief is protected 
by article 9. In the ECHR’s decisions, the term ‘practice’ in article 9 (1) “does not cover 
each act which is motivated or influenced by a religion or belief”. In fact, the 
manifestation should be one of the “normal and recognized manifestations” of religion 
or belief that “actually express the belief concerned”.700 It is therefore unclear why the 
ECHR’s judges could not consider the veil a ‘normal manifestation’ which expresses a 
profound religious belief.701 The distinction between ‘belief’ and ‘manifestation’ has 
received little attention from jurists as it is taken as necessary in the legal reasoning.702 
The idea that religion necessitates a separation between what is observable and what 
does not fit with the liberal separation between the public and the private. Through the 
distinction between forum internum and forum externum the Court presupposes a 
religious individual whose faith is a simple private matter distinguishable from its 
manifestations (such as symbols, rituals, etc.). 
For Cavanaugh, the separation between faith and its manifestation, at the heart of 
human rights discourse over the veil, makes room for state action to identify and 
characterize different social spheres of competence such as ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ and 
to justify limitation of personal freedoms.703 Many scholars have noted that in recent 
years the ECHR’s attitude has shifted in relation to cases that deal with religious 
freedom: previously, for the Court “the state has no direct role to play in the religious 
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life of believers”704 which implies that different religious communities should not 
interfere in the public sphere. However, recently, through a growing emphasis on state 
neutrality, the Court has given states the power to decide which practices are to be 
considered ‘religious’. In fact, in the Court’s reasoning, secularism is “a tangible 
manifestation of neutrality”:705 this means that only the state can decide how to provide 
an appropriate space of religious diversity while advancing the principle of secularism. 
Since secularism is conceived as the only possible system to secure the autonomy of the 
individual “from others and from state power through its articulation of the autonomy 
of the state from cultural and religious authority”,706 the state has the power to “either 
tolerate or ban particular cultural differences without being defined as partial.”707 
Although the ECHR has established the distinction between faith and its manifestation 
through art. 9, it avoids giving any specific definition of ‘religion’,708 leaving this duty to 
European member states. However, what transpires from different cases is that the 
Court understands religion as mere individual, voluntary, private, intellectual 
conviction.709 The tendency of the Court to essentialize religion, and in particular Islam, 
is evident in all the analysed cases concerning the wearing of the veil. This 
essentialization is not surprising, as western and Human Rights law promote abstract 
reasoning.710 In fact, the act of categorizing always involves a certain level of abstraction 
from one context to its application into another which results in a high level of 
uncertainty.711 This is evident in the analysed cases which reveal that the modern 
secular state does not always apply the principles that guide it: as a matter of fact, the 
principles of necessity, proportionality and state neutrality have been applied differently 
in different cases, as is particularly evident in the comparison between Dahlab and 
Kokkinakis’s case.712 As Asad argues, the “problem with universal definitions of religion 
is that by insisting on an essential singularity, they divert us from asking questions about 
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what the definition includes and what it excludes – how, by whom, for what purpose, 
and so on. And in what historical context a particular definition of religion makes good 
sense.”713 Hence, the concept of religion is discursively constructed “not [as] a neutral 
descriptor of a reality that is simply out there in the world”, but as a category that is 
inseparable from western history and goes hand in hand with its “Siamese twin 
secularism”.714 Asad identifies three metaphysical beliefs that are at the heart of secular 
discourse and that allow the relegation of religion into a private sphere. 
 “[firstly], that ‘the world’ is a single epistemic space, occupied by a series of mutually 
confirming sciences […] that not only employ something called ‘the scientific method’ 
but also confirm it as the model for reason […] [secondly] that the knowledges gained 
from these disciplines together support an enlightened morality, that is to say, rules for 
how everyone should behave if they are to live humanely; and [thirdly] that in the 
political realm this requires particular institutional separations and arrangements that 
are the only guarantee of a tolerant world, because only by compelling religion […] to 
remain within prescribed limits can the transcendent power of the secular state secure 
liberty of belief and expression.”715 
The foundational myths of secularism reveal the fact that it is exactly the lack of 
problematization of secular forms of power that allows the secular state to introduce 
restrictions to personal freedoms without perceiving them as violence but as a 
safeguard of the place assigned to religion.716 The western/secular/liberal 
understanding of faith presupposes a specific modern liberal perception of society 
which is at the foundation of western positive and Human Rights law.717 For Asad, 
western law is part of a modern project which seeks to institutionalize a specific form of 
principles and subjectivities in the public secular sphere: in other words, “modernity is 
not primarily a matter of cognizing the real but of living-in-the-world”.718 
Therefore, western positive and Human Rights law protect an individual who complies 
with the principle of secularism and with a secular mode of experiencing religion: “the 
political solution that secularism proffers […] lies not so much in tolerating difference 
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and diversity but in remaking certain kinds of religious subjectivities (even if this 
requires the use of violence) so as to render them compliant with liberal political 
rule”.719 In this sense, what transpires from these decisions is the imposition of a new 
universal law that in principle ‘saves’ the part of humanity which has yet to be allowed 
to enter into the arrangement of liberal law but, in reality, it reinforces its own absolute 
power and, as a metaphysical Christian God did before, it controls and guides individuals 
in their existence: thus “from identifying the human individual in various ways to 
demanding that the state take charge of regulating her conduct, the liberationist ideal 
of human rights discourse has born a state increasingly regulatory and punitive.”720 
Although western liberal law is centred upon a liberal concept of the individual, it 
increasingly aims at state control of human conduct and the individual’s physical being, 
the body, even though it calls for the protection of minorities. Therefore, European 
decisions over the practice of veiling emerge as the mirror of liberal paradoxes: if, on 
the one hand, the individual has rights, then on the other those rights can be 
threatened according to how the society and the nation-state want it to be regulated. 
Hence, in positive and Human Rights law, the individual is free and, at the same time, 
compelled. As Diamantides argues, 
“If the secular individual of practical reason acts as both a source of value and legislator, 
what value is there of legally entrenched human rights provisions that are open to 
deviations imposed by the practicalities of the state? [...] We legally entrench an 
absolute sense of human dignity just as we reserve the right to judge it as finite, subject 
to political necessities, which, be they true or false, constitute a determinism as 
rigourous as that of nature’s indifference from which human rights were supposed to 
deliver us!”721 
 
In this sense, secularism, which has become synonymous with ‘modernity’, defines 
specific forms of knowledge and practices (religious and non-religious) and it becomes 
the framework through which to read and understand the religious, political and ethical 
spheres of the Christian/secular/liberal subject.722 Secularism, then, is a concept that 
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“brings together certain behaviors, knowledge, and sensibilities in modern life.”723 In 
other words, “a secular person is someone whose affective-gestural repertoires express 
a negative relation to forms of embodiment historically associated with (but not limited 
to) theistic religion.”724 
Hence, the separation between private and public, secular and religious, creates not 
only an understanding of how private and public life should be lived and experienced, 
but also a specific imagination which mediates people’s identity in the ‘modern’ 
world.725 Therefore, secularism is not a neutral position but, rather, it is a “normatively 
prescriptive model that favours certain forms of modern religion at the expense of 
others that are equally legitimate.”726 Evans observes that the ECHR has a tendency to 
protect forms of religion that are compatible with western/secular/liberal sensitivities 
and that do not challenge the supremacy of the state over the individual’s public life. In 
other words, since in secular thought religion is conceived as a mere private belief, it 
should not interfere with the individual’s public life: in the case, the role of the law is to 
secure civic loyalty which is challenged by specific manifestations of faith in the public 
space.727 In this view, the women’s headscarf is seen as a threat to secular sensitivities 
because it proposes a specific idea of religion that does not conform to western 
secularity. 
In this sense, the essentialization of religion, along with the separation between faith 
and its manifestation, not only ignores the specific materialities of different religions, 
but it also excludes different subjectivities. As I will argue in the next Chapter, for many 
Muslims, religion is not a simple private intellectual conviction, but a relationship 
created through practices:728 Asad notes that the Arabic term Iman (faith) “is not a 
singular act that one performs naked before God. It is the virtue of faithfulness toward 
God, an unquestioning habit of obedience that God requires of those faithful to him, a 
disposition that has to be cultivated like any other, and which links one through mutual 
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responsibility and trust to others who are faithful.”729 Hence, if European democracies 
are founded on the principle of pluralism, as stated in the cases, then they should 
consider that religion is not always essentially the same and its definition very much 
depends on different cultures and historical periods.730 
Thus, what the legal decisions over the headscarf reveal is that, by defining religion as a 
private belief, secularism tries to define and permanently fix the place of religion in the 
public sphere. However, by so doing, western law excludes different subjectivities. As 
Asad points out,  
“Muslims, as members of the abstract category ‘humans’, can be assimilated […] into a 
global (European) civilization once they have divested themselves of what many of them 
regard (mistakenly) as essential to themselves. The belief that human beings can be 
separated from their histories and traditions makes it possible to urge an 
Europeanization of the Islamic world.”731  
Hence, in the West, the subject of law has the autonomy to express her/his identity only 
when those identities can be assimilated into liberal secular sensitivities. As a matter of 
fact, coercive de-veiling in some European countries has led to the exclusion of many 
women, the ‘others’, the ‘outsiders’, from the public space. As positive and Human 
Rights law conceives the individual abstractly, it excludes subjectivities that do not 
comply with the Christian/liberal/secular understanding of religion. In this sense, the 
‘salvation’ project of positive and Human Rights law in reality means assimilation into 
Christian/secular/liberal understandings of law and politics. Failing to assimilate into a 
new law’s subject means the disappearance of the individual from the public space 
because it represents an embarrassment. The matter of the veil is therefore associated 
with the European idea of ‘assimilation’ where prohibitionist laws are justified as 
mechanisms to ensure that ‘outsiders’ can be adjusted into secular, democratic western 
society. 
Phillips formulates this asymmetry between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ (or between a 
tolerant West and an intolerant East- as presented by the Court) in the following way: 
“‘we’ have culture while culture has ‘them’, or we have culture while they are a culture. 
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Or, we are a democracy while they are a culture […] this asymmetry turns on an 
imagined opposition between culture and individual moral autonomy, in which the 
former vanquishes the latter unless culture is itself subordinated by liberalism”.732 
The (imagined) clash between cultures is well shown in the analysis of the ‘hijab cases’ 
whereas Sharia is conceived as a static positivized legal order, as the western positive 
law. Diamantides’ analysis has helped to unfold the ‘clash of civilizations’ in which the 
veil emerges as the symbol of a clash between two forms of universalist and absolute 
historically-conjoined legal systems: the European and the Islamist ‘fixed codified Sharia 
law’ to be implemented by the appropriate hierarchical authority which is the exact 
mirror of the West.733 The desire to create a unique, fixed and binding law, as I have 
argued, passes through the control and juridical regulation of women’s body. 
The gender dimension of the matter of veiling is of particular importance as, through a 
complex and often incoherent reasoning, the Court has linked ‘secularism’, the 
‘republic’ and women’s body. The debate over the veil highlights contradictory views on 
Muslim women. On the one hand, the Court sees those women as victims of an 
oppressive and intolerant religion and acts as their rescuer, while on the other, Muslim 
women are represented by the Court as dangerous religious fundamentalists who seek 
to overthrow secular western values. This contradictory view reveals, on the one hand, 
an objectionable mode of autonomy, (as they transgress the limits of their freedom) 
while on the other, a lack of autonomy, (as they are seen as subjects obedient to 
fundamentalist male relatives). With the exception of SAS v France,734 in which, for the 
first time, the Court rejected the idea that the veil is an impediment to gender equality 
(although the French government still sustains this argument), all the other cases were 
based on the idea that banning the veil is a necessary means to advance the 
secular/liberal idea of gender equality. However, it is difficult to understand how gender 
equality can be advanced through a punitive measure or through a totalizing 
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understanding of Islam.735 In this sense, the European legal decisions over the practice 
of veiling contrast with the principle of gender equality.736 
The dissenting opinion of Judge Tulkens in the Sahin case well explains this point: “What 
is the connection between the ban and sexual equality? The judgment [of the majority] 
does not say. Indeed, what is the signification of wearing the headscarf? As the German 
Constitutional Court noted in its sentence of 24 September 2003, wearing the headscarf 
has no single meaning: it is a practise that is engaged in for a variety of reasons. It does 
not necessarily symbolize the submission of women to men and there are those who 
maintain that, in certain cases, it can even be a means of emancipating women. What is 
lacking in this debate is the opinion of women, both those who wear the headscarf and 
those who choose not to do.” 737 
Therefore, the regulation of women’s bodies emerges as one of the main contradictions 
in the human rights discourse which claims to safeguard dignity for all.738 Women’s 
body, as I have argued, is of a fundamental importance for the reproduction of a 
society’s values: “through their clothing and demeanour, women and girls become 
visible and vulnerable embodiments of cultural symbols and codes. In addition, the 
primary identification of the woman with the family and home, in a problematic 
separation of ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres of existence, contributes to her secondary 
status in the very realm where her future is debated and even decided: the public”.739 
Foucault sees in the control of bodily practices by legal/political authority a modern 
technique of discipline.740 Through this reading, the regulation of Muslim women’s attire 
can be understood as an essential disciplinary tool of the new form of liberal neo-
governmentality. The concept of secularism, widely used to justify the normative 
control of (Muslim) women’s body, becomes one of the technologies of control 
employed by the state to discipline (different/ non-homogeneous) bodies. In this view, 
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secularism is used to keep the body under the control of the state: from a secularist 
point of view, religious symbols mark differences in bodies that are supposedly neutral, 
rational and abstract. 
Honderich observes that “the problem of classical utilitarism is, in a word, its 
unfairness”.741 In fact, the idea that an action should provide happiness to the greatest 
number of people allows some minority rights to be sacrificed in the name of a greatest 
common welfare.742 In the context, by overlooking the historical, social and religious 
meaning symbolized by the veil, western discourse has sacrificed Muslim women’s 
freedom in the name of a defence of the majority’s secular sensitivity. However, by so 
doing, instead of protecting women’s rights and pluralities, it excludes them. 
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Chapter 4: The veil that reveals 
In the last few years, the female headscarf has been a focal point for many polemical 
debates in the West. In many European countries, the veil has been banned in public 
schools, public offices and, in certain cases, public spaces. The most recent debate 
concerns the summer 2016 ‘burkini ban’743 implemented by several mayors of the 
French Riviera. The ban came after the July 2016 attack in Nice, when eighty-six people 
died. The mayors’ decision was based on the assumption that the veil is ‘a sign of’ 
Salafist proliferation, contrasting with French liberal/secular/democratic values.744 
Clearly, the ‘burkini ban’ sparked passionate debates on various social media, especially 
after the publication of a video in which four male French police asked a Muslim woman 
to undress on the beach.745 In order to reduce the social and political tension created by 
the video, Mr. Christian Estrosi, president of the Regional Council of Provence-Alpes-
Côte d'Azur and deputy mayor of Nice, threatened to file a lawsuit against anyone who 
posted photos or videos of women wearing burkini on Facebook or Twitter. Heedless of 
the rights of a woman who was asked to undress in front of the entire world, he stated 
that the publication of those photos “provoke[d] defamatory remarks and threats” 
against police agents. He added that legal complaints had already been filed “to 
prosecute those who spread the photographs of our municipal police officers and those 
uttering threats against them on social networks.”746 Although France’s highest 
administrative court overturned the mayors’ decision to ban the burkini, as it was 
considered to be in violation of French laws on civil liberties, freedom of movement and 
religious freedom, many mayors decided to maintain the ban, opening another legal and 
political battle over women’s body.747 
                                                             
743 A type of swimwear which covers the whole body except for the face, hands and feet, used by 
some Muslim women. 
744 Elaine Ganley, ‘Why France Thinks the Burkini Is an Attack on Secularism' (The Independent, 
2016) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/burkini-ban-france-cannes-nice-
muslim-islam-beach-french-secularism-a7206971.html> accessed 9 September 2016. 
745 ‘France Warns of Muslim Stigmatisation amid Burkini Ban’ (Al-Jazeera, 2016) 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/france-warns-muslim-stigmatisation-burkini-ban-
160824191045697.html> accessed 9 September 2016. 
746 Amar Toor, ‘French Official Threatens to Sue Social Media Users Who Share Burkini Photos’ 
(The Verge, 2016) <http://www.theverge.com/2016/8/25/12637964/france-burkini-ban-photo-
nice-social-media> accessed 9 September 2016. 
747 Aurelien Breeden and Lilia Blaise, ‘Court Overturns “Burkini” Ban in French Town’ (The New 
York Times, 2016) <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/27/world/europe/france-burkini-
ban.html> accessed 9 September 2016. 
181 
 
The ‘burkini ban’ is of particular interest as it focuses on how western/liberal/seculars 
semiotic understand images, symbols and sign in the public sphere. In fact, from a 
purely aesthetic point of view, there is no difference between a burkini and swimwear 
worn by divers. Moreover, plenty of people cover up on the beach to protect 
themselves from the sun or for a variety of other reasons.748 This indicates that the 
power of the burkini does not lie in the mere image of a covered body, but in the 
symbology attached to an article of clothing. The ‘burkini affair’ in France, which 
emerges within the framework of an endless obsession over the female headscarf, 
reveals that attention should be paid to the semiotic of signs and how it works in the 
modern western/secular/liberal public space. 
As I shall argue, western semiotic ideology, which gives to images and signs a fixed 
meaning arbitrarily defined by social conventions or by law, does not take into 
consideration the “affective and embodied practices through which a subject comes to 
relate to a particular sign”749 and naturalizes and defines the religious subject as an 
individual who simply submits him/herself to a set of recommendations based on 
general beliefs: in other words, secularism conceives of religion as a simple belief, and 
therefore as a matter of personal choice. This understanding is strictly linked to the 
place of religions within the secular state and to the role of the law in regulating ‘visible’ 
religious practices, such as the veil, in the public space. In this sense, secularism is not 
understood as the mere separation between temporal and spiritual power, but as the 
re-conceptualization of religious sensitivities and religious practices in the modern 
world:750 thus, while secular thought has come to define concepts of state, economy, 
religion and law, it simultaneously creates a specific law and religious subject through 
the control of the visible in the public space. 
In this concluding Chapter, I will consider this issue through the lens of the passionate 
debate that has developed in the last few years around European legal decisions 
concerning the practice of veiling; as I have argued, those juridical decisions rely on the 
assumption that veiling is a symbol ‘irreconcilable with the principle of gender equality’ 
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and thus ‘incompatible with western democratic values.’ Reading Wendy Brown751 on 
the necessity to cast doubt on the normative limits of liberal political discourse, I will try 
to challenge the reasoning of European courts over the practice of veiling. 
I will draw on Mahmood’s study752 of ‘pious women’ to argue that non-liberal traditions 
have developed different understandings of religion and bodily practices: if, on the one 
hand, secular rationality defines religion (and religious signs/practices) as a simple 
matter of personal choice, then on the other ‘pietist women’ disclose a 
performative/affective understanding of (religious) bodily practices. Her analysis is of 
particular interest as it reveals that what is often ignored is the way in which liberal 
thought defines and universalizes a specific Christian/liberal/secular rationale based on 
very specific concepts of religion and, along with it, of women’s agency and freedom. By 
challenging western universal(ist) understandings of the category of agency, freedom 
and desire, she argues that different contexts produce different subjectivities: this, in 
turn, helps to understand the lives of women, including the practice of veiling, in a non-
liberal framework. In fact, the very liberal/fixed and universalist concept of women’s 
freedom and agency overlooks the fact that many Muslim women freely choose to wear 
the veil and that this is often understood as a mark of agency, or as a tool to acquire a 
specific subjectivity: thus, “what is seldom problematized in [western] analysis is the 
universality of the desire – central for liberal and progressive thought – to be free from 
relations of subordination.”753 Mahmood’s work helps not only to understand Muslim 
women’s practice, but also to unfold the western universal(ist) understanding of a 
specific concept of freedom and agency in order to deconstruct the two fixed and 
monolithic poles between which women, in the ‘East’ as well as in the ‘West’ have been 
trapped: as Spivak points out, we should now “fix the critical glance not specifically at 
the putative identity of the two poles in a binary opposition, but at the hidden ethico-
political agenda that drives the differentiation between the two.”754 In fact, as my 
analysis attests, the ambiguity and plurality of the practice of veiling indicates not only 
different individuals’ normative choices, but also that, often, speaking about this 
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practice in western societies becomes quite problematic, “for the universalism such 
terminology seems to endorse denies these cultural variations and specificity.”755 
Thus, it is not through the analysis of women’s freedom, but through the symbology 
conferred on the practice of veiling that the gender dimension of the problem can be 
unfolded. This leads to the second argument against the courts’ reasoning: the 
definition of veiling as a ‘religious symbol incompatible with western democratic values’. 
I argue that it is exactly the act of defining veiling as a ‘sign’, a ‘symbol’ of something 
intrinsically ‘other’, that allows the marginalization of Islamic culture in the 
liberal/secular public sphere where Christian symbols can be displayed as carriers of 
democratic values, while Islamic symbols have been banned as a threat to 
western/liberal/secular values. Through Goodrich’s work of the power of images,756 
Mahmood’s analysis of Muslim performative practices,757 and Asad’s analysis of the 
secular,758 I will try to understand why the veil has been defined as a symbol of values 
incompatible with democracy. As I shall argue, symbols not only allow people to give 
meanings free from any context as they come to be understood through the western 
semiotic distinctions between signifier and signified, but they also have the power to 
create an emotional attachment to something ‘un-representable’. This is why, 
historically, political power has always tried to control symbols, signs and clothes in the 
public sphere in order to create a specific political attachment to an absolute power that 
represents the unity of a people. The necessity to control images and symbols in the 
public sphere is mirrored in the legal decisions over the practice of veiling. By defining 
veiling as a ‘sign’, a fixed symbol of a monolithic culture in contrast to western secular 
democratic values, European courts ‘naturalize’ women’s desires as something ‘neutral’ 
to be defined by the state through an ‘exercise of sovereignty’: in fact, it is the sovereign 
that decides which symbols are to be regarded as ‘religious’ and gives to religious 
practices their proper place within secularized democracies, in the ‘East’ as well as in 
the ‘West’. 
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In this sense, drawing from Mancini’s analysis, the regulation of (Muslim) women’s 
attire can only ‘defend’ a very specific kind of democracy which is based on a substantial 
homogeneity, such as that described by Schmitt.759 He argues that democracy is based 
on a form of ‘substantial homogeneity’ which, in turn, forms the unity of a people. This 
unity and homogeneity is artificially constructed through the creation of a fundamental 
dichotomy between ‘self’ and ‘other’, ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ which 
underlines every democracy. In this regard, in the name of an artificially constructed 
homogeneity, the ‘other’, the ‘different’, the ‘outsider’ (the presence of other 
subjectivities) has to be excluded by an exceptional act of sovereign power in order to 
‘save’ the (imagined) unity and homogeneity of western democracies. It is exactly in this 
context that the hijab emerges as symbol, a ‘sign’, a ‘cut-division’ between ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’, ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ whereas the ‘Muslim woman’ emerges as the ‘enemy’, 
disloyal to a secularized transcendental power that wants only to rescue her by un-
veiling her. As Mancini argues, it is through the “removal of the culture of Islam on the 
unproven assertion that it is undemocratic [that] homogeneity is artificially reinforced at 
the expense of genuine cultural diversity.”760 As a result, “secularized religion and 
secularism are used in order to exclude the other and protect the culturally 
homogeneous character of European societies that is perceived – and even explicitly 
described – as threatened by pluralism and globalization.”761 Therefore, the definition of 
veiling as a ‘sign’, a ‘symbol’ of something intrinsically ‘other’, allowed and encouraged 
the emergence of certain kinds of (homogeneous) subjectivities, namely the (abstract) 
Christian/secular/liberal autonomous individual, at the expense of other plural 
subjectivities, namely the ‘diversity of the other’ represented in the image of a veiled 
woman: as such, veiled Muslim women have been un-unveiled to be re-veiled with the 
veil, the mask, of the western ‘liberated’ and ‘re-humanised’ western/secular/Christian 
law’s subject. In contrast, as Asad argues, it is exactly because the veil raised 
disagreement between Muslim scholars on whether it is divinely required by God, that 
its symbology should also be indeterminate for non-Muslims.762 
Thus, the obsession for ‘un-veiling’ Muslim women indicates the inadequacy of western 
(and Islamist) universal(ist) discourse within pluralistic contexts. Through the juridical 
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regulation of women’s attire, western judges tried to regulate specific kinds of 
sociability and to bring private sentiments into the public sphere. In other words, by 
defining veiling as a fixed symbol of something intrinsically ‘other’, not only do 
European judges exclude different concepts of freedom and agency and different forms 
of ‘humanity’,763 but they also operate a re-configuration of religious practices and 
sentiments in the ‘modern/secular world’. Therefore, “the forms of attire toward which 
secular-liberal morality claims indifference are indexical precisely of the kind of 
religiosity that makes such a secular-liberal morality possible in the first place.”764 
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4.1 On Freedom and Agency: an East/West Perspective 
In the 1960s, the feminists’ struggle for emancipation rendered a simple piece of 
clothing such as the miniskirt the symbol of a whole social and cultural change. At that 
time, the mini skirt represented the possibility for women to make choices over their 
body, historically controlled by patriarchal social and political powers. ‘I wear my skirt as 
I like’ could be a slogan of women struggling for the mini skirt more than forty years 
ago; rather, it is a campaign created in 2015 after the expulsions from school of young 
French and Belgian girls because their skirts were considered ‘too long’ and thus a 
‘provocation, and potential act of protest’.765 The decision, made by the Head of School, 
was taken after the banning of religious symbols from public schools in the context that 
the ‘long-skirt’ was considered ‘Muslim clothing’ and thus a ‘religious symbol’. This 
indicates that the juridical regulation of women’s body, along with the fundamental 
dichotomy between the ‘naked-liberated’ body and the ‘covered-constrained’ one, 
remains at the core of many polemical debates, in the past as well as today: it seems 
that in the Christian/liberal/secular West, in which the model of ‘liberated’ woman has 
been ‘naturalized’ and ‘universalized’, the length of women’s skirts becomes the 
measurement of women’s freedom. As I shall argue, this dichotomy, which is mirrored 
in western legal decisions over women’s clothes where the ‘naked body’, symbolized in 
the miniskirt, is considered a ‘sign of’ women’s liberation associated with the possibility 
of agency while the ‘long-skirt’ (along with the hijab) is regarded as a ‘conspicuous 
religious symbol’ incompatible with Christian/secular values of tolerance and gender 
equality, endorses problematic assumptions, not only about the proper place of religion 
and religious practice within secularized democracies and the role of the law in 
regulating religious practices, but also about women’s freedom and the possibility of 
agency. 
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While in the West the veiled (or ‘too dressed’) body has become the monolithic symbol 
of women’s universal oppression and seclusion, in Pakistan a popular new animated 
television series, ‘Burqa Avenger’, soon to be broadcast in India, offers a different 
understanding of veiled Muslim women by challenging the western universal(ist) 
understanding of women’s freedom and the possibility of agency. In the series, Jiya, an 
unveiled teacher in a female primary school in Pakistan, struggles in defence of 
women’s rights by ‘transforming’ herself into her alter ego, ‘Burka Avenger’: a super 
heroine who wear the burqa to conceal her identity while using ‘Takht Kanaddi’, a 
special martial art involving books and pens, to struggle against the enemy.766 Unlike the 
western stereotype of a subjugated woman victim of a chauvinist society, Jiya is an 
educated woman and ‘books’ and ‘pens’ are the weapons she uses against the enemy. 
Moreover, interestingly, it is exactly through her burqa that the main character acquires 
the possibility of agency as she can hide her identity and fly. In other words, ‘Burqa 
Avenger’ is an interesting character because she escapes from the western monolithic 
view of Muslim women and offers a different understanding of Muslim women’s 
performativity. While many scholars have revealed that the association between veiling 
and ‘women’s oppression’ is an overstatement,767 its centrality in western legal 
reasoning is exemplified in the comparison between the Dahlab and Kokkinakis cases, 
decided at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).768 
On the one hand, a Swiss teacher was dismissed because she started to wear the veil 
despite never telling her students that she had converted to Islam, while on the other, 
Mr. Kokkinakis tried to proselytize in a country where this is illegal. The fact that Ms. 
Dahlab’s illocutionary act (or performance) of wearing a veil was considered more 
threatening than Mr Kokkinakis’ proselytizing reveals a clash between a performative 
body and the logocentrism on which western polity and law is based. If Kokkinakis’s 
proselytizing is protected, it is because the court perceived he did ‘nothing but speak’ 
with the intention to convert another who is free to accept or not; if Ms Dahlab was 
removed from sight it was because she demonstrated, performed, acted out, her right 
to be different, which carries illocutionary force. Thus, it is exactly the illocutionary force 
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of Ms Dahlab’s performative act that is at stake. In fact, western scholars and judges 
tend to see bodily performances as expression, symbol and ‘sign’ of profound 
cultural/religious fixed meanings whereas the ‘veiled body’ emerges as a constraint to 
women’s agency. 
In contrast to many western feminists and scholars who have analysed the condition of 
women in Muslim majority societies in terms of the moral autonomy of the subject 
resisting external (patriarchal) structures of power,769 Mahmood’s work770 discloses a 
different understanding of bodily practices, ethics, freedom and agency from that of the 
liberal polity. She intends agency as the “capacity for action that historically specific 
relations of subordination enable and create” by reconsidering “the conceptual 
relationship between desire and self-making, performance and the constitution of the 
subject, and moral action and embodiment in feminist debates.”771 Her analysis helps to 
“move beyond the teleology of emancipation underwriting many accounts of women’s 
agency,”772 and to analyse the relationship between body and subject formation within 
non-liberal discourses; through her study of subjects excluded by the liberal trajectory, 
Mahmood challenges the idea of agency central to the liberal concept of autonomy by 
‘expanding’ the Butlerian concept of ‘performativity of the body’.773 
Butler’s analysis is drawn from two central concepts of Foucault’s philosophy: firstly, 
power is conceived as a relation of forces which are productive of new discourses, 
objects, desires, and relations. Secondly, the subject does not precede power relations 
but is produced through those relations. Thus, the conditions that secure the subject’s 
subordination are the same that produce self-consciousness and agency.774 This 
“understanding of power and subject formation encourages us to conceptualize agency 
not simply as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but as capacity for 
action that specific relations of subordination create and enable.”775 By questioning the 
works of power, which do not simply dominate but also form the subject, Butler breaks 
with a long feminist tradition which presumes that all humans are “endowed with a will, 
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a freedom, and an intentionality” whose workings are “thwarted by relations of power 
that are considered external to the subject.”776 In her analysis, the subject is located 
within structures of power, which in turn, form the subject. As she argues, 
 “to claim that discourse is formative is not to claim that it originates, causes, or 
exhaustively composes that which it concedes: rather, it is to claim that there is no 
reference to a pure body which is not at the same time a further formation of that body. 
In this sense, the linguistic capacity to refer to sexed bodies is not denied, but the very 
meaning of ‘referentiality’ is altered. In philosophical terms, the constative claim is 
always to some degree performative.”777 
Drawing from Derrida’s interpretation of Austin’s concept of the ‘performative’, Butler 
formulates the idea of a subject performatively constituted through the repetition of 
heterosexual norms which retroactively produce the appearance of gender: in other 
words, norms are the necessary ground in which the subject can enact her agency in 
terms of repetition and/or subversion of identities and subjectivities.778 In Butler’s 
thought, while on the one hand the reiteration of structures of norms consolidates 
particular discourses, then on the other it is the very structure of norms that provides 
the subject with the means for its destabilization: “the paradox of subjectification is 
precisely that the subject who would resist such norms is itself enabled, if not produced, 
by such norms. Although this constitutive constraint does not foreclose the possibility of 
agency, it does locate agency as a reiterative or rearticulatory practice, immanent to 
power, and not a relation of external opposition to power.”779 In other words, for Butler, 
agency emerges as located within a productive reiterability and is related to the work of 
re-signification of norms. 
In contrast with Butler, who reduces agency to a binary and antagonistic framework in 
which norms are reiterated and/or re-signified, Mahmood intends agency “not simply 
[as] a synonym for resistance to social norms but [as] a modality of action.”780 Drawing 
from Austin’s ‘speech-act theory’, Butler’s theory of performativity, and Derrida’s 
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performative act as ‘iterable practice’, Mahmood argues that “it is through repeated 
bodily acts that one trains one’s memory, desire, and intellect to behave according to 
established standards of conduct.”781 In other words, it is one’s performative practice 
that determines one’s desires and not the opposite: for the pietist women that 
Mahmood worked with, for instance, “action does not issue forth from natural feelings 
but creates them.”782 In fact, for women of the piety movement, repeated bodily acts 
such as praying or wearing the veil become indispensable for specific values considered 
necessary attributes of the self. The Aristotelian term habitus,783 and the equivalent 
Arabic malaka, can capture this sense of embodiment and inhabitation: habitus, or 
malaka, is a quality acquired by doing and repeating certain actions until those actions 
become an integral part of the subject.784 In this sense, the body is both a way to 
express an inner state and a means through which certain moral values are acquired 
through the repetition of specific bodily performances. Imagine, she argues, a pianist 
who submits herself to a strict disciplinary regime to gain the ability, ‘the requisite 
agency’, to play the piano virtuously: in the case, her ability to play the piano is 
compounded with her ability to be taught. ‘Docility’, a term associated with the absence 
of agency, “literally implies the malleability required of someone to be instructed in a 
particular skill or knowledge – a meaning that carries less a sense of passivity and more 
that of struggle, effort, exertion, and achievements.”785 Similarly, for women such as 
those Mahmood worked with, agency is seen as the individual capacity to train the body 
in order to become willing subjects of a particular discourse. Thus, Mahmood intends 
agency not as ‘resistance to power’, but as ‘capacity for action’: in her analysis, agency is 
linked with performativity and emerges as “the specific ways in which one performs a 
certain number of operations on one’s thoughts, body conduct, and ways of being, in 
order to ‘attain a certain kind of state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or 
immortality in accord with a particular discursive tradition.”786 If agency is seen as the 
capacity to undertake moral actions, then this capacity “is entailed not only in those acts 
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that resist norms but also in the multiple ways in which one inhabits norms.”787 For the 
women of the piety movement, for instance, piety “rises from practice, is perfected by 
practice, and then governs all actions and practices.”788 By considering the possibility 
that norms can actually structure the interiority of the subject, Mahmood eludes 
Butler’s antagonistic and dualistic framework: norms can be confirmed or subverted, 
but they can also be inhabited, aspired to and consumed. 
“[Norms] are performed, inhabited, and experienced in a variety of ways […]:[they] are 
not simply a social imposition on the subject but constitute the very substance of her 
intimate, valorised interiority. I think about the variety of ways in which norms are lived 
and inhabited, aspired to, reached for, and consummated. This requires that we explore 
the relationship between the immanent form a normative act takes, the model of 
subjectivity it presupposes (specific articulations of volition, emotion, reason, and bodily 
expression) and the kinds of authority upon which such an act relies.”789 
Hence, unlike Butler, for Mahmood agency is understood as the ability to take specific 
kinds of performative action, just one of which is resistance/reiteration: agency is thus 
located within specific discourses which, in turn, form the subject who, performatively, 
reiterates/subverts/inhabits norms.790 This model of performativity “emphasizes the 
sedimented and cumulative character of reiterated performances, where each 
performance builds on prior ones, and a carefully calibrated system exists by which 
differences between reiterations are judged in terms of how successfully (or not) the 
performance has taken root in the body and mind.”791 However, she argues, this does 
not mean “to invoke a self-constituting autonomous subject nor subjectivity as a private 
space of cultivation. Rather, it draws our attention to the specific ways in which one 
performs a certain number of operations on one’s thought, body, conduct, and ways of 
being”792 within specific discursive traditions. 
Thus, what is important to understand is “the complex relationships between the 
immanent form of a normative act, the model of subject it presupposes, and the type of 
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authority on which it is based.”793 By recalling Foucault’s relationship between ethics 
and morals, Mahmood gives another place to bodily practices: a place in which moral 
virtues are acquired through the reiteration of those practices.794 In fact, borrowing 
from Aristotle, Foucault conceives ethics not as an abstract concept but as a series of 
practical performances that are relevant to a specific way of life. For Foucault, ethics 
refers to a particular set of procedures and techniques through which the subject comes 
to be formed in a particular (localized) context.795 Therefore, subjectivity is an effect of 
the modality of a specific structure of power in which the subject is formed through the 
re-enactment of practices delimited in advance. However, Foucault also recognizes 
another kind of subject formation, namely ‘moral subjectification’, which refers to the 
available model “for setting up and developing [a] relationship with the self, for self-
reflection, self-knowledge, self-examination, for the decipherment of the self by oneself, 
for the transformations that one seeks to accomplish with oneself as object.”796 Hence, 
if on the one hand the subject resists or complies with moral codes, then on the other, 
Foucault recognizes that the subject has many different ways of forming a relationship 
with a ‘moral code’ which, in turn, establishes a relationship between the inner self 
(will, desires, actions etc.) and norms within a particular discourse. Foucault’s analysis of 
ethical formation helps to understand agency firstly as a capacity required to take 
specific moral action and, secondly, as bounded to cultural and historical discourses 
through which the subject is formed. Hence, at stake is not what a certain ethic means 
but what it does. Women with whom Mahmood worked learned how to analyse body 
and soul movement in order to acquire a specific selfhood: 
“[they] establish coordination between inner states (intention, movements of desires 
and thought etc.) and outer conduct (gestures, actions, speech etc.). This principle of 
coordination has implications for how we might analyse the conceptual relationship the 
body articulates with the self and with others, and by extension, the self’s variable 
relationships to structures of authority and power.”797 
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In other words, if “bodily habitus constitutes a tacit form of performativity, a citational 
chain lived and believed at the level of the body,”798 then it is through the shape that 
specific ethical practices take that it is possible to analyse the ethical subject formation; 
“the importance of these practices does not reside in the meanings they signify to their 
practitioners, but in the work they do in constituting individuals: similarly, the body is 
not a medium of signification but the substance and the necessary tool through which 
the embodied subject is formed.”799 
The understanding of the body as a ‘means to’ and not a ‘sign of’, challenges the 
western/liberal understanding of norms in terms of subversion and/or destabilization. 
For the women of the ‘piety movement’, for instance, “this means that the possibility 
for disrupting the structural stability of norms depends upon literally re-tutoring the 
body rather than in destabilizing the referential structure of the sign, or, for that matter, 
positing an alternative representational logic that challenges masculinists reading of 
feminine corporeality.”800 Thus, if the signification and citationality of the body is at the 
centre of Butler’s theory, Mahmood is more interested in the work the body performs: 
in her analysis, the body is a ‘medium for, not a sign of.’ “In this view, the specific 
gestures, styles, and formal expressions that characterize one’s relationship to a moral 
code are not a contingent but a necessary means to understanding the kind of 
relationship that is established between the self and structures of social authority, and 
between what one is, what one wants, and what kind of work one performs on oneself 
in order to realize a particular modality of being and personhood.”801 
For instance, despite a wider consensus between Muslims about the importance of the 
Islamic virtue of ‘modesty’, there is no consensus on how this virtue should be lived, 
performed, and/or experienced and whether it requires the donning of the veil. For 
most of the piety movement’s women, the veil not only expresses the value of modesty, 
but it is also the means through which this value is acquired.802 Thus, what is at stake is 
not the capacity of women to subvert or re-enact the norm of modesty, but rather the 
relationship between the body, the norm, and how the body inhabits norms in different 
contexts. 
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Not surprisingly, both Islamists and secular state-fetishists have found in the piety 
movement a bitter enemy: the authority those women follow is grounded in sources 
which elude the logic of singular state sovereignty. In fact, although many liberal 
feminists see those subjects in search of piety as being outside the ‘modern-civilized’ 
‘first world’ trajectory, what seems to unite women of different social classes of this 
movement is the open conflict with several structures of (patriarchal) authority such as 
Islamic orthodoxy, liberal or nationalist discourse, family relations, state institutions, 
etc.803 In fact, their activities and their interpretation of Islamic precepts have deeply 
challenged nationalist as well as Islamist movements because of the role that the body 
acquires within the nationalist imaginary, be it secular or Islamist/secular. Women of 
the piety movement are quite critical towards nationalist-identitarian interpretations of 
religiosity, understood as an abstract system of beliefs without any connection to the 
way in which those beliefs are lived, performed, and experienced: based on their point 
of view, this understanding of the body treats performative acts primarily as a ‘sign of’ 
the self rather than as a ‘means to’ its formation.804 
Mahmood’s work discloses how women manoeuvre their agency within different 
frameworks of power and how specific body performances can be understood in non-
liberal terms: agency comes from “within sematic and institutional networks that define 
and make possible particular ways of relating to people, things, and one self:”805 in this 
way, she operates a shift from a centred human subject to its ‘condition of possibility’ 
within specific discourses which, in turn, determine those conditions. 
This notion presupposes that there does not exist a homogeneous idea of personhood, 
but that different subjectivities cohabit in a specific pluralistic cultural and historical 
space and that each of those configurations of personhood is the product of different 
discourses. Mahmood describes how women of the piety movement have a completely 
different understanding about ritual obligations and the role of the body in forming the 
‘moral-subject’. These differences within an (apparently) united movement challenge 
not only the western monolithic idea of individual freedom and agency, but they also 
help to understand how different discourses can form different subjectivities and that 
those plural subjectivities often escape from the liberal logic of freedom and agency of 
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the (homogeneous) fixed and monolithic Christian/secular law’s subject. This is why 
‘Burqa Avenger’ is such an interesting character: in her plurality of performative acts, 
she escapes the logic of the singular state sovereignty which needs to sustain a fixed 
and monolithic subject. Jiya wears the burqa when she wants and/or when she needs. In 
this way, she not only embodies a different concept of freedom and agency but also, 
more importantly, she represents an ‘intimacy’, what Agamben calls a use of the body or 
as a use of the self which is defined as “a relation to an inappropriable and un-
representable zone of un-known”.806 By escaping from the western semiotic ideology 
which presupposes that the primary function of images is to communicate fixed 
meanings, ‘Burqa Avenger’ avoids being re-scribed as a monolithic subject of the nation-
state and she manoeuvres her agency through the different use of her body within a 
community and a plurality of normative choices. This plurality of normative choices is 
embedded in the very structure of classical Islamic law, and it is part of the post-madhab 
character of Islam which reveals a certain flexibility, as witnessed by Muslim scholars as 
well as illiterate Muslims, toward different Islamic schools and Islamic sources.807 In fact, 
“scholarly arguments are not simply frozen bodies of texts, but live through the 
discursive practices of both lettered and unlettered Muslims whose familiarity with 
these arguments is grounded in a variety of sources – not all of which are controlled by 
scholars. Moreover, scholarly arguments are often transformed by the context in which 
they are evoked, a process that imparts to the arguments new meanings, usages, and 
violence not intended by the original author.”808 
The essence of classic Islamic jurisprudence, based on the comprehension of the past 
for a re-formulation of practices in the present, creates a link between the past and the 
present, practitioners and scholars, and between theory and how, praxiologically, norms 
are lived, experienced, performed and inhabited.809 The donning of the veil is a good 
example of the plurality of sources and discourses in which women manoeuvre their 
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agency. In fact, as I showed in the first Chapter, veiling is not a compulsory practice in 
Islam and many Muslim women do not veil at all. Since in classical Islamic jurisprudence 
there does not exist a centralized authority that regulates and/or punishes infractions, 
and due to the lack of consensus over many matters, including the practice of veiling, 
juridical matters become interpretable by the individual. As Asad argues, the 
engagement of ordinary Muslims with Islamic founding texts depends on the context 
through which those texts acquire a specific meaning.810 In this way, Asad operates a 
shift from a western understanding of a fixed and unchangeable sharia law to an 
interpretable religious text in which meanings are established based on contextual 
power relations. In other words, the interpretation of a particular norm depends not 
only on classical Islamic sources but also, more importantly, on the practical context in 
which these norms are performed, inhabited, and experienced. In this sense, the veil 
can also be seen as a ‘possibility of action’, a tool for women to negotiate certain norms 
and/or inhabit pluralistic non-liberal patriarchal traditions. The full-face-veil worn by 
’Burqa Avenger’, for instance, is not only a tool through which she achieves her goals, 
but it is also an element that empowers her by giving her an exceptional possibility of 
agency, exactly like the mask worn by ‘western super-heroes’. It is exactly her ‘plurality’ 
of performative acts that gives her the freedom to perform and manoeuvre her agency 
within particular discourses. 
In some way, the life of Jiya/’Burqa Avenger’ is not much different from that of many 
Muslim women who manoeuvre their agency within non-liberal plural discourses. Abu-
Lughod gives the example of a woman who decided not to veil because she considered 
herself virtuous, or another who, after marrying an older man, decided not to veil for 
anyone younger and subsequently she stated that everybody is younger.811 In this sense, 
“veiling is both voluntary and situational […] an act undertaken by women to express 
their virtue in encounters with particular categories of men.”812 Many Bedouin women, 
for instance, cover their faces with a black head cloth in front of older men: this is 
understood as a voluntary act that expresses a sense of morality and honour towards 
their family. Thus, by covering their faces in front of certain categories of men, Bedouin 
women not only decide when and for whom to veil, but they also express their 
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individual ethic as well as a sense of honour towards their families. By contrast, the veil 
worn by Egyptian women in the mid-1970s can be read both as a mark of piety and as a 
sign of being an educated and sophisticated urban woman,813 while Boddy’s study of 
Sudanese women within zar cult814 reveals how women use this cult as a kind of 
‘subordinate’ discourse as well as “a feminine response to hegemonic praxis.”815 As 
Hirschmann observes, “these discursive challenges to customary practices illustrate 
women’s power to exert some control over the conditions of their lives by redefining 
those practices and categories of meaning: women reconstruct their material realities 
through discursive intervention in customary practice.”816 Therefore, the donning of the 
veil should not be confused with lack of agency, but should be intended within 
particular discourses which form not only the subject but also its desires.817 
This may be what is unsettling for western liberal feminists and leftists: that desire is not 
a universal fixed category and subjectivity is a fragile and ambiguous concept 
constituted through performativity of a lived and ever changing body of interpretable 
norms. Those norms are not only subverted or re-enacted but also lived, experienced, 
and inhabited. This is not to say that all Muslim women wear the veil to create a pious 
self, nor that they all intend their bodies as a tool to reach specific ethical achievements: 
as I pointed out, even if a specific group of women wears the veil for a specific reason, it 
is impossible to generalize because the choice to veil is very personal. Women can 
decide to veil, or not to veil, in order to gain social esteem or to feel free from 
harassment. The veil worn by urban women, for instance, has a different meaning from 
the veil worn by peasants working in the fields in Bukittinggi, Sumatra. Moreover, in 
certain neighbourhoods of big cities in the Middle East, prostitutes wear the veil to hide 
their ‘illicit’ profession: in this sense, the veil is a sign of dishonour. Since the practice of 
veiling takes different colours, shapes and forms, it also implies different meanings and 
normative choices within different cultural and historical contexts.818 
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The attempt by western scholars and judges to see the practice of veiling as a fixed and 
unchangeable religious/cultural symbol, a ‘sign of’, not only does not take into 
consideration the plurality of meanings and practices of veiling and the historical and 
cultural context within which certain practices, wills and desires develop, but it also 
imposes a specific semiotic ideology on different cultures. 
In ‘Christian Moderns’, Keane819 reveals how the western semiotic distinction between 
signifier and signified, object and subject, form and essence, mirrors Calvinist and 
Protestant concerns to institute a separation between the transcendent world and the 
reality of this world. This distinction was imposed on other cultures by western 
missionaries and has become embedded in the secular idea of what it means to be 
modern and how images work in the liberal/secular world. As, in western semiotic 
ideology, clothes are conceived as images,820 they are intended as a vehicle for 
meanings: they signify structures behind what is represented, irrespective of the 
modality of the subject/object relation.821 It is exactly this fixed reading of clothes that 
emerges in the European legal decisions where the practice of veiling comes to be 
defined as a fixed ‘religious symbol’ incompatible with the principle of secularism and 
gender equality. Those decisions reveal a very secular understanding of religion and 
religious practices: one in which the (abstract) individual can choose to separate its 
personal beliefs from its external being. As I have argued, secularism conceives religion 
as simple belief and therefore as a matter of personal choice. In contrast, Mahmood’s 
analysis reveals that religious practices can also be an integral part of the individual. In 
fact, although many western commentators see religion as ‘alien’ to liberal/secular 
thought, the semiotic reading that has been applied by western judges in cases related 
to the Muslim headscarf implies a specific liberal/secular understanding of religion. As 
Vakulenko points out, the understanding of veiling as a mere ‘religious symbol’, as 
expressed in the European legal decisions over the female headscarf, does not only 
ignore the social, political, psychological and legal dimensions of the phenomenon, it 
also reinforces a strict division of the private/public spheres.822 The secular 
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understanding of religion, then, depends upon a prior normative understanding of what 
religion is and how the secular law’s subject should experience its religious life: this 
understanding is today embedded in western positive law. 
 
Along with a specific concept of religion, European judges have disclosed a very specific 
idea of ‘womanhood’ and what constitutes the (female) body in the modern secular 
world where hair is visible: in fact, in liberal/secular thought, freedom is intended as the 
mere possibility of the subject to choose autonomously, based on her own desires. In 
liberal theory, individual autonomy defines the ‘human’ and emerges through the 
distinction between positive and negative freedom which has deeply informed liberal 
and feminist analyses of women’s freedom and women’s rights.823 Negative freedom is 
defined by the absence of external obstacles, while positive freedom is understood as 
the capacity to realize an autonomous will: thus, in western-liberal thought, autonomy 
“is a procedural principle, and not an ontological or substantive feature of the subject, it 
delimits the necessary condition for the enactment of the ethics of freedom.”824 
Based on Berlin, negative freedom is defined as something external, alien, ‘other’ to the 
self; it means “not being interfered with by others. The wider the area of non-
interference, the wider my freedom.”825 Negative freedom draws a clear distinction 
between ‘subject’ and ‘object’, the ‘self’ and what is ‘other’, ‘external’ to the subject 
while, at the same time, it relies on a very strict notion of individual responsibility.826 
Thus, freedom is understood as something ‘measurable’ because ‘the less external 
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constraints we have, the more we are supposed to be free’: hence, in liberal thought, 
freedom is an ‘objective’, and not a ‘subjective’ principle. Despite differences between 
western philosophers on the significance of ‘choice’ and ‘constraint’, negative freedom’s 
individualism is revealed in the distinction between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, while 
constraints “contain an inherently conflictual character, because individuals’ desires and 
interests inevitably collide with them.”827 However, as I shall point out, it is difficult to 
apply this distinction to analyse how people, in the ‘East’ as well as in the ‘West’, live 
and experience life and to think that this opposition between the individual and the 
society is universally valid. 
On the contrary, positive freedom focuses on the analysis of political and social 
conditions which emerge as limits to individual freedom, and tries to find positive 
actions in order to overcome those constraints. In positive liberty theories, the subject is 
a rational ‘self-master’ who knows exactly what her own true desires are: thus, positive 
freedom presupposes an individual as totally detached from the external context 
(understood as a ‘constraint’ to the individual’s desires).828 The problem with this 
approach, however, is that individual ‘will’ or ‘desires’ come to be determined by 
‘others’, the state and its law: “since the laws embody the true will, then by forcing me 
to obey the law the state is only ‘forcing me to be free’ that is, to follow my true will, 
whether I know it or not.”829 The western idea of (positive) freedom is embedded in 
modern western positive law and this is revealed by the fact that many European states 
feel the need to legislate on women’s bodies. In the context of western legal decisions 
over the veil, the main concern of the judges was to ‘rescue’ Muslim women from 
religious fundamentalist groups, whether they wanted it or not: by implying that they 
knew the true ‘will’ and ‘desire’ of (Muslim) women (which, surely, is not ‘wearing a 
veil’), European judges acted as ‘rescuers’ for those women, supposedly unable to make 
a choice based on their true interests and desires. The western project of Muslim 
women’s ‘salvation’ from and/or to something, not only implies a certain violence 
entailed in the process, but it also reinforces a sense of the superiority of western liberal 
thought.830 This indicates that liberal concepts of women’s freedom and agency are not 
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just part of a philosophical tradition, but have become a normative feature of the 
modern liberal/secular state. 
The difficulties in the western approach to freedom are revealed in the complexity of 
drawing a clear line between an internal self, with its own particular desires, and the 
external world, in which the subject exists: “without such specificity of context, the 
individual too is unspecified, an abstraction.”831 As I have argued, the ontological idea 
behind the modern legal subject is the very abstract notion of the individual: Hegel 
named it the ‘hypothetical self of modernity’ and pointed out that “as this person, I 
know myself to be free in myself. I can abstract from everything, since nothing confronts 
me save pure personality and free ego.”832 This (transcendent) and abstract form of 
subjectivity is possible only if the individual is free from all cultural and social 
constraints: to become an ‘abstract individual’, “we have to completely forget the 
relationships (e.g. ethical, juridical, love, etc.) we are used to thinking about.”833 Thus, 
the external world, traditions, sentiments etc. are seen as deformations of a natural 
individual who is (abstractly) free only once s/he is free from external oppressive 
structures of power.834 This western/Christian/secular abstract idea of the subject has 
been particularly violent when imposed on other (plural) non-liberal cultures: in fact, 
from the first colonial encounter until today, colonial powers have always tried to 
‘rescue’ Muslim women by un-veiling them.835 Since the western/Christian/secular 
individual emerges as a mask, an abstraction, the western approach does not help to 
understand how will and desires are formed. If, as positive liberty scholars argue, we 
have conflicting internal desires and interests, then how can we understand our true 
will? 
As argued, in order to understand how desires and interests come to be formed, it is 
essential to understand them within specific historical and cultural contexts which, in 
turn, form the subject, her choices, will, and desires: in fact, “in ordinary life the wish to 
do one thing rather than another is rooted in dominant conventions, in loyalties and 
habits one has acquired over time, as well as in the anxieties and pleasures experienced 
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in interaction with lovers and friends, with relatives, teachers, and other authority 
figures.”836 If, echoing Foucault,837 the subject emerges as the product of a particular 
form of social formation and as such is not only ‘constrained’ but also formed by it, then 
we need to interrogate the liberal assumption of a ‘rational-self-master’ who knows 
exactly what his/her true desires are. In fact, if the ‘choosing subject’ exists within a 
specific discourse, then “the ideal of the naturalized and unified subject utilized by most 
freedom theories is thus deeply problematic and simplistically overdrawn”838 because 
our desires and interests come to be shaped by what the general discourse renders 
‘available’.839 
Abu-Lughod’s study of Bedouin women is an interesting example of how the concept of 
freedom can be understood differently in non-liberal traditions.840 She argues that for 
Bedouin women “autonomy or freedom is the standard by which status is measured 
and social hierarchy determined […] Equality is nothing other than equality of autonomy 
–that is, equality of freedom from domination by or dependence on others.”841 Hence, 
freedom is intended as “the strength to stand alone and freedom from domination”: 
this “is won through tough assertiveness, fearlessness, pride [and] through self-control 
[over] the passions.”842 Thus, negative freedom, as exposed by western philosophers 
such as Hobbes and Locke, and positive freedom, as defined by Hegel and Rousseau, are 
an integral part of Bedouin society. However, as Hirschmann and Abu-Lughod reveal, 
despite an apparent similarity in the understanding of the concept of freedom, there is 
still a consistent difference. Although individual autonomy is an important feature 
within Bedouin tribes, the concept of honour remains central in the Bedouin culture.843 
For Bedouin, honour is strictly linked to the status of each tribe; it is associated with the 
capacity to “stand[s] alone and fear[s] nothing,” for “fear of anyone or anything implies 
it has control over one,”844 and is measured as both the capacity to secure authority and 
the free consent to obey. Hence, if on the one hand, the individual must be strong and 
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independent, then on the other, it is linked to tribal hierarchical structures, due the 
strict link between honour, autonomy and tribal status. 
According to Abu-Lughod’s study,845 in Bedouin society, a practice such as veiling, 
understood as a symbol of women’s oppression by western judges, is considered a 
source of honour; it attests to a certain independence from men because it “serves as a 
statement that the wearer is intent on preserving herself as separate from others, 
emotionally and psychologically as well as physically; it is a tangible marker of 
separateness and independence.”846 If, for many women of the piety movement the veil 
is a tool to achieve specific abilities and potentialities, for the Bedouin women Abu-
Lughod worked with, the veil indicates esteem and autonomy because it ‘covers’ not 
only the body but also “the natural needs and passions.”847 For them, challenging 
familiar hierarchy would be considered a dishonour and, thereby, a mark of un-
freedom. Interestingly, although Bedouin women condemn those (men and women) 
who violate tribal norms, they seem to be delighted by people, especially women, who 
show a strong will: those women do not always follow tribal/familiar norms but their 
authority is nevertheless recognized by the community.848 It is worth noting that the link 
between honour and modesty drawn by Bedouin society “serves to rationalize social 
inequality and the control some have over the lives of others […] if honor derives from 
virtues associated with autonomy, then there are many, most notably women, who 
because of their physical, social, and economic dependence are handicapped in their 
efforts to realize these ideals.”849 It can, though, be argued that this is what Foucault 
calls social control, which is based on the colonization of desires:850 this kind of 
colonization “not only coerces individuals, but redefines such coercion as freedom and 
choice thereby denying individuals the ability to see the control they are subject to, and 
making them the instruments of their own oppression.”851 If it’s true that, in the ‘East’ 
as well as in the ‘West’, the subject, its desires and, consequently, its choices are the 
outcome of specific discourses, then it would be problematic to state that women’s 
agency upholds values that oppress them as the ability to challenge cultural norms is 
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troubling also for men: the difference, in the case, is that it is ‘men’ (intended as a 
group), in the ‘West’ as well as in the ‘East’, who set the parameters of the general 
discourse by enforcing cultural norms which give them more possibilities of agency than 
women. 
My analysis reveals that if, on the one hand, women manoeuvre their agency within 
structures of power, often re-enacting patriarchal norms, then on the other, those 
norms gave them the framework within which they negotiate their choices: in essence, 
they manoeuvre their agencies through intervention in customary practices despite 
those practices being affected by specific power relations. As Hirschmann points out, 
“Women who utilize the veil to express agency subvert the practice by turning its norms 
against itself, but also reinforce its underlying power structure; they may ‘negotiate’ 
patriarchal restrictions, but they also feed into and support them. Hence the lines 
between agency, choice, and resistance on the one hand, and oppression, domination, 
and coercion on the other, become blurred: what looks like oppression may in fact be 
resistance, and what looks like free choice and agency may in fact be oppression. 
Indeed, it is often the case that resistance and agency are simultaneously an expression 
or illustration of oppression.”852 
Thus, if on the one hand, every human is confronted with choices, then on the other, 
those choices are formed by the discourse people live in because it is the “general 
ethical dimension that not only gives sense to the self in relation to others but also 
forms a notion of freedom that can only unfold itself in a specific cultural narrative. A 
cultural narrative does not imply a restriction against which a will would have to be 
formulated; rather, it defines a person and his or her will as a bent toward the world.”853 
This reveals how the question of women’s freedom emerges as extremely ambiguous in 
relation to specific discourses which, in turn, form specific subjectivities. 
These studies disclose not only the well-known plurality of the Muslim world, as well as 
different meanings of the practice of veiling, but they also reveal the possibility to think 
about freedom and agency in ways that are different from liberal/Christian/secular 
thought. On the one hand, those women share certain western concepts such as control 
over the self, the absence of external constraints and the importance of the individual, 
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while on the other, autonomy is deeply influenced by concepts of honour, membership 
and obedience to sources of authorit(ies). Understanding the context within which 
some choices are made possible, helps to understand concepts of freedom and agency 
as located within a community, structures of power, and relationships.854 For those 
women, the veil is not the symbol of a chauvinist religious/fundamentalist political 
movement that obliges them to cover their head, as implied by European judges, but a 
tool through which they negotiate their preferences: the veil helps them to be located 
within a community (kinship, family, religious, national) because it is through their 
agency within their community that they achieve specific concepts of freedom, agency 
and ethics. 
Those women, unlike the western citizen who is detached from her/his community and 
so is alone in front of the state, manoeuvre their lives within a community in which 
other values of freedom and autonomy emerge.855 In fact, as I have pointed out, at the 
heart of eastern concepts of freedom is not the self-reliant, self-controlled, lonely 
western citizen, but an individual who is part of a community which, in turn, deeply 
influences concepts of self, freedom and agency. In other words, when analysing 
concepts of women’s freedom and agency, it is essential to understand the local context 
in which certain bodily acts are performed and certain desires formed. 
Therefore, the analysis of the practice of veiling should take into consideration “not just 
[…] whether the choosing subject can act on her choice but how that subject and her 
choices are constructed in the first place.”856 In this sense, when studying the practice of 
veiling, the liberal opposition between those who defend the ‘free will’ of Muslim 
women and those who see veiling as a backward cultural imposition is a fake one. The 
paradox of liberalism lay exactly in the formulation of choice as measurement of 
freedom (the more choices I have, the more I am supposed to be free).857 In fact, as I 
have argued, the western universalist model of “human action presupposes […] a 
natural disjuncture between a ‘person’s true desire’ and those that are socially 
prescribed…The politics that ensues from this disjuncture aim to identify moment and 
places where conventional norms impede the realization of an individual’s real desires, 
or at least obfuscate the distinction between what is truly one’s own and what is socially 
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required.”858 In contrast, the studies I have taken into consideration hypothesise a 
possible separation between self-realization and autonomous will and between agency 
and discursive infrastructures. In other words, the liberal distinction between a subject’s 
own desires and social conventions cannot be easily presumed in Muslim majority 
societies since “socially prescribed forms of behaviour constitute the conditions for the 
emergence of the self as such and are integral to its realization.”859 Clearly, a study of 
veiling can’t be mapped from the western binary distinction between more and fewer 
choices, as the way in which we experience our daily life is far more complicated. 
If the freedom of the western individual is based on her ability to choose, then Muslim 
women, who choose to wear the veil as autonomous individuals, should be free to dress 
as they please. However, paradoxically, the same law that is founded on the concept of 
freedom and individual autonomy is also the one that limits women’s agency by 
normatively regulating their attire. As I have argued, the liberal concept of ‘autonomous 
individual’ comes out as an ‘imaginary’, because individual actions and desires come to 
be ‘universalized’, ‘naturalized’ and properly measured and regulated by the positive 
action of the law. In fact, European legal decisions over the practice of veiling reveal a 
specific concept of women’s freedom, that of the ‘liberated’ western woman, and show 
that the immanent and multi-layered pluralistic practice of veiling escapes western eyes. 
Thus, what the practice of veiling really unfolds is the blindness of our own practices, 
including dressing: “social constructivism [should remind] us once again of the 
inevitable situatedness of meaning in context, and the contractedness of desire, choice, 
and subjectivity.”860 In fact, the concept of ‘situatedness’ implies that all practices, 
including veiling, shall be understood within specific structures of power;861 in the case, 
the power of western discourse lay exactly in the homogenised representation of 
covering practices which allowed the continuation of an epistemic violence against 
Muslim women.862 By defining veiling as a ‘backward’ practice, not only do European 
judges violate women’s own understanding of their own practices, but they also reduce 
the ‘woman question’ to a single piece of cloth which takes different forms, lengths, 
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colours, and meanings in different cultural and historical contexts. In fact, in the legal 
decisions over the practice of veiling, Muslim women are a unified category whose 
oppression is simply a variation of a basic theme.863 However, “to assume that the mere 
practice of veiling women in a number of Muslim countries indicates the universal 
oppression of women through sexual segregation not only is analytically reductive, but 
also proves quite useless when it comes to the elaboration of oppositional political 
strategy”.864 
Failing to recognize that all humans are ‘multiple-layered’ and that the practice of 
veiling represents a plurality of norms, ethics and bodily practices reduces the subject to 
a singular and fixed identity. It is exactly for this reason that the veil is seen as a ‘clash of 
civilizations’: if we reduce the human to a singular and fixed identity, then this identity 
can be measurable only through allegiances to a specific power which, in turn, forms 
identities, subjectivities and desires. It is in this way that the plural subjectivities and 
identities of Muslim women have been reduced to a static and monolithic law’s subject. 
This ‘reductionism’ is not only theoretical, but is part of a wider neo-colonial and 
paternalistic political context in which the juridical regulation of women’s body becomes 
a useful tool to control the public sphere.865 But the Muslim women’s body has also 
been a useful tool to justify western imperialist warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well 
as Islamists’ struggles for the establishment of a territorial nation-state under a singular 
and fixed sharia law: “arguably, in neither case do women take part in constructing the 
framework within which decisions about dress take place, but rather, are forced to 
respond in conflicting directions to frameworks constructed by men.”866 The mandatory 
de-veiling operated by the Shah in pre-revolutionary Iran, for instance, was no less 
oppressive than the compulsory re-veiling ordered by the Islamic revolutionaries in the 
aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution:867 both (patriarchal) regimes aim at legally 
regulating and controlling women’s attire by inscribing women’s bodies as monolithic 
symbols of cultural belonging and not as subjects of history. In this sense, “the effort to 
unveil forcefully Muslim women who have chosen Islamic attire would be akin to the 
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intolerance of those who attempt to mask them by imposing the veil.”868 Therefore, it is 
not the veil that renders women free or unfree, but the means that patriarchy allocates 
to a specific article of clothing in order to control and limit women’s agency. By un-
veiling Muslim women, the law re-veiled them with the veil, the mask, of the unified 
western citizen and, by so doing, defined not only its subject, but also, more 
importantly, the image that the subject has of itself: only in this way the power of the 
law enables the Christian/secular/liberal subject to become part of a ‘universal 
humanity’. 
Moreover, are we really sure that, by freeing their heads from a piece of cloth, we can 
free Muslim women? Can we say that, once freed and included within the pale of 
positive/universalist/western ‘humane’ law, those women will want to be like the 
‘liberated’ western women? Or maybe they will want something else?869 
As Hirschmann argues, “it is less whether western freedom is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ than who 
determines what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ about the West and East.”870 In this sense, “the 
connections between ‘East’ and ‘West’ are profound, not only in the similarity of how 
their discourses work to express and materialize gendered power, but in how different 
cultural contexts reveal things about others that are not visible from within.”871 Since 
veiling challenges “western assumptions about what women should choose, it illustrates 
how power operates in all contexts.”872 It shows how power operates in Muslim 
majority societies but also in a western context in which the ‘colonization’ of our desires 
and will occlude the possibility to think about other lives and other ways of 
understanding agency, freedom, autonomy and subject formation. These studies 
highlight that “discourse, language, and systems of knowledge, [provide] us with the 
sense of who we are, and hence with our powers and freedoms as much as our 
limitations and restrictions.”873 Maybe we should recognize that the western/liberal 
world is not necessarily the best one or the only one, and that the liberal-secular system 
is not the only solution to multicultural/multi-ethnic societies, as different people might 
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simply want different things.874 Paradoxically, it is exactly this category of women, the 
ones who choose something incomprehensible in the eyes of the ‘western liberated 
woman’, who challenge the western universalistic category of understanding of 
freedom and agency. After all, can we really say that veiling is more or less oppressive 
than the Wonder Bra or the miniskirt? 
Remarkably, while historically many articles of clothing have simply disappeared from 
the fashion landscape, the veil has persisted over the years and is still an obsession for 
many: “It may be that since the west triggered the symbolic importance of the veil 
through its imperialism, it retains a certain dominance over the terms of the 
discourse.”875 Thus, it is not through the concept of freedom and autonomy that we can 
understand the gender dimension of the ‘hijab obsession’ but through the analysis of its 
symbology. 
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4.2 The Symbology of ‘otherness’ 
In an interview published in an online newspaper in 2015, a journalist asked Talal Asad 
why, in a previous article, he had written that ‘Muslims as Muslims cannot be 
represented in Europe’.876 Behind the irony lies a truth. As the relationship with the 
Muslim world is often understood in terms of a ‘clash of civilizations’, Muslim women’s 
body and their plurality of performative acts become a static and monolithic symbol of a 
chauvinist society disclosing, in this way, a problem of representation of the Muslim 
world’s wide plurality. 
This is clear when reading the ‘hijab cases’ in which the veil has been defined as a 
monolithic ‘religious symbol incompatible with democratic values’.877 As I have shown, 
European judges see in the veil the disclosure of something intrinsically anti-democratic 
and anti-feminist, vis-à-vis the ‘liberated’ Christian/secular/western woman. This 
interpretation allowed the emergence of a fundamental dichotomy between Christian 
and Islamic symbols in the public sphere: in fact, on the one hand, Christian (religious) 
symbols are interpreted in cultural terms as a secularized Christianity which carries 
democratic and pluralistic values, while on the other, Islamic symbols are interpreted as 
‘religious symbols’ or as the expression of a backward culture incompatible with 
western democracy.878 Thus, what emerges from the legal decisions over the practice of 
veiling is not the plurality of different normative choices expressed in the different uses 
of the veil and typical of the Muslim world, but the symbol of something static, 
monolithic, which has to be removed from the public sphere in order to ‘save’ 
democratic values. 
The definition of veiling as a ‘symbol’ of something intrinsically ‘other’ is an important 
feature in the analysis of the ‘hijab cases’. The power of symbols is well-known in critical 
legal theory; through symbols and images, it is possible to understand what cannot be 
said directly. As Lacan argues, an idol “gives pleasure to other gods”,879 as images 
remind us of ancestral myths still unattached to the symbols of institutional prose.880 
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Since symbols have the power to create an illusion of presence and attachment to what 
is ‘un-representable’, then images are the point of fracture which defines the 
boundaries between the inside and outside of the law, as the ‘veiled’ woman, through 
her clothes, represents the boundaries of citizenship. In fact, as clothes have been 
regarded as a ‘symbol’, a ‘visible image’ of a different ‘other’, they have always been 
normatively regulated by the law through a sovereign act: garments operate a visible 
differentiation, a boundary, a clear-cut dividing line, between citizens and foreigners 
and between the different classes of citizens.881 Thus, it is through symbols and 
metaphors that it is possible to conceptualize nationality, geography and gender, as it is 
through the visible that the public sphere comes to be shaped. But images, symbols and 
metaphors do not only ‘differentiate’ and shape the public space, they also allow people 
to give a meaning free from any context: they “invite one to do a reading of them 
independently of people’s stated intentions and commitments. Indeed, the reading 
becomes a way of retrospectively constituting ‘real desires’ [and] facilitates the attempt 
to synthesize the psychological and juridical concepts of the liberal subject.”882 As I have 
argued, the distinction between object and subject, signifier and signified, form and 
substance, is in reality an integral part of the Protestant semiotic ideology which is now 
embedded in the secular idea of what it means to be ‘modern’. Drawing from Keane,883 
who finds that Saussure’s system of language based on the distinction between signifier 
and signified mirrors Calvinist and Protestant concerns to institute a distinction between 
the transcendent world and the reality of this world, Mahmood points out that “to 
confuse one with the other is to commit a category mistake and fail to realize that signs 
and symbols are only arbitrarily linked to the abstractions that humans have come to 
revere and regard as sacred”.884 It is exactly the (western) implied duality between 
signifier and signified that is at stake in the regulation of veiling, in which ‘the veil’ has 
been defined as a fixed ‘religious symbol incompatible with secular values of gender 
equality’. As Asad argues, 
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“The process of signification is both rational and clear. It is assumed that a given sign 
signifies something that is clearly ‘religious’. What is set aside in this assumption, 
however, is the entire realm of ongoing discourses and practices that provide 
authoritative meanings. The precision and fixity accorded to the relationship of 
signification is always an arbitrary act and often a spurious one where embodied 
language is concerned. What is signified by the headscarf is not some historical reality 
(the evolving Islamic tradition) but another sign (the eternally fixed ‘Islamic religion’) 
which, despite its overflowing character, is used to give the ‘Islamic veil’ a stable 
meaning.”885 
In other words, if the power of symbols lies in their capacity to evoke a monolithic and 
static belonging, then the veil has the power to evoke the ‘Islamic veil’ so, “more than 
an image, the veil is an imaginary – a shrouded difference waiting to be unveiled, to be 
brought into the light of reason, and made indifferent.”886 In essence, in 
western/Christian/secular imaginary, the veil “can only symbolize the world of authority 
and tradition that already stands in a false relation to history and requisite progress: its 
proper meaning is decided by a prior verdict, namely, that this tradition (often glossed 
as literalist) must be destroyed in order for reason, culture, and the free spirit to grasp 
the true meaning of religion. Any attempt to resist such a judgement cannot but take in 
the terms of its own demise.”887 By contrast, although the veil as a cultural/religious 
symbol has been “constructed by and through various and conflicting discourses 
surrounding ideas of nation, culture, personhood, and power as well as gender,”888 what 
I have tried to show is that the veiled woman, intended as a ‘cultural/religious other’, 
should be distinguished from the ‘veiled’ woman as a subject of culture and history 
within historical heterogeneous non-liberal discourses.889 As Mahmood’s analysis points 
out, Muslim women who wear the veil as an act of piety do not want to communicate 
something, rather, for them, the veil is a tool to achieve a specific selfhood. 
In this sense, the construction of a stereotyped veiled woman as a signifier of a 
dangerous ‘other’ operated by western judges inevitably eludes the gender dimension 
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of the problem, so not only does the ‘veil’ emerge as a ‘fantasy’, but also the (Muslim) 
‘woman’ becomes an ‘imaginary objectified body’, a mere carrier of specific cultural 
values. This is not surprising, as gender plays an important role in the construction of a 
people’s identity. As Benhabib argues, it is exactly through women’s body that ideas of 
the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ come to be constructed:890 in fact, “in the struggle against the 
veil, sexual difference demarcates the line between the self and the other, between the 
western, gender-egalitarian self against the oriental and patriarchal other.”891 
As a matter of fact, the regulatory principle implied in the European legal decisions over 
the practice of veiling is not ‘gender neutral,’ as it discloses a very specific idea of 
‘womanhood’ and what constitutes the (female) body, where hair is visible. This is 
exemplified in a passage of the Stasi Commission report892 which states that “young 
men force [girls] to wear clothes that are concealing and asexual, and to lower their 
eyes on seeing a man; and if they do not conform with such rules, they are stigmatized 
as ‘whores’.”893 This passage implies that women, in order to be ‘free’ and ‘equal’ to 
men in liberal societies, should underline their sexuality: thus, “the ‘power of the 
secular’ seems […] to reside in its capacity to naturalize such a distinctive perspective on 
the female body, and to represent and grasp the non-veiled body as the natural and 
‘free’ body.”894 In this way, the ‘covered body’ emerges as un-natural or as a violation of 
women’s autonomy, whereas the ‘liberated’ and ‘sexualized’ western woman is seen as 
the natural condition for women’s freedom. As women’s body is ‘naturalized’, their 
‘desires’ also turn into something ‘neutral’ to be defined by the appropriate authority. 
In fact, by defining the veil as a ‘religious’ symbol, the court operated a detachment of 
the subject from its ‘object’: desire, in this context, becomes something neutral to be 
defined by the state, so the object of the desire (the veil) can be defined as ‘religious’ or 
‘irreligious’ and not any more through a socio-psychological approach.895 
Thus, what is at stake is the association between the wearing of particular attire and 
specific ‘desires’ as it is presumed that “the wearer’s act of displaying the sign […] 
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incorporates the actor’s will to display it – and therefore becomes part of what the 
headscarf meant.”896 In the case, the Muslim gendered identity becomes central in the 
meaning attributed to the headscarf to display ‘that’ particular identity, namely a fixed 
and static, backward Muslim tradition. In fact, the symbolic construction of the ‘Muslim 
woman’ is intrinsically linked to the one of the Muslim man, who is seen as a terrorist, 
soaked in a backward chauvinist culture that oppresses women: in this context, Muslim 
women emerge as the symbol of a (stereotyped) ‘monolithic Islamic culture’, a static 
subjectivity disloyal to liberal democracies that want to ‘rescue’ them. It is through the 
definition of veiling as a ‘symbol’, a ‘sign of’, that the ‘covered body’ becomes 
something static, a symbol of a specific cultural belonging, an ‘object’. However, as I 
have pointed out, if a “sign designates not a real status but an imaginary one, [so the 
veil is] an imaginary transgression.”897 The result of this operation is that Dahlab, Sahin 
and Shabina, as well as many other Muslim women in Europe, have been removed from 
the public sphere or un-unveiled, to be re-veiled with the mask of the ‘western liberated 
woman’: so it seems that in ‘liberal’ and democratic Europe, women all look alike. 
Interestingly, in 2008, a Moroccan woman, mother of three children and married to a 
French citizen, was denied French citizenship because, based on the Conseil D’Etat 
reasoning, her full-face-veil did not fulfil the ‘condition of assimilation’, which is 
considered an essential requirement to gain French citizenship.898 The fact that the 
‘secular values’ of her (Muslim) husband were not taken into consideration indicates 
that only women should conform to the principle of secularism and gender equality.899 
In this regard, the situation of Muslim women seems not much different from that of 
‘liberated’ western women: in both cases women are not considered members of a 
community, but emblems, symbols, of specific discourses. The debate over the hijab and 
the definition of the appropriate garments women can wear in the public sphere, 
highlights that in western/liberal/secular countries the ‘woman question’ has been a 
useful tool to create a dichotomy between two dis-similar imaginaries of womanhood; 
the ‘constructed’ western ‘liberated’ woman, and the ‘imaginary’ Islam-ist one. 
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However, as I have argued, the simple wearing of a specific garment cannot be linked to 
women’s oppression and Islam cannot be seen as incompatible with democracy, as it is 
a religion open to interpretation and not a political movement that threatens western 
democracy. Moreover, the limitation of women’s rights in the name of women’s rights is 
a paradox: as I have shown in the first Chapter, not only is the veil not always worn as a 
religious symbol, but the practice and the meaning attributed to the practice changes in 
different historical and cultural contexts. Thus, reducing the ‘veil’ to a religious/cultural 
symbol not only simplifies the complexity of subject formation, but it also betrays the 
rich history and wide meanings of the practice: “when this conjunction is used to frame 
contemporary issues of constitutional and legal order, it presents the veil and its 
regulation as a problem in need of a solution rather than asking how this symbol comes 
to be regarded as a problem.”900 The question that arises from this reading is who 
decides if the meaning of a certain symbol, such as the veil, is ‘religious’ or not? And 
why are states so concerned in regulating (Muslim) women’s attire? 
As Asad points out, the banning of the veil can be understood as an exercise of 
sovereign power, as it is the sovereign that decides which symbol is to be regarded as 
‘religious’ and, consequently, it acquires the power to shape the public sphere.901 Since 
the definition of ‘religious symbols’ becomes a juridical matter, the sovereign gains the 
teleological and transcendental power to impose those definitions on its subjects. The 
necessity for a sovereign power to decide upon exceptions is made clear in the Stasi 
Commission’s report, which points out that the donning of the veil overloads teachers 
and public officers who “are often left isolated, in a difficult environment” to define 
which ‘religious symbol’ can be legitimate in a public school.902 Thus, if it is the sovereign 
power that decides exceptions and defines symbols, then “all modern concepts of the 
state are secularized theological concepts”903 as the state assumes the teleological duty 
of defining images and metaphors in the public sphere. As Hobbes argues, “we are not 
everyone to make our own private reason or conscience, but the public reason, that is 
the reason of God’s supreme lieutenant, judge; and indeed we have made him judge 
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already, if we have given him a sovereign power to do all that is necessary for our peace 
and defence.”904 In this sense, if the sovereign has the absolute power to decide on 
everything, it also has the authority to decide on religious symbols in the public sphere: 
therefore, the ‘exercise of sovereignty’ becomes a necessary act to maintain ‘peace and 
order’ whereas “public order refers not merely to security or the absence of material 
disorder, but also to all the conditions of life in a well ordered society.”905 Therefore, if, 
on the one hand, the state seems to withdraw from religious matters, then on the 
other, it intervenes in educating/forming Christian/secular/liberal legal subjects through 
the control and fashion of symbols in the public sphere: 
“[the] secular state today abides in a sense by the cuius region aius religio principle (the 
religion of the ruler is the religion of his subjects), even though it disclaims any religious 
allegiance and governs a largely irreligious society […] [in fact] it is not the commitment 
to or interdiction of a particular religion that is most significant in this principle but the 
installation of a single absolute power – the sovereign state – drawn from a single 
abstract source and facing a single political task: the worldly care of its population 
regardless of its beliefs. The state is now transcendent as well as a representative 
agent.”906 
In other words, the state, the Leviathan, which embodies an absolute transcendental 
and abstract power, is also the one that defines symbols and their place in the public 
sphere. As religion directs people to other loyalties and other ‘worldly-powers’, the 
state has to define its place in the worldly care of its population in order to assure the 
loyalty of the Christian/secular law’s subject to a transcendental absolute power 
embodied in the sovereign. Thus, what is at stake is the legitimate authority that 
decides over the definition of symbols and gives a specific shape to the public sphere. In 
this sense, the separation between spiritual and temporal power is blurred as it is the 
state that regulates not only the public but also the private lives of its subjects.907 As 
Mahmood puts it, “the ongoing regulation of religious life through juridical and 
legislative means suggests a far more porous relationship than the doctrine of 
secularism suggests […] [it] shows how a self-avowed secular state has come to define 
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what religious and nonreligious attire is in the public domain (something normatively 
considered a matter of personal choice within liberalism).”908 This is clear in the analysis 
of the ‘hijab cases’ whereas, on the one hand, liberal polity tries to operate a separation 
between private and public, spiritual and temporal, while on the other, the state takes 
the responsibility of creating ‘Christian/secular’ citizens by regulating their private life, 
ethics, and sentiments. Thus, the question is not how to accommodate Islam within 
Christian/liberal/secular polity but how liberal polity defines the public space and its 
limitations through the juridical regulation of women’s body.909 
By defining what the appropriate attire is for Muslim women, not only did the sovereign 
state remove Sahin, Dahlab and Shabina, like many other Muslim women in Europe, 
from the public sphere, but it also brought private sentiments into the public scrutiny of 
the secular polity and, by so doing, it operated a re-configuration of religious practices 
in the public sphere. Therefore, citizenship emerges not as a natural right, but as 
something constructed by an act of sovereignty through the force of the rules of law, 
whereas the Christian/secular/liberal citizen becomes “a particular kind of contradictory 
individual – one who is morally sovereign and yet obedient to the laws of the secular 
republic, flexible and tolerant yet fiercely principled”;910 a ‘citizen’ able to take part in 
the ‘game of the signs’ and show his/her loyalty to an absolute sovereign power. In fact, 
it is through the inclusion of the individual within the pale of the law that liberalism 
defines its subjects and forms a specific Christian/secular citizen loyal to a centralized 
transcendental sovereign power. Through an exercise of sovereignty, the absolute 
power defines subjectivities by shaping the public space while defining the public limits 
of religious sentiments: paradoxically, the sovereign state “realizes its universal 
character through a particular (female Muslim) identity, that is, a particular 
psychological internality.”911 
But why does the sovereign state need an exercise of sovereignty to limit Muslim 
women’s attire? Why was this act ‘necessary’ to ‘save’ democratic values? Is it simply to 
‘rescue’ the ‘poor Muslim women’ from their ‘terrible’ men? 
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Based on Schmitt’s analysis, what is important in a democracy is the unity of a people, 
which is based on some sort of ‘substantial homogeneity’ and is symbolized in the figure 
of the sovereign.912 He points out that it is through the concept of ‘substantial 
homogeneity’ that it is possible to create a particular identity able to clearly distinguish 
itself from other (foreign) identities: in essence, “democracy in the Schmittian sense 
ultimately means the unconstrained political expression of a particular people’s 
collective identity.”913 By linking the ‘individualistic-humanitarian’ feature of liberalism 
to democracy, understood in terms of homogeneity of a people, Schmitt argues that 
“the state rests, as a political unity, on the combination of two opposed transformative 
principles – the principle of identity (namely the presence of a people conscious of itself 
as a political unity) […] – and the principle of representation, the power of which is 
constituted as a political Unity.”914 
For Schmitt, the homogeneity and unity of a people is based on a false illusion, a 
‘fabrication’, a ‘false consciousness’ constructed in order to maintain a homogeneous 
‘imagined’ unity; in fact, communities “are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”915 Thus, the unity and 
homogeneity of a community is established through a certain form of ‘affective 
identity’: “in nationality there is an aspect of sentiment; it is at once soul and body.”916 
For Renan, in a unified nation, people are bounded by shared memories as well as a 
present will to live together: on the one hand, the will to live together and the defence 
of this ‘togetherness’ enables the principle of ‘unity’ to become the normative principle 
of legitimacy expressed in the ‘right of belonging’, while on the other, ‘shared memory’ 
provides for the need of affective source of national consent by binding people together 
in a unified fashion.917 In essence, in order to have a unified community, it is necessary 
to create an ‘affective identity’ which is translated into the ‘affective’ attachment to a 
unity represented by the sovereign. Goodrich’s work reveals how this ‘affective 
                                                             
912 Historically, philosophers have given different connotations to the term ‘democracy’. I have, 
however, chosen to adopt Mancini’s reading of the ‘hijab cases’. She argues that European legal 
decisions over the practice of veiling defend a specific kind of democracy, as the one described 
by Carl Schmitt. Susanna Mancini 'The Tempting of Europe' (n 21).  
913 Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Systematic Reconstruction and 
Countercriticism’ (1997) 10 The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 65, 69. 
914 Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Berlin, 1920) 214, in Kelly (n 903).  
915 Anderson (n 9) 6. 
916 Henriette Psichari (ed) ‘Qu’est-Ce Qu’une Nation?’, Oeuvres Completes de Ernest Renan (Vol 1, 
Calmann-Levy, 1947) 920. 
917 ibid, 903–4. 
219 
 
attachment’ is formed through the control and juridical regulation of symbols and 
metaphors in the public sphere. As a matter of fact, historically, the appropriation of 
images and icons was compounded with the implementation of rules related to 
clothes.918 As I have argued, clothes, in the past and present, represent cultural 
boundaries, accepted or rejected images of an (imaginary) community. It is through the 
regulation of images and symbols that the institution creates an emotional attachment 
to an absolute political power which speaks ‘for us’ because it ‘represents us’. In this 
sense, the appropriation of images works to create a fixed, gendered and stable identity 
of the legal subject within specific geographical borders, as the analysis of the ‘hijab 
cases’ reveals.919 In fact, it is exactly in the name of a European (imagined) 
homogeneous identity that the ‘veiled woman’ becomes a threat to democratic values. 
Unity and identity, which coincide in Schmitt’s analysis, become essential pillars to the 
political: unity is formed by an (imagined) common identity, while identity is shaped 
through the appropriation and legal regulation of what is visible in the public sphere. It 
is exactly in this way that the ‘veiled woman’ becomes the symbol of a fixed (Muslim) 
world, which looks similar to the dictatorship of the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
Based on Schmitt’s analysis, in order to create a unified homogeneity, politics needs to 
create a contrast, a differentiation, between homogeneity and plurality.920 For Schmitt, 
pluralism is the enemy of democracy as it threatens the sovereignty of the state and, at 
the same time, the existence of a (valuable) concept of politics. In his view, pluralism is 
not synonymous with political freedom, rather it “is the total domination of civil society 
and thus the elimination of politics in the name of morality, legality and the 
economy.”921 In fact, in pluralist theories “the state simply transforms itself into an 
association which competes with other associations; it becomes a society among some 
other societies which exist within or outside the state.”922 In essence, the autonomy of 
the social system would not guarantee the unity of the system itself. Plural theories 
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threaten not only the unity and homogeneity of a people, but also the legitimacy and 
the sovereignty of the state, as the problem of conflicting loyalties arises. In order to 
maintain a homogeneous character, the sovereign needs consent, it needs citizens loyal 
to an absolute and transcendental power which acts as the only power able to defend 
the ‘being’ of a people against ‘intrusions’; only the state, and not particular groups, 
Schmitt insists, can protect and defend us. 
The battle between ‘homogeneity’ and ‘plurality’ is particularly clear in the Sahin case923 
in which the court repeatedly emphasized the impossibility of reconciling Turkey’s 
secular-liberal and democratic values with extremist (Islamic) religious movements by 
referring to the Refah Party that, based on the court reasoning, attempts to introduce 
sharia law which ‘would oblige individuals to obey static rules of law imposed by 
religious concerns’. However, the court confused Refah neo-Ottomanism, which calls for 
a plurality of legal systems based on personal status, with Islamist fundamentalists who 
call for the establishment of an Islamic empire where jurisdiction is territorial. Indeed, 
with regard to the distinction between personal/communitarian Islamic law and 
territorial/individualistic western law, it is clear that the ECHR’s decision to dismantle 
Refah was partly based on the ground that the party was planning to set up a plurality of 
legal systems. In the case, the court’s ignorance of the plurality of Islamic traditions 
regarding the veil was compounded by its rejection of a plurality of legal systems within 
the same territory qua political unit. It is clear, therefore, that in seeking to forcibly 
expose Turkish womens’ bodies to their natural rights the ECHR was also seeking to 
subjugate them under the logic of singular state sovereignty. This shows that what really 
threatens western societies is not a veiled woman, but the pluralism she represents. 
Islam is not only a pluralistic religion, as it is open to interpretation and is praxiologically 
lived and experienced differently in different cultural and historical contexts, but also 
the practice of veiling itself takes different shapes, colours and meanings which mirror 
different normative choices. 
If homogeneity and unity, and not plurality, are the bases of democracy, then how does 
politics make ‘difference’ possible? How can the ‘right of belonging’ be imaginatively 
constructed through the image, the ‘symbol’, of the ‘other’? 
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Based on Schmitt’s analysis, political communities are bounded by a fundamental 
distinction between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’: “‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, 
ultimately, have no content in themselves, they are oppositional positions capable of 
unifying the members of a group.”924 Thus a strong homogeneous and united 
community needs the identification and elimination or eradication of the ‘other’, the 
‘enemy’: hence, the very idea of democracy is based on the concept of exclusion, of 
‘containing’/eliminating/hiding the differences and pluralities that ultimately threaten 
the monolithic character of liberal democracies by threatening their (imagined) 
homogeneity and unity.925 As a matter of fact, the people of a nation are bound by 
symbolic boundaries represented by the presence (as a negation) of the ‘other’ in the 
public sphere which challenges the national homogeneous identity of a people. Only in 
this way, territorial and personal boundaries are secured by an exercise of sovereignty 
in defence of democracy. Echoing Hobbes’s Homo Homini lupus, Schmitt argues that 
(imagined) ‘enemies’ threaten our being both from outside and inside: for this reason, 
“a sheltered and protected life requires not only the apathy, indifference, and self-
indulgence of wealth and power, but also, and more crucially, the work of the state that 
maintains the physical distance, separation, and destruction of the enemy.”926 In this 
context, the identification and elimination of the ‘enemy’ by the state is extremely 
important in order to preserve the unity of a people.927 
Nowadays, Islam has become the ‘other’ and the hijab the symbol of ‘otherness’. In fact, 
since the 1970s, sociologists have noticed that racist discourses based on 
biological/ethnic claims have been replaced by different, and more subtle, forms of 
discrimination based on cultural belonging.928 As Balibar argues, it is not any more the 
category of race, but that of ‘immigrant’, understood as “the result of their belonging to 
historical cultures,”929 which enables racist discourses: this, in turn, “entails a 
superimposition of different dimensions of ‘otherness’ that exacerbates issues of 
boundaries, accommodation and incorporation. The immigrant, the religious, the racial, 
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and the socio-economic dispriviledged ‘other’ all tend to coincide. Moreover, all those 
dimensions of ‘otherness’ now become superimposed upon Islam, so that Islam become 
utterly ‘other’.”930 If Islam is the ‘other’, the veiled woman who supposedly represents 
backward Islamic values incompatible with western democratic principles is the symbol 
of this ‘otherness’: in this way, Muslim (veiled) women have been forcibly included in a 
symbolic and imaginary dichotomy between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ 
which underlies every democracy. 
This dichotomy is clear in the analysis of the ‘hijab cases’. In the Begum case,931 for 
instance, a young British student in the UK was forbidden to attend her school because 
she had started to wear a jilbab and not a shalwar kameeze, considered the most 
appropriate uniform for Muslim women by three local imams. As Mancini argues, this is 
indicative of western binary perceptions of Muslims as the court implied the existence 
of two kinds of Muslims: the one ‘accommodated’ in liberal/democratic societies, and 
Islamic fundamentalists from which western democracy has to be defended:932 “the 
court seems to appreciate this trivialized version of Islam, where everybody looks alike, 
there is no room for diversity, nor is there for minorities within minorities: a watered-
down version, an Islam that doesn’t look too Islamic.”933 My anthropological study 
reveals, however, that there are many kinds of Muslims and three local imams cannot 
decide which is the best attire for Muslim women. The dichotomy between a ‘tolerant’ 
West and in ‘intolerant’ East is mirrored also in a passage of the French resolution over 
the practice of veiling, which stresses the “power and the duty we have to oppose 
ideologies and ways of thinking [symbolized by the full-face veils] that one can only 
qualify as ‘barbarian’, in the sense that they deny the idea of progress, of civilization, of 
democracy, of sex-based equality […] it’s our value system which is at issue […] this is 
our Republic being tested in this way.”934 In Germany, five German Landers, while 
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allowing the display of Christian symbols, adopted a law that banned Islamic symbols in 
public schools.935 As the Bavarian Ministry declared, Christian symbols, included ‘nuns’ 
habits’, are permitted as they are not ‘political symbols’ while Islamic dressing can be 
the symbol of an ideology opposed to gender equality.936 
“With the representation of the cross as the icon of the suffering and Lordship of Jesus 
Christ […] the plaintiffs who reject such a representation are confronted with a religious 
worldview in which the formative power of Christian beliefs is affirmed. However, they 
are not thereby brought into a constitutionally unacceptable religious-philosophical 
conflict. Representations of the cross confronted in this fashion […] are […] not the 
expression of a conviction of a belief bound to a specific confession. They are an 
essential object of the general Christian-occidental tradition and common property of 
the Christian-occidental cultural circle.”937 
It is exactly the interpretation of the crucifix as a ‘cultural symbol’ and Islamic (female) 
dress as a ‘religious symbol’ that allows the creation of an (imagined) enemy and the 
need to defend a homogeneous national identity. Similar reasoning was applied by the 
court in the Lutsi case938 in which Italian judges argued that “the crucifix […] may be 
legitimately displayed in the public schools because it does not clash with the principle 
of secularism, but, on the contrary, it actually affirms it.”939 In this way, the court not 
only implied that secularism had been achieved thanks to Christian values, but also that, 
as secularism is rooted in Christianity, the crucifix had to be displayed in public schools. 
Those legal decisions illustrate how the concept of ‘radical otherness’ (what Kristeva 
calls ‘the abject’)940 is established through the boundary expressed by the law: as Butler 
argues, “the ‘abject’ designates that which has been expelled from the body, discharged 
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as excrement, literally rendered ‘other’.”941 Once it has established the division between 
‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, the ‘abject’, the ‘stranger’, must be excluded from civil liberty and 
civil rights as their plurality of cultures do not belong to liberal democracies. In order to 
maintain democracy, the boundary between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ becomes crucial and 
the identification and expulsion of the ‘other’ from the public sphere necessary.942 As 
Fadil puts it in relation to the banning of the full-face veil in Belgium, “the exclusion of 
face-veiled women as ‘abject other’ enables a minimal sense of ‘we-ness’ in the 
fractured Belgium but also in other western-European countries where citizenship is 
increasingly cast in cultural terms.”943 It is exactly through these boundaries, expressed 
symbolically by the veil, that the (fixed) identity of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ emerges: the 
necessary exercise of sovereignty operated by the authority to bind Muslim women to a 
fixed subjectivity can be seen as an effort to maintain differences and, thus, a 
homogeneous and unified democracy. In fact, European legal decisions on the limitation 
of civil liberty and religious freedom show how ‘defence mechanisms’ tend, on the one 
hand, to belittle the image of the ‘other’, as ‘veiled women’ are seen as victims or 
brainwashed, while on the other, to assert a right of violence and aggressivity in limiting 
the personal sphere of the legal subject. Thus, the concept of ‘radical otherness’ is 
essential to maintain the homogeneity of a people and, consequently, the exclusion of 
the ‘other’ is necessary to ‘save’ western democracies. 
As the inscription of women’s bodies into the homogeneity of western democracy has 
been set by the law, Muslim women have been unveiled to be re-veiled with the mask 
of the unified Christian/secular law’s subject: in this sense, “(late) liberalism has become 
a form of life that decides the very way in which we imagine humanity.”944 In the case, 
law allows a double movement; on the one hand, it excludes the ‘other’ by ‘de-
humanising’ them, while on the other, it ‘re-inscribes’ the ‘other’ into a liberal trajectory 
by ‘re- humanising’ them.945 The result of this ‘law’s double movement’ is that “religious 
freedom as a public, mainly collective, institution has been transformed into fragments 
of a diffuse ‘right to identity’ that blurs the line between the public and private domains. 
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The public dimension of ‘civil rights’ shrinks and re-emerges as a diffuse ‘right to 
recognition’ of the freely chosen identity by public authorities and, finally, by every 
individual.”946 Hence, on the one hand, by determining forms and languages in advance, 
the rules of law form a specific Christian/liberal/secular citizen and its being, its desires, 
while on the other, it takes significant steps in limiting the personal freedom of Muslim 
women by representing the constructed desires of a majority of European people in 
search of an abstract, unified, and universal identity. The necessity to regulate women’s 
body in order to create a fixed and abstract legal subject is related to the need to 
control the public sphere. If metaphors produce the necessary emotional attachment to 
legal obedience and political love, then the visible has to mirror a specific order of 
power and imagination and the legal subject should mirror a legitimate order of 
thought.947 As democracy is based on the unity of an (imagined) community, then 
symbols and metaphors, which form and strengthen the unity and identity of a people, 
have to be regulated in order to save the homogeneity and unity of European 
democracy. 
In fact, as Schmitt argues, to defend democracy, the rules of law are not enough as they 
are impotent in protecting the homogeneity of the nation, so an act of sovereignty 
becomes necessary.948 For Schmitt, the sovereign intervenes normatively exactly where 
the (procedural) law fails; “if sovereignty as the ‘highest legal power’ sees itself as the 
need to exercise reflective judgement, then sovereignty as ‘actual power’ is concerned 
with survival and must be defined as the paradoxical self-preservation of the law by 
extra-legal means, or rather, by the legal suspension of the law.”949 This is clear when 
analysing the ‘inconsistencies’ found in the analysis of the ‘hijab cases’ as it is not 
objectively clear whether the veil is a threat to democratic values or a symbol of 
women’s oppression. Those instances become clear if we interpret it as an act of 
sovereign power embodied in a ruler: this exercise of sovereignty represents a 
necessary act to preserve the political unity and identity of a people. Performed by a 
prince and supreme legislator, the sovereign act creates a (necessary) exception, a 
‘disturbance’ symbolized in the veil, which must be rendered invisible by ‘exceptional’ 
rules of law. In fact, in the discourse over the veil, Christian (religious) symbols are 
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interpreted in cultural terms as a secularized Christianity which carries democratic and 
pluralistic values, while Islamic symbols are interpreted as ‘religious symbols’ or as the 
expression of a backward culture incompatible with western democracy. In this way, the 
unity and homogeneity of a people “are easily attained when the basic difficulty is 
emphatically ignored and when, for formal reasons, everything that contradicts the 
system is excluded as impure.”950 Since democracy depends “upon the ‘identity’ of 
rulers and ruled”,951 it is exactly pluralism, which responds to a different logic and 
loyalties, that threatens the unity of a people and the sovereign, who represents an 
abstract and imagined homogeneity. For this reason, the sovereign power must react 
and actively pursue artificial unity and homogeneity in order to maintain unanimity and 
unity. Thus, what the European legal decisions mirror are the desires and the 
projections of a large part of the European population which identifies an imaginary 
Muslim ‘enemy’ and excludes it, legally, politically, and ‘visibly’, in order to preserve 
itself.952 
Those decisions reveal that symbols are constructed in order to create homogeneity in 
contraposition with an imaginary ‘enemy’, which is, at least, the ‘plurality of the other’: 
“both the imposition to learn ‘under the cross’ and that to learn bareheaded indicate 
the existence of a homogeneous collective identity and of outsiders, who have the 
choice between accepting to share, even symbolically, the values of the majority, or to 
be excluded from the public sphere.”953 Thus, more than a crusade against a 
visible/invisible evil, the juridical decisions over the veil reveal the fragility, vulnerability 
and paradoxes of implicit assumptions of a liberal universalist thought in search of a 
universal and abstract identity. However, “to rely on a powerful and yet empty 
representation of Europe, opens the door to marginalization and the exclusion of those 
who threaten the unity of the representation, to the homologation of conducts, and to 
the tyranny of majorities.”954 
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Conclusion 
Debates on the sartorial practices of Muslim women seem almost inevitably to be 
reduced to a footnote of the ‘clash of civilization’ thesis. Thus, the veil become a symbol 
of ‘chauvinist’ (Islamic) religion, in which the individual is (supposedly) submitted to 
‘fixed’ and ‘un-liberal’ rules of conduct. In turn, unveiling symbolises a 
Christian/secular/liberal west, in which the individual is (apparently) free from 
submission and thus able to (freely) choose. As I pointed out, this view was crucial to 
the colonial project. The banning of the veil under colonial rule reinforced the idea of 
the backwardness of other culture in Muslim-majority societies and equated unveiling 
with emancipation.955 The rhetorical dichotomy – backward Islam/progressive west- is 
nowadays represented by and fabricated over the symbol of the veil, once again, in view 
of the number of Muslims living in the west. In fact, western European countries that 
banned the veil “see the unveiling as equivalent to liberating women, just as the 
rhetoric of colonialism focused on women’s oppression in colonized societies, attaining 
moral justification for eradicating the culture of colonized people.”956 Recent debates 
concerning the veil show that in western public discourse, the veil is often seen as 
discharging a singular transparent function: it ‘hides’ from the public sphere not only 
the female body, but also makes transparent the symbolism of backward/’anti-
modern’/anti-secular values. 
In my analysis, by contrast, the veil does not conceal: it reveals. It reveals first that the 
veil has been seen through the lens of western semiotics as a fixed symbol of a 
profound ‘clash of civilizations’, of women’s oppression, and of intolerant/undemocratic 
values. As I discussed in Chapter three, in the Sahin case the veil has been understood as 
a symbol of ‘radical Islam’; in the Dahlab case the headscarf has been seen as a 
proselytising symbol in conflict with the principle of gender equality, while in the Begum 
case the jilbab has been considered a symbol of Islamic fundamentalism, able to 
threaten the ‘peace’ of the school. I have tried, in this regard, to understand how and 
why a specific fixed and monolithic symbology has been attached to the veil: through a 
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study of signs, symbols and semiotics in the secular space, I have attempted to unwrap 
the way in which the (supposed) tension between the ‘secular’ and the ‘religious’ is 
understood as an absolute polarization. This dichotomy, as I have argued, is not neutral, 
for it discloses a very occidental Christian/secular understanding of ‘religion’ and the 
religious subject. In fact, in liberal/secular thought, ‘religion’ is understood as mere 
belief, an idea, a matter of personal choice, while the secular subject is conceived as an 
autonomous, abstract, individual: one who is able to separate its internal from its 
external being. In my analysis, it is exactly this specific Christian/secular understanding 
of religion and the religious subject that allows the regulation of private (religious) 
sentiments in the public sphere. In this view, the regulation of Muslim women’s 
performative practices, applied through the distinction between faith and its 
manifestation made by article 9.2, indicates that secularism does not emerge as the 
mere separation between religion and politics, private and public, but as the re-
configuration of religious sensitivities and religious practices in the public space. Thus, 
to think about the ‘religious’ is also to ‘re-think’ the ‘secular’: “through a certain double 
movement secularism and Christianity have become productively fused, in a way that 
repeats the story of European exceptionality while inscribing the essential otherness of 
the Muslim populations within its borders.”957 By rhetorically constructing the veil as a 
fixed symbol of something intrinsically ‘other’, both liberals and, ironically, Islamists try 
to create a fixed and static law’s subject who is bound to a monolithic positivized and 
universal-ist law through the control and the juridical regulation of images and symbols 
in the public sphere. This, in turn, not only reproduces colonial discourses over women’s 
body, but it also imposes a rhetorical truth which shapes a well-defined national 
identity:958 be it secular or Islamist. I sum, I argued that the regulation of images and 
symbols in the public sphere emerges as a necessary act of sovereign power to create a 
specific fixed and bound legal and religious’ subject and to give to religious practices its 
proper place in order to create unity and homogeneity. However, by so doing, the 
secular/liberal and democratic law as well as the fixed/positivized Sharia law called for 
by Islamists nowadays, excludes different subjectivities and protects a very specific law’s 
subject through the force of a binding law. 
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In fact, my analysis discloses a symmetry between western positive and human rights 
law on the one hand, and the positivized Sharia law called for by Islamists on the other. 
Islamists, in contrast to classical Islamic law, aspire to bind the entire world to a 
universal singular and fixed Sharia law as interpreted by their ‘Caliph’, Western law 
aspires to redeem the whole of humanity through the inclusion of the human within the 
pale of the law. Diamantides’ comparative study between sovereignty formation in the 
East as well as in the West is of particular interest, not only because it unmasks the so 
called ‘clash of civilizations’, represented and constructed over the women’s headscarf, 
but also because it places the matter of the veil within a specific form of sovereign 
power which presupposes a fixed abstract law’s subject bound to a monolithic, positive, 
and universal-ist law.959 His analysis reveals that while in the West legal and political 
power merged and were sanctified in the figure of an absolute sovereign, in the pre-
modern Muslim world, political and legal authority was always in need of negotiation. In 
fact, while the assimilation of Graeco-Roman concepts led western legal scholars to 
develop a Canon law, where first the Pope and then the Emperor had the absolute 
auctoritas interpretativa (the authority to interpret the law), in Islam this assimilation 
never succeeded in creating a Canonic form of Sunnah. In fact, despite the Abbasids’ 
effort to create a unique and monolithic Canon law, valid for all citizens, irrespective of 
cultural and religious differences, the opposition of the Ulama never allowed the 
creation of a singular body of Sharia law.960 It is exactly this ‘gap’ or, as Diamantides 
names it, a ‘deficient sovereignty’, that modern Islamists want to fill, eager as they are 
to contest western dominance. In this view, the obsession over the veil shared by both 
is not only related to the place of women’s body as carrier of societal values within 
nationalist thought, but to the anxiety produced by the encounter of two dis-similar 
universal-ist and imperialist legal and political systems conjoined in modernity: 
European ‘humane’/positive law and Islamist ‘fixed codified Sharia law’ which mirrors 
the West.961 The veil emerges as the visible metaphor of eastern and western anxiety 
produced by the imposition of one type of secularized monotheism over another. This 
anxiety is played out over Muslim women’s bodies, which become the symbol of an 
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‘imaginary’ dichotomy, of something intrinsically ‘other’, to be removed from the public 
sphere. 
This is particularly clear when reading the legal decisions over the practice of veiling 
which rely on a polarization between a tolerant and secular West and an intolerant and 
religious East: in the Sahin case, for instance, the rejection of the plurality of meanings 
of the veil is compounded by the rejection of the pluralist legal system called by Refah, 
as I have pointed out in Chapter three; in the Begum case, the jilbab worn by Shabina, 
seen as a symbol of radical Islam, is understood in contrast with the Shalwar Kameez, 
considered the symbol of a ‘tolerant’ Islam; while in the Dahlab case, the ‘illiberal 
values’ of her hijab are seen in contraposition with gender equality and women’s 
freedom. This dichotomy, as I have argued, encodes problematic assumptions about 
religion and religious practices in the public space as well as the role of the law in 
regulating religious practices/symbols. In fact, the distinction made by art. 9.2 between 
faith and its manifestation discloses a specific (Christian/secular) definition of religion 
and religious practices: Cavanaugh observes that “religion in modernity indicates a 
universal genus of which the various religions are species: each religion comes to be 
demarcated by a system of propositions; religion is identified with an essentially 
interior, private impulse; and religion comes to be seen as essentially distinct from 
secular pursuits such as politics, economics, and the like.”962 
McClure shows how the ‘modern’/universalist/liberal/secular definition of ‘religion’ is 
linked to statecraft and authority.963 Through an analysis of Locke’s work, grounded in a 
specific western epistemology which empowers the state, and a study of the concept of 
religion as developed from secular liberalism in the seventeenth century, she argues 
that the relegation of religion into a private domain allows the state to be the only 
rightful power to regulate the civil domain, and so to impose conformity or toleration 
towards different religious practices in the name of ‘public order and security’. In fact, 
Locke’s epistemology focuses on the distinction between ‘this-world’ (subject to civil 
regulations) and the ‘other’ (metaphysical) one: while religion concerns the individual’s 
salvation in the ‘other world’, ‘this-world’ is regulated by civil authority.964 In essence, 
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the seventeenth-century distinction between civil and religious domains, private and 
public, state and religion, has given to the state the legitimacy of regulating any visible 
practices in the civil domain in the name of the civil interests of ‘this-world’. For 
McClure, “the factual character of worldly effects […] constitutes a standpoint from 
which all permitted practices of worship are rendered equal, independent and politically 
indifferent, a distinctly civil perspective that deploys empiricism as a mechanism for 
effectively converting religious ‘difference’ into religious ‘diversity’.”965 In other words, 
the emphasis on ‘worldly effects’ operated by western philosophers “foreclose[s] the 
use of coercion in religious matters even in the hands of those legitimately entitled to 
wield it in the domain of civil interests […] it is precisely the civil criterion of worldly 
injury that operates to circumscribe the scope and limits of what might be advanced as 
an appropriate expression of religious belief and practice in the first place.”966 
In this view, the rule of toleration established by western secular tradition is based not 
on a principle of ‘personal conscience’, but on the notion of ‘worldly harm’, as evident in 
the analysis of the ‘hijab cases’ in which the headscarf has been forbidden through the 
exceptions made by art. 9.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which limits 
the personal right of freedom of religion in specific cases. The article states that 
‘freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others’. Although the judges have not presented any objective 
proof of the veil’s danger to European democratic societies, they have constructed 
veiling as an element capable of ‘disrupting societies’ while defining what is perceived 
as a ‘social harm’ in modern western societies. In all the analysed juridical decisions, 
veiling emerges as an ostentatious, un-necessary, and unacceptable manifestation of a 
religious belief and comes to be perceived as a ‘danger’ to the freedom of others or as 
an element capable of ‘disrupting’ the ‘peace’ of the society: in other words, the veil has 
been perceived as a ‘real’ ‘social harm’. As McClure argues, “in the context […] of 
contemporary expressions of ‘difference’, themselves articulated in terms of worldly 
harm, the neutrality of civil law and state policy, guaranteed epistemologically with 
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respect to religion, is extinguished in both logical and practical terms.”967 In this view, as 
I have argued, European legal decisions over the practice of veiling indicate that 
secularism is not a neutral position as, inevitably, any exercise of civil power would 
favour one definition of ‘religion’ over others through a specific normative 
understanding of what a ‘social harm’ is. In the case, European judges, who have 
(erroneously) intended secularism as a synonym of state neutrality, have banned the 
veil based on the ‘safety and security’ of western/liberal societies while applying a very 
‘modern’ Christian/secular definition of religion: this, in turn, depends upon a prior 
normative understanding of what religion is and how the secular law’s subject should 
experience its religious life. 
What it is missed, then, in the western debate over the women’s headscarf is the way in 
which liberalism understands and defines ‘religion’ and ‘religious practices’ in the 
modern world and how this understanding is encoded in the law. In my analysis, 
secularism emerges not as the mere separation between the private and the public, 
religion and the state, but as the re-configuration of religious sensitivities and religious 
practices in the secular public sphere.968 In other words, secularism becomes the 
imposition of a specific form of subjectivity and emerges not only as a “constellation of 
institutions, ideas, and affective orientations that constitute an important dimension of 
what we call modernity, [but also as a] concept that brings together certain behaviours, 
knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life”.969 
In fact, the law’s subject that emerges from European juridical decisions over the 
practice of veiling is a specific Christian/secular/liberal subject, an abstract autonomous 
individual who is able to separate its internal from its external being, as revealed in the 
distinction art. 9.2 makes between faith and its manifestation. For Hobbes, the nature of 
the political individual is split between its juridical, authoring/authorizing essence, and 
its ‘outward appearance’, its fictional representation: this notion “establishes an 
indissoluble relation between the creation of a fictional representation, to which is 
attributed a Leviathan’s power, and the juridical notions of the person in relation to 
authorship and authority.”970 In modern western law, the law’s subject emerges as a 
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mask, an ‘appearance’, and acquires its existence only through its inscription within the 
pale of a binding, fixed and monolithic positivized law. In fact, as Esmeir’s analysis points 
out, in positive and human rights law, the human comes out as a person in the law who 
enjoys specific juridical protection only when re-inscribed within the pale of a positive, 
‘humane’ and universal-ist law.971 As human rights and state law only protect a mask, an 
abstract secular individual, a ‘human-yet-to-become’ that needs the state law in order 
to be human, Muslim women have been un-veiled only to be re-veiled with the mask of 
an abstractly free law’s subject: a liberal/Christian/secular individual who is (in the 
abstract) the holder of rights and the bearer of duties, but at the same time is free and 
compelled, creator and created – a subject bound to the force of a positivized law which 
shapes its ‘internal desires’ and its external world through the control of symbols and 
images in the public sphere. 
Since the modern (juridical) subject enters into ‘universal human nature’ by wearing the 
mask of secular rights holder over any particularity, the exclusion of many veiled Muslim 
women from European public space becomes the emblem of the intrinsic paradox of 
liberalism and human rights discourse which claim to safeguard minority rights: in fact, 
if on the one hand secular/liberal thought claims a separation between the spiritual and 
the temporal, then on the other, the private life of the individual has become extremely 
regulated. This difficulty in establishing a clear cut-dividing line between the ‘secular’ 
and the ‘religious’ is not a contradiction, but the very condition for the exercise of 
secular power.972 As ‘secular’ power has the authority to regulate symbols and bodily 
performances in the public sphere for the ‘safety’ and ‘security’ of its citizens, it has also 
the power to operate a re-conceptualization of religious practices in the secular space 
through a specific semiotic reading of signs and symbols. 
In fact, although there is a wide body of literature about the many uses and meanings of 
the veil, all western legal decisions over the practice of veiling as far have given to the 
headscarf a fixed and monolithic symbology which is defined through a particular 
liberal/secular discursive tradition.  Following Saussure’s distinction between signifier 
and signified, form and substance,973 I have argued that the veil appears in law as 
carrying a single and fixed meaning, arbitrarily defined by law or social conventions. 
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Moreover, in Christian/secular semiotics “there must be something that exists beyond 
the observed practices, the heard utterances, the written words, and it is the function of 
religious theory to reach into, and to bring out, that background by giving them 
meaning”.974 In liberalism, this ‘something’ is the abstract universalist notion of juridical 
humanity. The veil is seen as the dispensable cover of this humanity. 
In this context, Mahmood’s analysis has been particularly helpful in order to understand 
the relation established between the body and specific practices in non-liberal contexts. 
She argues that religious practices are not only the mere performance of a (fixed) 
internal self, but an integral part of the individual.975 In fact, for Muslim believers, Islam 
is not simply a religion but a way to inhabit, live, and experience life: their love for the 
Prophet is mirrored in their wish to imitate his behaviour and way of life, “not as a 
commandment but as virtues where one wants to ingest, as it were, the Prophet’s 
personal into oneself”.976 Thus, Muslim performative practices lie “not so much upon a 
communicative or representational model as on an assimilative one”.977 The Aristotelian 
term schesis, which is defined as the way in which something relates to something else, 
can capture this sense of pluralistic embodiment and inhabitation (or intimacy) which is 
experienced differently by Muslim believers throughout the world: “such an 
inhabitation of the model (as the term schesis suggests) is the result of a labor of love in 
which one is bound to the authorial figure through a sense of intimacy and desire”.978 In 
this view, symbols (in the form of religious performances) do not carry a specific 
meaning, but are a set of relations established between the ‘object’ and the person who 
performs a particular utterance: an emotional form of relationality that binds a subject 
to an object.979 In this view, symbols are not only intrinsically linked to the individual’s 
social life (and, consequently, changing with it) but they are a constitutive part of the 
individual itself: as Asad argues, 
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“different kinds of practice and discourse are intrinsic to the field in which religious 
representations (like any representation) acquire their identity and their truthfulness. 
From this it does not follow that the meanings of religious practices and utterances are 
to be sought in social phenomenon, but only that their possibility and their authoritative 
status are to be explained as products of historically distinctive disciplines and 
forces.”980 
In sum, symbols and images are not to be read necessarily as mere representations of a 
fixed and monolithic meaning, but as a “cluster of meanings that might suggest a 
persona, an authoritative presence, or even a shared imagination. In this view, the 
power of an icon lies in its capacity to allow an individual (or a community) to find him –
or herself in a structure that has bearing on how one conducts oneself in this world.”981 
Indeed, for the women Mahmood worked with, religion is not a simple idea and so a 
matter of personal choice, as in western/secular liberalism, but a way to live and inhabit 
the world bodily and ethically: they use their body as a means to, not a sign of. Thus, the 
analogy between words/text and religious practices, as presupposed in secular semiotic 
ideology and encoded in western/Christian/secular law, overlooks the ‘form of life’982 in 
which certain bodily practices are performed.983 The liberal/secular tendency to 
overlook the political dimension of specific bodily practices “is in part a product of the 
normative liberal conception of politics, one separate from the domain of ethics and 
moral conduct, and is in part a reflection of how the field of ethics has been 
conceptualized in the modern period.”984 Religion, in this context, becomes an ‘abstract 
system of regulatory norms’, and is not constitutive of the subject. In this view, the 
(western/Christian/secular) semiotic reading applied by western judges to the practice 
of veiling (through the distinction between faith and its manifestation made by art. 9.2), 
encodes a very specific liberal/Christian/secular understanding of religion and the 
religious subject which emerges as an (abstract) individual who can choose to separate 
its personal beliefs from its external being: in other words, by “fail[ing] to attend to the 
affective and embodied practices through which a subject comes to relate to a 
particular sign – a relation founded not only on representation but also on…attachment 
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and cohabitation”985 European judges have ‘naturalized’ a specific notion of religion and 
the religious subject. 
Along with a fixed idea of religious practices and the religious subject, western legal 
decisions over the practice of veiling disclose a very fixed and monolithic concept of 
womanhood: in fact, the banning of the veil has been justified not only as a necessary 
act to defend secular values, but also as a crusade in the name of women’s rights where 
the veil has been read as a fixed symbol of gender inequality, of something that ‘hides’ 
women’s body (and being) from the public sphere. However, Mahmood’s investigation 
of the ‘piety movement’, which focuses on how to analyse bodily performances without 
reducing them to the western/liberal concept of freedom and agency, has shown that 
different contexts produce different subjectivities while disclosing different ways of 
subjectification and different understandings of bodily practice, women’s freedom and 
agency. 
The fact that European judges have intended the veil as a universal symbol of women’s 
oppression reveals that the universalism of the western liberal concept of freedom and 
agency has been the main domain through which to read women’s oppression and their 
possibility of agency: it is clear therefore that, by taking into consideration only the 
western notion of individual freedom, western/positive/universal(ist) law hides other 
forms of humanity and other concepts of freedom and agency.986 The imposition of a 
western idea of freedom not only has the power to exclude differences by creating an 
imaginary, monolithic, fixed, and homogeneous law’s subject, but it also imposes an 
epistemic violence upon Muslim women through the fetishization of ‘un-veiling’. In fact, 
the idea of freeing women by unveiling them in the name of ‘women’s rights’ has been 
“used ideologically to isolate and contain adversaries of great powers”:987 the 
representations of a subjugated Muslim woman needing to be ‘rescued’ by western law, 
“have fit particularly well into patriarchal social mythologies whose own devaluation of 
women has been cloaked in terms of a need to ‘protect’ women from the harshness of 
certain jobs or political responsibilities”.988 In the event, by overlooking the ever-
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changing historical, social and religious meanings symbolized by the veil, 
western/liberal/secular law has only given to Muslim women the ‘free’ choice to be 
assimilated into western societies or to disappear from the public sphere. This indicates 
that, in the liberal West, the subject of law, the citizen, has the autonomy to express 
her/his identity only when those identities can be assimilated into 
Christian/secular/liberal understanding of ‘secular’ and ‘religious’. As I have argued, the 
inscription of women’s body into the homogeneity of western societies has been set 
through an exercise of a centralized sovereign power in order to control the public 
sphere through regulatory mechanisms that ‘normalize’ and ‘naturalize’ the private life 
of its subjects.989 In fact, by giving a fixed definition of the practice of veiling, the 
sovereign acts as a prince, a theologian active in the recognition, definition, and 
exclusion of symbols in the public sphere through the establishment of a fundamental 
dichotomy between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, which underlies every 
democracy. For Schmitt, in order to maintain unity and homogeneity, the sovereign 
needs to create a dichotomy between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ and to eliminate the 
latter.990 This (imagined) dichotomy, as Mancini argues, is nowadays symbolized by 
(Muslim) women’s bodies, which emerge as mere carriers of a static tradition and not as 
subjects of heterogeneous cultures with different concepts of freedom and agency: 
“[European legal decisions over the female headscarf] reflect the desire of majorities to 
re-establish clear boundaries between the self and the other, to avoid dialogue and 
compromise with the other, and to reduce the visibility of the latter, in order to guard 
the [supposedly] homogeneous character of the public sphere.”991 
 
In this sense, the western obsession with the veil reveals not only how identity and 
inequalities are structured and reproduced in western/liberal/secular societies,992 but 
also that the veil plays a crucial role in defining both ‘western/secular’ and 
‘eastern/Islamist’ identity.993 In fact, “the authoritative status of 
representations/discourses is dependent on the appropriate production of other 
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representations/discourses; the two are intrinsically and not just temporally 
connected.”994 This means that the production of knowledge about the ‘other’ is 
simultaneously the production of knowledge about the self: “given that knowing is a 
way of making, this knowledge-production will always be accompanied by competing 
epistemologies: […] such an ongoing rhetorical contest is beheld upon the very fabric of 
the hijab.”995 For Bleiker “the inevitable difference between the represented and its 
representation is the very location of politics”:996 political representation, as well as 
other visual representations, does not depend upon a prior/pre-given truth, but on who 
gives meaning to a specific image, symbol or performative act. The symbology attached 
to the practice of veiling has a precise political meaning and discloses several 
intertwined issues: the fragility and paradoxes of a liberal and secular polity which 
claims to safeguard minority rights but at the end is unable to uphold the values it 
professes; the universalism of western (and Islamist) concepts which hides an inability 
to accommodate different subjectivities and leads to the exclusion of many women 
from the public space respectively by veiling/unveiling them; and the tactic of imputing 
a fixed, monolithic, law-bound subjective identity  through the force of a positivized law 
in order to maintain the unity and homogeneity of a ‘people’.  
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